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General introduction
Pain is a well recognizable and familiar experience to all human beings. In most cases, 
pain takes the form of an acute episode that temporarily disables individuals in their daily functioning, 
and that cures spontaneously within a short period of time, or after effective medical treatment has 
taken place. Nevertheless, there is a substantial part of the population that has to contend with 
daily recurrent pain complaints for a prolonged period of time. Although the prerequisite for pain 
duration has been debated, there is now general consensus that pain complaints lasting longer 
than three months can be considered  ‘chronic’. Apart from chronic pain complaints originating 
from evident physical or organic causes (e.g., cancer pain), a considerable part of the chronic pain 
patients suffers from non-specific pain complaints. That is, they experience pain even though no 
objective or somatic cause can be detected, or they suffer from persisting pain complaints after the 
somatic cause has been effectively treated. Non-specific chronic pain is predominantly localized 
at the musculoskeletal system, affecting the lower back, the lower- and upper limbs (knee, elbow, 
leg), the neck, and the shoulders (Kerssens, Verhaak, Bartelds, Sorbi, & Bensing, 2002; Verhaak, 
Kerssens, Dekker, Sorbi, & Bensing, 1998). An epidemiological study in a Dutch community sample 
demonstrated that about 75% of the general population indicates to have experienced pain at 
the musculoskeletal apparatus in the past period of twelve months. Moreover, for 45% of this 
group, these pain complaints persisted for longer then three months (Picavet & Schouten, 2003). 
In another study, examining the prevalence of low back pain and associated disability in the Belgian 
population, 41,8% of the respondents indicated to have experienced low back pain for at least one 
day in the past period of six months. Moreover, for 8,2 % of this group, low back pain was seriously 
impeding daily functioning (Goubert, Crombez, & De Bourdeaudhuij, 2004). Although the group 
of chronic patients constitutes a relatively small proportion of the general population (5-10 %), this 
group is responsible for a large proportion of health-care costs and levels of work absenteeism in 
western societies (e.g., Waddell, 2004). In addition, chronic pain is known to have an enormous 
impact on the personal and social relations of the individual in pain (Morley & Eccleston, 2004; 
Sullivan, Adams, & Sullivan, 2004). 
Given the detrimental effect of chronic pain on the individual and his or her surrounding, 
research into the factors and mechanisms that contribute to the aetiology, the persistence, and 
the effective management of chronic pain complaints has known a significant boost in the latest 
decades. This burgeoning research interest has amongst others resulted in the identification of 
a number of psychological factors and mechanisms that may predispose persons toward, or 
conversely protect them against the development and persistence of chronic pain complaints. 
The current thesis contributes to this line of research by zooming in on the specific contribution of 
some of these proposed vulnerability and resilience factors. Consequently, the main and overall 
objective of this thesis is to add to the understanding of factors, mechanisms, and processes that 
constitute a mediating or moderating role in pain and pain-related disability. Before introducing the 
exact research questions of this thesis, this first chapter will start with a brief overview of some of 
the most prevalent theoretical models of pain as they have been formulated throughout history. 
Next, the theoretical background against which this thesis has been conducted will be presented 
by introducing some central concepts and factors underlying the studies in this thesis. Last and 
concordantly with the outline of this thesis, the main research questions of the individual studies in 
this thesis will be presented. 
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Important	theoretICal	approaChes	to	paIn
Given the perpetual and universal nature of pain, various scholars have attempted 
to understand and explain the experience of pain throughout history. Over 2000 years ago, 
the illustrious philosopher Aristotle (384 vC – 322vC) conceptualized pain as a purely affective 
experience, while conversely, the 17th century philosopher Descartes proposed pain as a purely 
sensory and mechanistic principle, that was not at all subject to emotional or rational input (Benini 
& DeLeo, 1999; Bonica, 1991; Gardiner, Metcalf, & Beebe Center, 1937). Building on Descartes’ 
ideas, a biomedical perspective on pain has predominated the conceptualization of pain for quite 
some time. In short, the biomedical perspective considers pain as the pure consequence of tissue 
damage, and following this perspective pain relief can only be the result of medicinal or surgical 
treatment. However, from a biomedical point of view, several robust observations regarding pain 
are difficult to explain. As such, it cannot provide an adequate explanation for the presence of pain 
complaints when no objective injury can be detected, or conversely, for the abstinence of pain 
complaints even though physical injury is clearly present (e.g., Jensen et al., 1994). Furthermore, the 
biomedical perspective cannot account for observations of the so-called phantom limb pain, where 
pain is experienced in missing body parts (Giummarra, Gibson, Georgiou Karistianis, & Bradshaw, 
2007). Most importantly, the biomedical perspective cannot explain why such large inter-individual 
differences exist in the way in which persons experience, react to, and cope with a pain experience. 
Hence, it gradually became clear that in order to gain a thorough understanding of pain and its 
consequences, the influence of other than purely sensory factors had to be taken into consideration. 
 With the postulation of the ‘Gate Control’ theory, Melzack and Wall (1965) advocated 
the importance of interactive effects between psychological factors and physiological factors in 
experience of pain. In this theory, a ‘modulating gate mechanism’ was assumed to operate in the 
dorsal horn of the spinal cord that allowed for the ascending transmission of information from the 
periphery to the brain to be influenced by the descending transmission of information from the brain 
(Melzack & Wall, 1965). Briefly, the ‘Gate Control Theory’ posits that each particular pain experience 
results from the integration of purely sensory information with cognitive and affective information in 
the central nervous system. Psychological processes can thus influence and modulate reactions 
to painful sensations. At present, the biopsychosocial perspective on pain is widely accepted as 
the theoretical framework for the understanding and treatment of chronic pain disorders (Turk 
& Flor, 1999; Turk & Gatchel, 2002; Waddel, 2004). The biopsychosocial model postulates that 
pain results from the dynamic interaction between physiological, psychological, and social factors. 
Although these three components of the model are strongly interconnected, they show small 
content overlap, since different processes are assumed in each individual component of the model 
(Turk & Gatchel, 2002; Waddel, 2004). For example, it is easy to understand that factors that exert 
an influence on the biomedical aspects of pain, for example an injury, are different from factors that 
exert an influence on the daily functioning of individuals in pain, for example the affective evaluation 
of the sensory experience. In this multidimensional approach to pain, pain is conceived as a 
unique experience that can have divergent outcomes in terms of illness, disability and suffering. 
The major benefit of the biopsychosocial perspective concerns its flexibility in allowing a broad 
variety of factors to influence and determine each individual pain experience simultaneously. Due 
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General introduction
to its general nature, however, the model does not entail a specific operationalization of the exact 
factors and processes that are subsumed in each of the individual components. It goes without 
saying that the psychological component alone already embraces a broad range of factors and 
mechanisms (i.e., behavioural, emotional, psychophysiological, and cognitive) that might prove 
useful in determining how an individual experiences pain, whether or not acute pain will persist, 
and whether the individual in pain will respond to treatment. Over time, several specific explanatory 
models of pain have been developed under the biopsychosocial umbrella, in which the role of 
one or more crucial psychological factors is emphasized. Of these models, the so-called ‘fear-
avoidance models’ have proven to be very fruitful in offering an explanation for the perseverance of 
chronic pain complaints and the transition from acute to chronic pain.
fear-avoiDanCe moDelS of ChroniC pain
With the introduction of a ‘fear-avoidance model of exaggerated pain perception’ in 
1983, Lethem and colleagues were the first to reserve a critical role for fear of pain and avoidance 
behaviour in the explanation of perpetuating pain complaints in the absence of organic pathology 
(Lethem, Slade, Troup, & Bentley, 1983). Some years later, Philips (1987) emphasized the influence 
of cognitions on avoidance of pain. From that point forward, various cognitive fear-avoidance 
models have been developed, commonly referred to as contemporary fear-avoidance models, 
in which pain disability is conceived as the result of a vicious process that is determined by the 
interaction between cognitions and behaviour (Asmundson, Norton, & Norton, 1999; Vlaeyen, 
Kole Snijders, Rotteveel, Ruesink, & et al., 1995; Waddell, Newton, Henderson, Somerville, & et 
al., 1993). Subtle differences aside, contemporary fear-avoidance models share the same basic 
tenets, and these can be easily understood from the integrated model that is illustrated below 
(see Figure 1; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Upon the initial perception of pain, individuals will assign a 
certain meaning and purpose to the painful experience that is based upon current expectations 
regarding the pain and prior learning history. Although the majority of individuals will evaluate the 
pain experience as undesirable and unpleasant at this stage, most persons will not perceive it 
as an extreme threat or an insurmountable catastrophe, and as such, they will proactively and 
gradually confront their pain, and resume their daily activities until full recovery is accomplished. 
Nevertheless, a minority of individuals assigns a catastrophic meaning to the painful experience by 
exaggerating the possible meaning and consequences of the pain. This catastrophic interpretation 
does then lead to pain-related fear (fear of pain, fear of movement, fear of (re)injury), which in its 
turn initiates the avoidance of potential painful activities and hypervigilance for potential signals of 
additional pain and bodily harm. As such, a vicious and self-perpetuating spiral is activated with 
avoidance of more and more (daily) activities, leading to functional disability and possibly also 
to social isolation and depression. In addition, physical deconditioning and depression may fuel 
the fear-avoidance cycle by increasing pain intensity and increasing the fearful appraisal of and 
selective attention to pain. 
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  Figure 1. The Fear – Avoidance Model (Adapted from Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000) 
By the postulation of pain-related fear, pain catastrophizing, and avoidance behaviour 
as essential elements, fear-avoidance models have offered a fruitful framework within which 
the development and maintenance of persisting pain complaints can be understood. Empirical 
support for the fear-avoidance model has been found within the area of chronic low back pain, 
osteoarthritis, neck pain, and chronic headache (e.g., Fritz, George, & Delitto, 2001; Leeuw et al., 
2007; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000; Waddell et al., 1993). A multitude of studies in pain patients, but 
also in healthy controls possessing elevated levels of pain-related fear and pain catastrophizing, 
have consistently demonstrated the association between both constructs and (1) dysfunctional 
behavioural responses to pain: for example heightened disability, lower activity levels, lower 
pain tolerance, reduced endurance of pain, escape and avoidance behaviour; (2) dysfunctional 
subjective responses to pain: for example heightened pain intensity levels, more distress because 
of the pain; and (3) dysfunctional cognitive responses to pain: for example hypervigilance towards 
signals of pain, attentional interference by pain (e.g., Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens, & Eelen, 
1998b; Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens, Van Houdenhove, & Van Den Broeck, 1999; Denison, 
Asenlof, & Lindberg, 2004; McCracken, Gross, Aikens, & Carnrike, 1996; McMurtry, 2005; McNeil 
& Rainwater, 1998; Peters, Vlaeyen, & Kunnen, 2002; Severeijns, Vlaeyen, van den Hout, & Weber, 
2001; Sullivan et al., 2001; Sullivan, Lynch, & Clark, 2005; Sullivan, Stanish, Waite, Sullivan, & 
Tripp, 1998; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). 
Although fear-avoidance models offer a good framework for explaining the transition from 
acute to chronic pain, they do not describe the pathways to entering this self-perpetuating negative 
spiral of pain in the first place. In other words: it remains unclear	why	certain people are inclined to 
respond to physical threat in an anxious, catastrophic, and avoidant manner, whereas others do 
Depression
Disability
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Pain related fear
Hypervigilance
Avoidance
Injury Recovery
Confrontation
No fear
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Catastrophyzing
+ -
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General introduction
not. In order to provide an answer to this question, it has been proposed that specific personality 
characteristics might make persons more or less prone to making these maladaptive responses. 
At present, an extensive body of literature is already available on factors that are considered to 
instigate dysfunctional responses to pain, including personality traits, affective factors, cognitive 
factors, and psychophysiological factors. To a much smaller extent, research has proposed factors 
that can exert a positive influence on the management of pain, thereby possible protecting persons 
against developing chronic pain. Providing a detailed overview of all subsumed vulnerability 
and resilience factors would exceed the scope of this dissertation significantly. Therefore, this 
introductory chapter will be limited to the discussion of only those factors that constitute a central 
role in the current thesis.
negatIve	emotIonal	personalIty	traIts
Within the biopsychosocial perspective, pain is not only defined as a sensory experience, 
but also as an emotional one. The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) has formulated 
the following definition of pain: ‘An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with 
actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage’ (Merskey & Bugduk, 
1994). Congruently with findings in other emotional disorders (e.g., anxiety, depression), it has 
been proposed that negative emotional factors, more specifically anxiety-related factors, fulfil an 
important role in the way in which pain is perceived, interpreted and responded to (Lang & Craske, 
1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Öhman, 2000). The link between pain and anxiety is adaptive 
from an evolutionary point of view, since a ‘healthy fearfulness for pain’ protects individuals against 
potential tissue damage (Öhman, 2000). As such, individuals will be reluctant to put their hands 
on a hot plate, or to grab the sharp blade of a knife with their bare hands because they fear the 
pain, injury, and disability that they anticipate to be associated with these actions. Nevertheless, 
as already described in the preceding section, the exaggerated fearfulness of pain and putative 
consequences of pain constitute critical factors in provoking the transition from acute to chronic 
pain (e.g., Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). 
In addition to pain-specific fear constructs, more general and trait-like anxiety factors 
(i.e., general negative personality traits: negative affectivity and trait anxiety, and fundamental fears: 
anxiety sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity) have been proposed as contributing factors to the 
exacerbation of acute pain episodes and the development of chronic pain (Hadjistavropoulos, 
Asmundson, & Kowalyk, 2004; Keefe, Rumble, Scipio, Giordano, & Perri, 2004; Keogh & 
Asmundson, 2004). More precisely, it is assumed that elevated levels of these traits might make 
persons more prone to respond fearfully and catastrophically to pain, and as such contribute 
indirectly to the onset and maintenance of chronic pain. 
The association between negative affectivity, trait anxiety and chronic pain has been 
demonstrated in several studies in both clinical and healthy populations. Both negative affectivity 
and trait anxiety are conceived as the general, stable, and trait-like tendency to view the world in a 
negative way and to respond fearfully to a broad range of situations (Clark & Watson, 1991; Lilienfeld, 
Turner, & Jacob, 1993). Heightened levels of both traits were found to be related to increased 
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pain intensity, increased discomfort and disability by the pain, hypervigilance for internal bodily 
sensations, and less adequate coping with and perceived control over pain (Keogh & Asmundson, 
2004; Stegen, Van Diest, Van de Woestijne, & Van den Bergh, 2001). Furthermore, a large body 
of research in both clinical and healthy populations is supportive of the role of anxiety sensitivity in 
determining dysfunctional responses to pain (e.g., Asmundson, Wright, & Hadjistavropoulos, 2000). 
Anxiety Sensitivity is commonly defined as the fear of anxiety-related symptoms and sensations 
that arises from the belief that these sensations are precursors of physical, social, or psychological 
harm (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986), and was originally conceived as a risk factor 
for panic disorder (Clark, 1986; Cox, 1996; Reiss, 1991; Teachman, 2005). Nevertheless, the 
sensitivity for somatic sensations that characterizes AS has instigated the examination of its role in 
the context of pain as well (Asmundson et al., 2000; Stewart & Asmundson, 2006). Hence, elevated 
levels of anxiety sensitivity were found associated with increased disability by pain, increased 
medication use, decreased tolerance for pain, and negative cognitive biases for pain-related and 
health threatening stimuli (e.g., (Asmundson, Wright, Norton, & Veloso, 2001; Greenberg & Burns, 
2003; Keogh & Cochrane, 2002; Norton & Asmundson, 2004; Stewart & Asmundson, 2006). 
Anxiety sensitivity has been proposed to constitute one of three fundamental fears – together 
with the fear of negative evaluation and injury/illness sensitivity (Reiss, 1991; Taylor, 1993). These 
three fundamental fears are assumed to underlie the common fears and psychopathology that 
we encounter in our daily society (e.g., fear of spiders, blood-phobia, social phobia) (Reiss, 1991; 
Taylor, 1993). Unlike negative affectivity and trait anxiety, the fundamental fears are assumed to 
be more specifically related to affective responses to those situations that are congruent with the 
specific content or object of each fear. As is already indicated in its name, the fear of negative 
evaluation refers to the heightened sensitivity and fearfulness for social evaluative situations and 
rejection. This latter fear is assumed to constitute a risk factor within the development of social fears 
and social phobia predominantly, and is assumed to possess less relevance within the prediction 
and development of chronic pain. Injury/illness Sensitivity, on the other hand, is conceived as the 
fear of getting injured or becoming seriously ill in the future (Reiss, 1991; Taylor, 1993). Starting 
from this conceptualisation, this factor might serve a particularly good candidate to consider for 
its role in the onset and persistence of chronic pain. Nevertheless, contrasting the considerable 
amount of attention that has been devoted to studying the influence of AS to pain and pain-related 
disability, the study of this second putative important fundamental fear, injury/illness sensitivity, has 
been largely neglected in pain research. The putative value of studying the role of IS in the onset 
and persistence of chronic pain complaints has as such been limited to the sparse direct or indirect 
acknowledgement of this research gap by some authors (e.g., Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Reiss, 
1991; Taylor, 1993). 
The growing body of research on the contribution of individual anxiety constructs to pain, 
in combination with observations of significant correlations and putative content overlap between 
some of these constructs have stressed the need for an integrative view on the way in which these 
individual constructs diverge from, and relate to one another. To satisfy this need, a theoretical 
framework, taking the form of a hierarchical tree has been proposed that incorporates all the nega-
tive personality constructs that are assumed relevant for pain, while conceptualizing the subsumed 
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General introduction
relation between them (see Figure 2; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). In this model, the general nega-
tive traits, the fundamental fears, and the pain specific fear constructs are incorporated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 2. Representation of the hierarchical model as proposed by Lilienfeld et al. (1993), and the modified hierarchical model for  
  
pain (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). The constructs assumed relevant for pain-related fear and anxiety are printed in bold. 
a ConCeptual theoretiCal framework: a hierarChiCal moDel of negative 
emotional ConStruCtS
According to Watson and Clark (1992), a hierarchical model requires that both general 
and specific factors influence the traits in the hierarchy. These authors proposed a two-level 
hierarchical model in which content-specific negative emotions (fear, guilt, hostility, and sadness) 
existed as covarying, yet distinguishable lower-order factors under the general trait construct NA 
(Watson & Clark, 1992). Based on the ideas of Watson & Clark, Lilienfeld and colleagues (1993) 
have proposed a more elaborated hierarchical model of negative emotional constructs, hereby 
distinguishing between levels of trait specificity of the incorporated constructs (see Figure 2). In a 
hierarchical model, the constructs that reside at the lower levels of the hierarchy are understood as 
specific lower-order constructs that subordinate to more general higher-order constructs residing 
in the higher levels of the hierarchy (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Lilienfeld et al., 1993; Watson & 
Clark, 1992). Hence, constructs at the lowest nodes of the hierarchy are assumed to have a very 
direct and specific influence on emotional-related problems, whereas constructs that reside at the 
top of the hierarchical structure will be more broadly and generalized related to a variety of problems. 
Negative 
affectivity
Trait Anxiety Agression Alienation
Fear of Negative 
Evaluation
Injury/illness 
sensitivity Anxiety sensitivity
Pain Catastrophizing Fear of pain Mental concerns Physical Concerns Social concerns
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Another assumption of a hierarchical model is that each individual construct will have variance in 
common with the higher-order construct that it subordinates to, as well as with the neighbouring 
constructs that reside at the same hierarchical level. Nevertheless, each construct is assumed to 
possess unique predictive variance as well, and as such, they are conceived as distinguishable 
from one another (Lilienfeld et al., 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992). Lilienfeld et al. (1993) proposed the 
hierarchical model as a putative solution for the ongoing debate in the literature on the ‘difference’ 
between the constructs of TA and AS in their predictive value of anxiety and anxiety disorders (see 
Lilienfeld, Turner, & Jacob, 1998; McNally, 1996; Reiss, 1997), for details on this controversy). 
In adopting a hierarchical structure that contains higher (TA) and lower-order (AS) factors, AS is 
proposed to provide specific information (i.e., tendency to react anxious to one’s own anxiety 
sensations and symptoms) that cannot be accounted for by the more general higher-order factor 
of trait anxiety (i.e., tendency to react anxiously to a broad range of anxiety provoking situations), 
even though both constructs are conceptually closely related. 
The hierarchical model as proposed by Lilienfeld et al. (1993) can easily be adapted to 
the area of chronic pain, requiring the addition of specific pain-relevant fear constructs at the lowest 
level of the hierarchy only. As demonstrated in Figure 2, this modified hierarchical model situates 
the most pain-specific constructs, i.e., fear of pain and pain catastrophizing, at the lowest level 
of the model, directly under the higher order factor injury/illness sensitivity. Injury/illness sensitivity 
and anxiety sensitivity are assumed to co-exist at the same hierarchical model under the higher-
order construct trait anxiety, which is at its turn subordinated to negative affectivity (Keogh & 
Asmundson, 2004). 
The hierarchical model as proposed here has never been formally tested yet, and constitutes a 
merely conceptual organisational structure, that helps researchers to understand relations bet-
ween the various constructs. In this light, it should be noted that this model does not intend to 
be definite with respect to the constructs that it includes and the exact placement of constructs 
within each level (see also Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). 
CognItIve	faCtors:	an	InformatIon	proCessIng	approaCh
According to the cognitive behavioural approach to pain, emotional and behavioural 
responses to pain are to a great extent determined by the cognitive appraisal and interpretation of a 
situation (Gatchel, Peng, Peters, Fuchs, & Turk, in press; Jensen, Romano, Turner, Good, & Wald, 1999; 
Turk & Okifuji, 2002). Following this perspective, cognitive mechanisms and processes are assumed 
to have a substantial impact on the manifestation of maladaptive responses to physical threat, and 
might mediate the relation between responses to threat and the presence of pain-related anxieties. 
 At present, the most dominant view in experimental cognitive psychology, the information-
processing perspective, offers a good framework to elucidate the structure and function of 
cognitive processes that guide subsequent behaviour. One way to gain insight in these cognitive 
processes is by asking persons directly about their thoughts, feelings, and attitudes, and so forth. 
This direct assessment method relies on self-report measures, for example questionnaires or 
interviews, which are commonly referred to as explicit measures. However, self-report measures are 
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known to possess several drawbacks, including a high susceptibility to social desirable response 
tendencies, response bias, and conscious consideration that affect responses (De Houwer, 2001; 
Fazio & Olson, 2003; Paulhus, 1998). Moreover, it has been suggested that persons only have 
limited access to, and might thus not always be capable to accurately report, their own mental 
representations and processes (Asendorpf, 2007; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). As such, 
it can be questioned whether self-reported cognitions are reflective of the genuine fundamental 
cognitive processes that are subsumed to guide behaviour. To overcome these problems, 
automatized testing paradigms have been developed. These paradigms aim to assess cognitive 
processes indirectly; that is, by inferring them from behavioural responses (e.g., reaction times, 
reading times) within a specific context (Asendorpf, 2007; Fazio & Olson, 2003). These so-called 
implicit measures do not only provide a more appropriate measure of the process of interest, they 
can also provide a more reliable insight in the temporal pattern of cognitive processes. As such, 
they allow the study of cognitive processes in the early stages of information processing, referred 
to as automatic processes, as well as the study of the strategic or controlled processes that occur 
in the later stages of information processing (McNally, 1995; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In short, 
automatic processes are conceived as largely unconscious and involuntarily, requiring a minimum 
of processing capacity, and being relatively difficult to regulate, whilst controlled processes are 
conceived as conscious and voluntarily, requiring considerable processing capacity, and being 
more easily to adjust (Beck & Clark, 1997; McNally, 1995; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Automatic 
processes (implicit cognitions) are assumed to predict spontaneous, reflexive behaviour, whereas 
controlled processes (explicit cognitions) are assumed to steer controlled, reflective behavioural 
patterns predominantly (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; McNally, 1995). 
As such, both automatic and controlled cognitions can exert separate, conjoint, competitive, 
or interactive influences on perceptions, actions, and judgements (Nosek, 2007). For example, 
implicitly and explicitly measured cognitions (e.g., implicit and explicit assessments of self-concept 
of being shy) have been found differentially predictive of divergent components of one behaviour 
(i.e., spontaneous shyness behaviour and controlled shy behaviour) (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mucke, 
2002). Other studies have demonstrated that explicitly measured attitudes (e.g., self-reported fear 
of spiders) can diverge from implicitly measured attitudes (negative associations towards spider 
pictures) (e.g., de Jong, Hout van den, Rietbroek, & Huijding, 2003; Huijding & De Jong, 2005). In 
addition, implicit attitudes have been found to possess explanatory value over and above this of 
explicit attitudes for certain problem behaviours, for example substance abuse (de Jong, Wiers, van 
den Braak, & Huijding, 2007; Huijding & de Jong, 2006). Taken together, the consideration of both 
implicit and explicit processes in the prediction of any behaviour or personality construct, so also 
pain, can contribute to a more thorough and complete understanding of the various components 
that constitute this behaviour or this personality construct.
information proCeSSing approaCh to pSyChopathology
Information processing approaches to psychopathology stipulate that the faulty 
processing of information, commonly referred to as cognitive bias, contributes to the onset 
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and maintenance of psychopathology (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). More 
specifically, individuals’ negative affective state or specific concerns are thought to be associated 
with favouring the processing of information that is congruent to these affective states and concerns, 
and this selective processing of information is then assumed to guide subsequent behaviour (Beck 
& Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1988). Moreover, since many of the irrational behaviours that are observed in psychopathology are 
known to be largely involuntarily (e.g., compulsions, panic attacks, addictions, etc.), it has been 
suggested that automatic processes in particular will steer these irrational behaviours (McNally, 
Hornig, Hoffman, & Han, 1999). At present, it is well established that cognitive biases play a 
major role in the aetiology and exacerbation of emotional and affective disorders. Cognitive models 
of emotional disorders state that a selective bias towards threat and the negative characterizes 
anxious and depressed individuals, and constitutes the core difference between individuals with 
and without anxiety and depression (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews 
& MacLeod, 1994). Given the conceptualisation of pain as an emotional disorder, the same 
cognitive processes that operate in anxiety have been suggested assumed to apply to the area 
of chronic pain as well (McKellar, Clark, & Shriner, 2003; Pincus & Morley, 2001). Hence, cognitive 
models of anxiety might serve a useful framework for understanding the occurrence of cognitive 
biases in the context of pain as well. 
In 1997, Beck and Clark have proposed a three-stage model of cognitive processing 
to clarify the occurrence of cognitive bias in anxiety, in which the sequential stages are described 
that are presumed to characterize the processing of threatening stimuli. Rather than holding on 
to a pure distinction between biases occurring at either the automatic or the controlled level of 
information processing (McNally, 1995), Beck and Clark (1997) advocate in their model that cognitive 
processing biases will be characterized by a mixture between automatic and strategic processing 
in each stage of information processing. The first stage of this model, the initial registration phase, 
involves the rapid, instantaneous, and automatic recognition of a stimulus and is referred to as the 
orienting mode. This mode is assumed to be entirely automatic, without any option for elaborative 
or strategic processing. The orienting mode functions as an ‘early detection warning system’ 
that aids the individual to allocate attention to putative threat. As such, this stage of information 
processing optimizes our chances of survival by signalling severe threat instantaneously. 
The early detection of a threatening stimulus will then activate the second stage of 
information processing, referred to as the phase of immediate preparation. This stage is directed 
at minimizing danger and maximizing safety, and includes autonomic responses (fight/flight 
responses), behavioural responses (escape/avoidance), primal thinking (narrowing of attention 
towards the threat), feelings of fear, and hypervigilance for threat cues. As such, this stage is 
assumed to guide a cognitive/behavioural/affective/physiological response pattern very rapidly 
and automatically. This stage of processing allows for initial semantic analysis of the stimulus or a 
primary threat appraisal that ensures that processing priority is given to the detected threatening 
stimulus. Nevertheless, this second stage is still considered to be largely automatic, involuntarily 
and occurring outside awareness. Finally, in the last stage of information processing, the secondary 
elaboration phase, elaborative processing of the meaning and consequences of the threatening 
information will take place. This stage involves the activation of other related schemas that 
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represent current concerns of the individual, and the reflective consideration of the meaning and 
context within which the threat occurs. Furthermore, the secondary elaboration phase involves the 
evaluation of possible coping resources that are available to the individual as well. Two important 
components of the secondary elaboration phase are excessive worrying and the search for safety 
signals. Excessive worrying is one of the core cognitive features of anxiety and is understood 
as an elaborative process that results from the activation of the primal threat mode and other 
more constructive modes of thinking. Excessive worrying can lead to an escalation of anxiety or 
pain because this process is often dominated by primal mode thinking that is actively directed 
at minimizing danger and maximizing safety, as such blocking off further constructive modes of 
processing. The search for safety signals refers to the strategic and elaborative search for means 
that can reduce the anxiety or pain. As such, the search for safety signals is aimed at counteracting 
the processes that were activated in the primal mode. Although the search for safety signals can 
effectively reduce anxiety or pain in the short term, it often results in unsuccessful attempts in 
the light of maintaining safety (e.g., avoidance, medication, coping, finding supports with others), 
leading to chronic suffering in the long term. 
Congruent with the assumed orientation towards threat in anxious and depressed 
individuals, pain-related anxiety is assumed to be associated with a selective cognitive bias for 
personally relevant-threatening stimuli (i.e., stimuli that relate to pain, injury, illness, health, bodily 
sensations). This selective processing of information might incline persons towards maladaptive 
responses that contribute to increased pain and disability (McKellar et al., 2003; Pincus & Morley, 
2001). Following the three-stage cognitive model, the detection of pain-related information in the 
orienting mode will lead to the activation of a primal threat appraisal that instigates a cognitive/
affective/physiological/behavioural pattern of responses very rapidly, automatically, unintentionally, 
and involuntarily. Further elaborative processing of the threatening information in the secondary 
elaboration phase might then strengthen, or counteract dysfunctional response patterns through 
processes of excessive worrying and the search for safety signals. 
In sum, the three-stage information-processing model assumes both automatic and strategic pro-
cesses to be involved in cognitive biases in emotional disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997). Following 
this, both the primary threat appraisal (as occurring in the second stage of information processing) 
and the secondary elaboration (as occurring in the third stage of information processing) require at-
tention in treatment approaches. More specifically, Beck and Clark (1997) suggest that successful 
treatment approaches will have to aim at reducing processes that occur in the primal threat mode 
and augmenting functional, positive elaborative processing in the secondary elaboration phase.
Cognitive biaS anD ChroniC pain: favouring the proCeSSing of pain-
relateD information
Studying cognitive biases in the context of pain at both an automatic and a strategic 
level, as a function of pain and as a function of pain-related anxieties, can contribute significantly 
to our understanding of pain. Gathering knowledge on these processes and their temporal pattern 
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provides (1) theoretical insight in the fundamental processes that underlie dysfunctional pain-
instigating behaviours, (2) information on the functionality of specific cognitive mechanisms as 
vulnerability factors within the aetiology of pain, and (3) information on the aspects of cognition 
that have to be rectified by treatment paradigms aimed at pain reduction and prevention of the 
development of chronic pain. To date, various studies have demonstrated the occurrence of 
cognitive processing bias within the context of pain in three main areas: (1) memory biases (2) 
attention biases, and (3) interpretation biases (McKellar et al., 2003; Pincus & Morley, 2001). 
Memory bias. With respect to memory bias, both explicit and implicit memory tasks 
have provided robust evidence for memory bias in chronic pain patients. This memory bias is 
characterized by better recall for pain-related, injury-related, and health-related stimuli in chronic 
pain patients in comparison to healthy controls (e.g., Edwards, Pearce, Collett, & Pugh, 1992; 
Pincus, Pearce, McClelland, & Isenberg, 1995). Nevertheless, substantial evidence on the relation 
between memory bias for pain-related information and individual pain-related anxiety levels is still 
lacking. Therefore, it is yet unclear whether the observed memory bias forms a mere by-product 
of the state of pain, or whether it might serve a latent vulnerability mechanism that instigates 
dysfunctional responses to the threat of pain in anxious individuals even so (Pincus & Morley, 
2001). Unlike memory biases, attentional and interpretation biases have both been studied as 
a function of the state of pain and as a function of pain-related anxieties. To date, attention is 
probably the most extensively studied cognitive process in relation to pain. 
Attention bias. Most studies on the detection of attention bias towards pain and 
cues of pain have relied on experimental automatized testing paradigms such as the emotional 
Stroop task and the dot-probe task. To put it simple, these tasks present both pain-related 
stimuli (pictures or verbal stimuli) and non-pain-related stimuli to participants, and require fast 
responses to certain features of the presented stimuli that are irrelevant to the valence of the 
stimuli (e.g., presentation colour in emotional Stroop, presentation location in dot probe). Slowed 
down (Stroop) or facilitated (dot probe) responses to the pain-related stimuli are then assumed 
to reflect attention bias. Although some studies found support for attention bias in pain patients 
using these paradigms, these results proved to be difficult to replicate in other studies and seemed 
to depend on the specific task and the exact type of stimulus material that were used to assess 
the bias (i.e., sensory pain words, affective pain words, pictorial stimuli) (Asmundson, Kuperos, & 
Norton, 1997; Asmundson, Carleton, & Ekong, 2005; Roelofs, Peters, Fassaert, & Vlaeyen, 2005; 
Roelofs, Peters, Zeegers, & Vlaeyen, 2002). In healthy volunteers possessing elevated levels of 
pain-related anxiety (i.e., pain-related fear, anxiety sensitivity), results on the occurrence of attention 
bias towards pain-related stimuli showed more consistency (Asmundson et al., 1997; Asmundson 
et al., 2005; Keogh & Cochrane, 2002; Keogh, Dillon, Georgiou, & Hunt, 2001; Keogh, Ellery, 
Hunt, & Hannent, 2001), although failures in replicating these findings have been reported as 
well (e.g., Roelofs, Peters, van der Zijden, Thielen, & Vlaeyen, 2003; Roelofs, Peters, & Vlaeyen, 
2003). The anomaly of more consistent findings in healthy persons and inconsistent findings in 
pain patients might suggest that the test paradigms were not difficult enough for pain patients 
who have to allocate their attentional resources to the continuous presence of actual pain already 
(Pincus & Morley, 2001). In a similar vein, Asmundson et al. (2005) postulated that the use of 
sensory and affective pain words as threatening stimulus material might fail in assessing attention 
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bias in patients because these stimuli are not threatening enough for pain patients, in contrast to 
healthy persons who are not yet suffering from persistent pain. Altogether, emotional Stroop and 
dot probe paradigms might suffer from low ecological validity due to the use of verbal and pictorial 
stimulus material. Several studies in which an ecological more appropriate paradigm (i.e., the 
primary task paradigm) has been used, have consistently and robustly demonstrated the attention 
demanding properties of pain, and the interruptive affect that pain can have on the allocation of 
attention to other tasks (e.g., Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1998a; Crombez et al., 
1998b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Peters et al., 2002). In the primary task paradigm, the effect 
of the administration of electrical pain stimuli on the performance of a simple cognitive task (e.g., 
distinguishing high and low pitch tones) is examined. The resulting interruptive effect of pain on 
attention has proven to be amplified by the intensity, novelty, unpredictability, and threat value of 
the pain stimulus (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). Moreover, attentional interference has been found 
to be especially pronounced in persons high in pain catastrophizing and fear of pain (Carleton, 
Asmundson, & Taylor, 2005; Crombez et al., 1998a, 1998b). Based on this latter line of research, it 
can thus be concluded that there is substantial evidence that pain demands attention, both in pain 
patients, but also in healthy individuals possessing elevated levels of specific pain-related fears. In 
addition, other studies have demonstrated that attention shifts to pain and pain-related cues and, 
once detected, pain is difficult to disengage from (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, 
& Wiersema, 2006; Van Damme, Crombez, & Eccleston, 2004). In sum, it can be concluded that 
attention biases are important to be considered in the onset and exacerbation of maladaptive 
response to pain, although further clarification is necessary on the precise structure and impact of 
this process in relation to maladaptive responses to physical threat. 
Interpretation bias. Finally, there is substantial evidence that both pain patients and 
persons with elevated levels of pain-related fear are inclined to interpret ambiguous and innocuous 
pain-related stimuli in a threatening or negative fashion (Edwards & Pearce, 1994; Pincus, Pearce, 
McClelland, Farley, & et al., 1994; Pincus, Pearce, & Perrott, 1996). Recently, Keogh and colleagues 
(Keogh, Ellery et al., 2001; Keogh, Hamid, Hamid, & Ellery, 2004) have demonstrated that negative 
interpretative bias for ambiguous situations mediated the relation between individual levels of 
anxiety sensitivity and tolerance for cold-pressor pain. Nevertheless, it should be noted that studies 
on interpretive bias in the context of pain have relied on explicit measures predominantly, using 
homophones (words with the same pronunciation, but a different spelling: e.g., dye/die; (McKellar et 
al., 2003; Pincus et al., 1994), homographs (words with the same spelling, but different meanings: 
e.g., needle; (Pincus et al., 1996), word-stem completion tasks (word stem can be completed in 
different ways: e.g., ten---: tender/tennis; (Edwards & Pearce, 1994) or interpretation questionnaires 
(e.g., Keogh, Ellery et al., 2001; Keogh et al., 2004). Consequently, these studies cannot provide 
insight in the temporal pattern of the negative interpretative thoughts. More precisely, it remains 
unclear whether the negative bias results from elaborative, constructive, integrative processes at 
the moment of responding to ambiguity (i.e., in the second elaboration stage) only, or if negative 
interpretations occur at an automatic spontaneous level already (i.e., at the primal mode stage).
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Cognitive proCeSSeS promoting aDjuStment to pain: perCeiveD Control 
anD SpeCifiC Self-effiCaCy
In addition to cognitive mechanisms assumed to influence maladaptive responses to pain, 
it is furthermore interesting to study cognitive mechanisms that might contribute to the adjustment 
to and adaptive coping with acute and chronic pain. As such, certain cognitive mechanisms or 
processes might counteract the activation of a primary threat mode, or promote adaptive functional 
processing in the elaborative phase of information processing, leading to beneficial effects on the 
pain experience and protecting against the development of chronic pain.
One cognitive construct that has been proposed as a mediator of decreased pain and 
disability is perceived control or the belief that one has at one’s disposal a response that can 
influence the aversiveness of an event (Thompson, 1981). In (chronic) pain patients, perceived 
control over pain has been found predictive of patients’ well-being and of better patient functioning 
(less depression, less disability, less interference by pain), and was found associated with increased 
activity levels, lower perceived pain severity, and increased patient satisfaction with treatment 
strategies (Jensen & Karoly, 1991; Pellino & Ward, 1998; Tan, Jensen, Robinson-Whelen, Thornby, 
& Monga, 2002). In experimental studies conducted in healthy volunteers, perceived control over 
pain has been found related to increased tolerance and prolonged endurance of experimentally 
induced pain (Arntz & Schmidt, 1989; Feldner & Hekmat, 2001). Recently, Janssen, Spinhoven, 
and Arntz (2004) demonstrated that successful control over the pain has a positive influence 
on individuals’ mood, whereas repetitive failures in controlling pain lead to increased anger and 
physiological reactivity. It seems noteworthy to mention that the idea that the pain can be controlled 
is already sufficient to achieve these beneficial effects, even when the control is not genuinely 
effective or utilized. 
A second cognitive factor that is assumed to mediate pain and disability is specific self-
efficacy. Specific self-efficacy refers to the belief one has in one’s own capability and quality to 
achieve desired outcomes using a specific task, strategy, or technique (e.g., Litt, 1988; Rokke, 
Fleming Ficek, Siemens, & Hegstad, 2004). Note that specific self-efficacy is distinguishable 
from the trait-like personality construct of generalized self-efficacy, which refers to the belief and 
confidence one has in one’s own capability to achieve desired outcomes in every day life and a 
broad range of situations (Luszczynska, Gutierrez Dona, & Schwarzer, 2005). As such, specific 
self-efficacy is situational determined and constitutes a cognitive state factor, rather than a trait 
construct. An extensive amount of studies has examined the relation between specific SE and pain 
both in clinical and non-clinical populations, demonstrating that specific SE beliefs are predictive 
of pain tolerance, pain endurance, and the degree of experienced disability by pain (Baker & 
Kirsch, 1991; Denison et al., 2004; Litt, 1988; Rokke et al., 2004; Williams & Kinney, 1991). In 
addition, prospective studies have demonstrated that confidence in one’s ability to engage in 
a post-surgical rehabilitation program and an increase in this confidence in the course of the 
programme was associated with faster recovery and better long-term outcomes (e.g., Waldrop, 
Lightsey, Ethington, Woemmel, & Coke, 2001). Studies on the relation between specific SE and 
pain have used different operationalizations of ‘specific’ SE; including the usage of medication, the 
proefschrift165x240_.indd   22 10-09-2007   10:55:24
		|23
General introduction
engagement in a pain treatment programme, the performance of relaxation techniques, or simply 
the belief that one can cope well with a specific type of pain. It might therefore be suggested that 
the operationalization of specific SE as ‘the belief in one’s ability to manage pain by the use of a 
specific strategy or technique’, can be understood as SE beliefs regarding perceived control on 
the pain experience (e.g., Arnstein, 2000; Jackson, Iezzi, Gunderson, Nagasaka, & Fritch, 2002; 
Rokke et al., 2004). Indeed, it is well acknowledged that both perceived control and specific self-
efficacy are intrinsically related to each other (Lang & Craske, 1997; Litt, 1988; Pellino & Ward, 
1998; Rokke et al., 2004). By manipulating both perceived control and specific self-efficacy beliefs 
in an experimental paradigm, Litt (1988) demonstrated that the benefits of perceived control 
over pain on pain tolerance were the greatest for those who were most confident (i.e., high self-
efficacious) that they were able to exercise this control. In a similar vein, Jensen and Karoly (1991) 
have stressed that in order to achieve a positive influence on well-being and activity levels in pain 
patients, the belief in ones personal ability to control pain is as important as the belief in the control 
strategy itself.
Since both specific self-efficacy and perceived control have proven to be susceptible to 
manipulations, it might be suggested that these cognitive factors constitute attractive candidates 
for treatment approaches to pain. 
foCus	and	outlIne	of	the	present	thesIs
The central research objective of the present thesis constitutes the examination of 
specific psychological factors for their putative vulnerability or protective role in the development 
and persistence of chronic pain. More specifically, the current thesis aims to examine several 
anxiety traits and fear constructs out of the hierarchical model as risk factors for the development 
of chronic pain, as well as underlying cognitive mechanisms that might contribute to or protect 
against the persistence of pain complaints. These main objectives will be addressed by studying 
both the independent and interactive role of these anxiety traits and cognitive mechanisms in 
relation to responses to pain or the threat of pain.
The thesis will be built up of two parts: I: the validity of conceptualizing several pain-related 
anxiety and fear constructs in a hierarchical model, and II: the role of psychological vulnerability 
factors. The hierarchical model as outlined above incorporates both anxiety sensitivity and injury/
illness sensitivity as putative vulnerability factors within the context of pain, and proposes that IS 
forms the higher-order factor of fear of pain and pain catastrophizing. Nevertheless, when Keogh 
& Asmundson (2004) proposed the hierarchical model, no studies that were directly supportive 
of the importance of IS within the development of chronic pain were available yet. The first study 
within this thesis (Chapter 2) aimed to address this gap in the literature by studying the differential 
predictive value of both IS and AS to pain-related fear and pain catastrophizing in a correlational 
design. In addition, the differential predictive validity of both IS and AS for subjective anticipatory 
fear ratings and pain tolerance for experimentally induced pain was examined in a second study of 
Chapter 2. After establishing the role of IS as an important factor to consider in the context of pain, 
the following chapter zooms in on the componential and dimensional structure of the proposed 
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hierarchical model of pain-relevant negative constructs. Each construct of the hierarchical model 
is commonly measured with a self-report measure that intends to represent a well-validated and 
reliable operationalisation of that construct. By gathering information regarding the perceived 
similarity between the individual items of these self-report measures, we have explored how these 
individual items are found to group together in larger units, and how they can be situated relatively 
to each other within a geographical dimensional space (Chapter 3). The resulting components 
and dimensional structure were then compared for their resemblance to the proposed theoretical 
conceptualisation of the constructs in the hierarchical model. 
Part II of this thesis describes a series of cross-sectional experimental studies that aim 
to further substantiate the role and function of the psychological vulnerability factors that were 
described in the introduction sections above in the explanation of maladaptive responses to pain 
and the threat of pain. Each study starts from specific hypotheses that aim to light out several 
theoretically related factors in their relative relation to responses to (the threat of) pain. Four out of 
the five studies in this second part examine the cognitive processing of pain-related information 
in function of individual levels of anxiety and fear-related constructs (chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7). An 
additional focus in these studies concerns the further substantiation of IS as a valuable factor to 
consider in the context of pain, and the examination of putative differential roles of IS and AS in 
their contribution to cognitive and behavioural responses to pain. 
In chapter 4, an indirect association measure (EAST; Jan De Houwer, 2003) will be 
adopted to examine whether individual levels of anxiety sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity can 
be found to be related to an automatic threat appraisal of stimuli that are reflective of pain, injury, 
and illness. In this study, emphasis is put on the putative differential predictive value of injury/
illness sensitivity and anxiety sensitivity for the automatic threat appraisal as well. Furthermore, 
the differential value of injury/illness sensitivity and anxiety sensitivity in predicting dysfunctional 
behaviour will be addressed by examining their predictive power for two behavioural correlates; 
i.e., the tendency to engage in health protecting behaviour and the use of health care services. 
In the following two chapters, a central role is assigned to the examination of a negative 
interpretation bias in the context of pain. First, evidence for the content-specificity of this cognitive 
bias will be sought by putting forward the Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (Clark 
et al., 1997) as a useful measure to assess content-specific negative interpretations (Chapter 5). 
More specifically, this study examines whether individual levels of the global and more specific 
anxiety-related constructs of the hierarchical model are associated with a general or a rather 
content-specific negative interpretation bias. Starting from the notion that most evidence for 
negative interpretation bias in the context of pain has come from studies that have assessed this 
bias with explicit measures, a study is set up that aimed to provide an automatic measurement 
of negative interpretations of pain-related ambiguity (chapter 6). Drawing on research in the area 
of social phobia (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; hews, 2000), this study proposes a lexical decision 
paradigm as an adequate measure to capture the spontaneous and non-reflective interpretations 
that individuals make when they are confronted with ambiguity that implies illness, injury and pain-
related threat. The relation between the resulting automatic interpretation bias as assessed with 
the lexical decision paradigm and individual levels of anxiety sensitivity, injury/illness sensitivity, 
pain catastrophizing, and fear of pain will be examined. It is hypothesized that heightened levels 
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of the anxiety and fear constructs would be associated with an increased tendency to interpret 
ambiguous situations negatively. In addition to the biased processing of information, one robust 
finding within research on the role of cognition in pain concerns the observation that pain can have 
an interruptive effect on attention that is responsible for deteriorations in cognitive task performance 
(Crombez et al., 1998a, 1998b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). This attentional interference effect 
seems to be highly dependent upon specific characteristics of the pain stimulus, and has been 
found to be particularly enhanced in individuals who are high in pain catastrophizing (Crombez et al., 
1998a, 1998b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). The current thesis aims to extend on these findings 
by examining whether individual levels of anxiety sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity can found 
to be related to the interruptive affect of pain on attention as well (Chapter 7). The primary task 
paradigm as described by Crombez et al. (1998a, 1998b) is used to assess the interruptive effect, 
and in addition to anxiety sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity, pain catastrophizing is assessed 
with the purpose of replicating prior reported findings. Furthermore, this chapter extends on 
discussing the context within which the interruptive effect of pain on attention is most likely to occur. 
 In the last and fifth study of the second part of this thesis, a shift is made from focussing 
predominantly on negative personality and cognitive factors to focussing on the role of positive 
personality and cognitive factors in determining responses to pain (Chapter 8). This chapter 
describes an experimental study that examines the influence of perceived control, specific self-
efficacy and their interaction with optimism and general self-efficacy on the subjective evaluation 
of experimentally induced pain. It is hypothesized that persons who believe that they can control 
their pain will expect and report less pain and fear for experimentally induced pain, and this effect 
is hypothesized to be especially pronounced when individuals possess high specific self-efficacy 
on the pain control strategy. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that optimism and general self-efficacy 
moderate beneficial effects of perceived control and specific self-efficacy. Finally, the last chapter 
of this thesis will provide a summary and integrative discussion of the results that are described in 
the individual studies in this thesis (Chapter 9). Furthermore, some limitations to these studies as 
well as recommendations for further research will be provided in this last chapter.
Before going over to the following chapter, it is important to note that all the studies in 
this thesis are conducted within a healthy study population, and to inform the reader of about 
the rationale that has provoked this choice. First, since the main objective of this thesis is to 
substantiate the importance of personality constructs and cognitive mechanism as putative 
vulnerability or resilience factors within the onset and exacerbation of chronic pain problems, it 
is necessary to study their influence outside the presence of current pain complaints. As such, 
resulting findings in this thesis can be ascribed to the presence of these vulnerability or resilience 
factors, rather then to the presence of current pain complaints. In addition, injury/illness sensitivity, 
which constitutes one of the central personality constructs of interest in this thesis, is assumed 
to reflect the predisposing fear that persons possess regarding the possibility of getting injured or 
becoming ill in the near or far future. Consequently, the self-report measure that is used to assess 
this construct entails various items that ask directly about the respondent’s concerns of becoming 
injured or seriously ill in the future. Hence, the assessment and study of this construct is not 
relevant in a clinical population that is already confronted with persistent pain complaints. 
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Part I
Conceptualizing pain-related anxiety and fear 
constructs in a hierarchical model
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Chapter 2
Do fundamental fears differentially contribute to 
pain-related fear and pain catastrophizing? An 
evaluation of the Sensitivity Index.
This chapter is published as: 
Vancleef, L. M. G., Peters, M. L., Roelofs, J., & Asmundson, G. J. G. (200). Do fundamental 
fears differentially contribute to pain-related fear and pain catastrophizing? An evaluation of the 
Sensitivity Index. European Journal of Pain, 10, 527-5.
		part one
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Fundamental fears and pain measures
abstraCt
Three fundamental fears - anxiety sensitivity (AS), injury/illness sensitivity (IS) and fear of 
negative evaluation (FNE) - have been proposed to underlie common fears and psychopathological 
conditions. In pain research, the relation between AS and (chronic) pain processes was the subject 
of several studies, whereas the possible role of IS has been ignored. The current research examines 
the role of IS with respect to various pain-related variables in two studies. In the first study, 192 
healthy college students completed the Sensitivity Index (SI; a composite measure assessing the 
three fundamental fears) and various pain-related questionnaires. In a second study, 60 students 
out of the original sample took part in a pain induction procedure and completed the SI as well. 
We first examined the properties of the SI. Factor analysis on the SI replicated the proposed factor 
structure (Taylor, 1993). However, some items of the ASI did show problematic loadings and were 
therefore excluded in subsequent analyses. The main hypothesis of the current study states that IS 
is a stronger predictor than AS of pain catastrophizing and fear of pain as assessed by self-report 
measures, and of pain tolerance and anticipatory fear of pain as assessed in a pain induction 
study. This hypothesis could be confirmed for all variables, except for pain tolerance, which was 
not predicted by any of the three fundamental fears. The current study can be considered as an 
impetus for devoting attention to IS in future pain research. 
IntroduCtIon
Anxiety sensitivity (AS), or the fear of anxiety symptoms (e.g., heart palpitations) 
arising from the belief that these symptoms will lead to harmful somatic, psychological or social 
consequences (Reiss et al., 1986), has been suggested as an important personality trait in the 
development and maintenance of chronic musculoskeletal pain (Asmundson & Norton, 1995). AS 
was found to be directly associated with fear of pain, and indirectly with pain-specific avoidance 
behaviour, irrespective of pain intensity and pain severity, in patients with chronic musculoskeletal 
pain (Asmundson & Norton, 1995; Asmundson & Taylor, 1996). Furthermore, elevated levels of AS 
influenced the pain experience, in response to a pain induction task, and appeared to be a stronger 
predictor than fear of pain for pain responses following a cold pressor task (Greenberg & Burns, 
2003; Keogh & Birkby, 1999; Keogh & Mansoor, 2001).
AS is considered as 1 of 3 fundamental fears (or sensitivities), together with injury/illness 
sensitivity (IS) and fear of negative social evaluation (FNE) (Reiss, 1991; Reiss, Peterson, & Gursky, 
1988; Reiss et al., 1986; Taylor, 1993, 1995). A fear is defined as fundamental when it satisfies two 
criteria: (1) it is a fear of inherently noxious stimuli, and (2) other common fears (e.g., fear of snakes, 
spiders, or heights) can be logically reduced to the fundamental fear (Reiss, 1991). The distinction 
between common fears and fundamental fears lies in the fact that fundamental fears provide 
reasons for fearing a wide range of stimuli whereas common fears do not. A person can, for 
example, be afraid of snakes and heights, but these fears seem unrelated to each other. However, 
it is possible that both fears arise from a heightened level of AS. That is: they can both originate 
from the fear of the confrontation with a snake or a height causing a panic attack (Taylor, 1995).
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Taylor (1995) performed further research into the three fundamental fears by means of 
a factor analytic and correlational study. For this purpose, he created a measure that consisted 
of pooled items for each fear, which formed a questionnaire that was named the Sensitivity Index 
(SI). In this questionnaire, the items from the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) (Peterson & Heilbronner, 
1987) were included to assess AS, while the Injury/Illness Sensitivity Index (ISI) was incorporated to 
assess IS. FNE was measured in the SI with the 12-item version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale (Leary, 1983). The resulting SI was subsequently submitted to a factor analytic analysis, 
which revealed three-factors that corresponded to the three fundamental fears as originally 
proposed by Reiss (1991). Intercorrelations of the three factors were low, with rs ranging from .26 
to .32 (Taylor, 1993). Pearson correlations between the three factors and common fears revealed 
that AS was related to agoraphobia, IS to animal fears and blood-injury fears, and FNE to social 
fears and animal fears. Taylor concluded that the three fundamental fears are indeed distinct from 
each other, and that they are specifically related to common fears.
It is important to note that the fundamental fears should not be equated to trait anxiety 
(Lilienfeld, 1996; McNally, 1996; McWilliams & Cox, 2001; Reiss, 1997; Sandin, Chorot, & McNally, 
2001). Lilienfeld (1996) proposed a hierarchical model in which the fundamental fears are lower-
order factors that are nested within the higher-order trait anxiety factor. In this hierarchical model, 
the lower-order factors share sufficient variance with the higher-order factor, while there remains 
unique variance that is unrelated to trait anxiety. Taylor’s analyses revealed that fundamental fears 
do indeed account for 41 % of the total variance in trait anxiety, leaving unique variance open that 
is unrelated to trait anxiety (Taylor, 1993,1995). 
In pain research, most studies have focussed on AS (Asmundson et al., 2000). However, 
it may be proposed that IS plays a more fundamental role than AS in the maintenance and 
exacerbation of (chronic) health conditions. IS represents the specific fearfulness of imminent 
injury and illness, and might form a higher-order factor not only of animal fears, but also of other 
fears that are related to harm to the body and to fear of pain. Recently, Keogh and Asmundson 
(2004) suggested an adapted version of the hierarchical model outlined by Lilienfeld (1996), in 
which IS acts as a higher-order factor of pain-related constructs such as fear of pain and pain 
catastrophizing. 
 The present study was primarily set up to explore the role of fundamental fears in the 
explanation of pain-related variables in a healthy population. We choose to conduct the study in a 
healthy population for two reasons. First, it allows us to compare our results with the results of Taylor 
(1993), since he used a healthy sample as well. More important, the choice for a healthy population 
stems from the properties of the ISI. The ISI concerns worrying about getting injured and becoming 
ill, and is meant to assess a predisposing fear for future injury and/or illness experiences. 
In the current research, two studies were set up to further validate the SI in a Dutch 
student sample and to examine the role of the fundamental fears in their explanation of pain-
related variables. In the first study, we examined whether we were able to replicate the three-
factor structure of the SI, as it was proposed by Taylor (1993). Also, the associations between the 
fundamental fears and trait anxiety were examined. The main aim of this study was however to 
examine the association between the fundamental fears and fear of pain and pain catastrophizing. 
It is hypothesized that although both AS and IS will be associated with fear of pain and pain 
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catastrophizing, IS will be the strongest predictor of these measures. FNE is not expected to 
contribute to the explanation of either fear of pain or pain catastrophizing.
The second study examined predictive validity of the fundamental fears using a pain 
induction procedure. A part of the original sample of study 1 underwent three experimental 
pain tests and anticipatory fear and pain tolerance for each of these tests was assessed. It is 
hypothesized that IS will predict anticipated fear and pain tolerance for experimental pain more 
strongly than AS. FNE is not expected to contribute to the explanation of anticipatory fear or pain 
tolerance.
method
partiCipantS 
In study 1, 192 students of Maastricht University (42 males and 150 females), with a 
mean age of 21 (SD= 2.55, range = 18-39 years), completed a battery of questionnaires, including 
the SI (see Measures section). 
In study 2, 60 unselected individuals (11 males, 49 females; mean age = 21, SD = 
2.04, range = 18-28 years) of the original sample were invited to take part in a pain induction 
experiment, and completed the questionnaires once again. The participants verbally reported 
to the experimenter to be free from (chronic) physical or mental illnesses in both studies. All 
participants gave informed consent and received financial compensation for their participation. The 
experimental protocol was approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of Maastricht University/
University Hospital Maastricht.
proCeDure
All participants from study 1 were recruited at Maastricht University through 
advertisements and posters in the University building. They completed the questionnaires in small 
groups of approximately 10 persons in a room in the University building. Six months later, 60 
participants from the original sample were randomly invited to take part in the pain induction study. 
The pain induction procedure consisted of an ischemic pain test, electrical stimulation, and heat 
pain stimulation that were presented in a counterbalanced order. Before the start of each pain test, 
anticipatory fear of pain was assessed. Participants rated the level of fear that they thought would 
be associated with the pain test on a 100-mm.visual analogue scale (VAS) with anchors ‘no fear 
at all’ to ‘very fearful’. Pain tolerance scores were obtained for each of the three pain induction 
procedures. Pain tolerance in the ischemic pain test was measured as the maximum amount of 
time (milliseconds) that people could endure performing handgrip exercises while pressure on their 
forearm was sustained on 160 mmHG through the cuff of a sphygmomanometer. In the electrical 
stimulation test, pain tolerance was defined as the maximum stimulus intensity (mA) that was 
		part one
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reached before participants indicated that pain tolerance was reached. The heat pain stimulation 
test measured pain tolerance as the maximum temperature (ºC) that participants could tolerate 
before they pushed a button to reduce temperature back to baseline level (for details on the pain 
induction procedure see Roelofs, Peters, Deutz, Spijker, & Vlaeyen, 2005).
meaSureS
The Sensitivity Index (SI) includes 39 items and consists of pooled items of three 
subscales, which tap AS (16 items), IS (11 items), and FNE (12 items). The English version of the SI 
(S. Taylor, 1993) was translated into Dutch in a state-of-the-art manner, involving back translation, 
after which the item content was checked against the original content. AS was measured by the 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987). This self-report measure consists of 
16 statements that assert the negative consequences of experiencing anxiety (e.g., ‘It scares me 
when my heart beats rapidly’). The ASI has been shown to be a reliable and stable measure of 
the fear of anxiety with Cronbach’s α above .88 and test-retest correlations above .70. (Peterson 
& Heilbronner, 1987; Reiss, 1991; Rodriguez, Bruce, Pagano, Spencer, & Keller, 2004; Sandin et 
al., 2001). IS was measured with the Injury/illness Sensitivity Index (ISI; Taylor, 1993), containing 6 
items pertaining to the fear of illness (e.g., ‘I get scared if I think I’m coming down with an illness’) 
and 5 items referring to the fear of injury (e.g., ‘The thought of injury terrifies me’). Recent results 
of a factor analytic study on the ISI scale (Carleton et al., 2005) revealed two factors - Fear of 
Illness (7 items) and Fear of Injury (4 items) - that load onto a single higher order factor (i.e., injury/
illness sensitivity or physical harm). The higher order factor of injury/illness sensitivity accounted for 
74.3 % of the variance in the lower-order factors and showed good simple structure with salient 
loadings of 0.86 for both the fear of Illness and Fear of Injury lower-order factors. The same study 
also proved the ISI to possess adequate reliability, with an alpha coefficient for the ISI total (12 
items) of 0.89. FNE was measured with the 11-item version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale (Leary, 1983). This scale also has satisfactory reliability and validity, and taps fear of situations 
related to public observable behaviour and evaluation situations (e.g., ‘I worry about what kind 
of impression I make on people’). Taylor adjusted the response format of the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale such that participants rated all items of the SI using a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (very little) to 5 (very much). The FNE had good internal consistency in this adapted format 
as well (Cronbach’s alpha above .80) (Taylor, 1993).
The Pain Anxiety Symptoms Scale (PASS; McCracken, Zayfert, & Gross, 1992) is a 40-
item self-report measure that measures pain-related fear. The PASS was originally developed for 
chronic pain patients, but it has proven to be applicable in pain free populations as well (Muris, 
Vlaeyen, & Meesters, 2001). The PASS consists of 4 subscales, measuring fearful appraisal of pain 
(e.g., ‘I think that if my pain gets too severe, it will never decrease’), cognitive anxiety (e.g., ‘During 
painful episodes it is difficult for me to think of anything besides the pain’), physiological anxiety 
(e.g., ‘Pain seems to cause my heart to pound or race’), and escape/avoidance behaviour (e.g., 
‘I try to avoid activities which cause pain’). The items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 (never) to 5 (always). The validity as well as the reliability of this measure has been well 
proefschrift165x240_.indd   34 10-09-2007   10:55:27
		|35
Fundamental fears and pain measures
established in several studies (Osman, Barrios, Osman, Schneekloth, & Troutman, 1994; Roelofs, 
McCracken et al., 2004). 
The Fear of Pain Questionnaire (FPQ: McNeil & Rainwater, 1998) was specifically 
developed to measure fear of pain in a non-chronic pain population. It is a 30-item measure that 
assesses fear of severe pain (e.g., ‘Breaking your leg’), minor pain (e.g., ‘Getting a paper-cut on your 
finger’), and medical pain (e.g., ‘Receiving an injection in your hip/buttocks’). The items are scored 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extreme). The psychometric properties of 
the English as well as the Dutch version (Peters et al., 2002) of the FPQ are satisfactory (McNeil & 
Rainwater, 1998; Roelofs, Peters, Deutz et al., 2005).
The Pain Catastrophizing Scale (PCS; Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995) taps pain 
catastrophizing, which is defined as ‘an exaggerated orientation towards pain’. Participants need 
to take painful past experiences in mind, and subsequently indicate on a 5-point scale ranging from 
0 (not at all) to 4 (all the time) to what extent they experienced each of 13 feelings and thoughts 
during that pain (e.g., ‘I feel as if I can’t take this anymore’). The original and Dutch version has 
proven to be reliable and valid measures (Osman et al., 1997; Severeijns, van den Hout, Vlaeyen, & 
Picavet, 2002; Van Damme, Crombez, Bijttebier, Goubert, & Van Houdenhove, 2002).
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait form (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1970) contains 20 items that tap a general anxiety disposition (e.g., ‘I worry too much about 
unimportant things’). Participants have to indicate on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (almost 
never) to 4 (almost always), to what extent these statements apply to them. A high score on this 
scale reflects a high general anxiety disposition. The original and Dutch versions (Ploeg van der, 
Defares, & Spielberger, 1980) have proven to be reliable and valid measures.
StatiStiCal analySeS
We performed an exploratory factor analysis on the SI to see whether we could replicate 
the three-factor solution reported by Taylor (1993). The internal consistency was calculated using 
Cronbach’s α for all subscales separately as well as for the whole SI. The total amount of variance 
in trait anxiety that was explained by the three fundamental fears was calculated by means of a 
simple linear regression analysis, in which all three fears were first entered independently into the 
model, and afterwards were tested simultaneously in the final model. 
 The association between the fundamental fears and trait anxiety and pain catastrophizing 
was examined with a stepwise linear regression analysis in which trait anxiety was entered in the 
first step and the predictors of interest (AS, IS, FNE) were simultaneously entered in the second 
step. The same analyses were performed to examine the unique predictive value of the three 
fundamental fears relative to pain tolerance and anticipatory fear of pain in the pain induction 
procedure. 
		part one
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results
StuDy 1
Factor Analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy of .92 
indicated that the items of the SI were suitable for factor analysis. The items were subsequently 
submitted to a principal components analysis with oblique (oblimin) rotation with Kaiser 
normalization. An oblimin rotation allows the obtained factors to be intercorrelated. Cattell’s Scree 
test revealed three factors to be extracted, which accounted for 52 % of the total variance. The 
factor loadings are shown in Table 1. This 3-factor solution corresponded with the three factors 
as originally proposed by Taylor (1993): Fear of Negative Evaluation (Factor 1), Anxiety Sensitivity 
(Factor 2) and Injury/illness Sensitivity (Factor 3). Correlations between the three factors were 
low to moderate, with r = .26 for the correlation between FNE and IS, r = .40 for the correlation 
between AS and IS, and r = .37 for the correlation between AS and FNE.
Taking salient loadings as those ≥ .30, Table 1 shows that each factor corresponds 
to a fundamental fear. However, some ASI items do load on other factors (items 13, 14) or have 
secondary loadings on another factor (items 34, 36). Furthermore, two ASI items do not load on 
any of the three factors at all (items 29, 38). Four items (items 13, 14, 29, 36) are problematic in 
both the study of Taylor and the current study. Item 38, as it was formulated in the Dutch translation, 
appeared to deviate from the original item after the back translation, which can explain the fact 
that it doesn’t load on any factor in the current study. This item has been changed in the most 
recent Dutch version. We created a reconstructed version of the SI in which the five problematic 
items were removed. Item 34 was left in the scale and assigned to the ASI subscale on theoretical 
grounds. All further analyses that are reported in this article were performed with the reconstructed 
version of the scale, although we also performed concordant analyses with the original scales in 
order to detect possible beneficial or detrimental effects of working with the original versus the 
reconstructed scale. Any deviations between both versions will be reported, if present.
 Table 1. Principal Components Analysis on the Sensitivity Index: Factor Loadings for the three-factor solution
.Item-Scale Item Description  Factors
  FNE AS IS
  4 –   FNE  I am concerned about other people’s opinions of me .92	 -.04 .02
  2 –   FNE  I worry about what kind of impression I make on people .92 .05 -.03
  9 –   FNE  I worry what other people will think of me even when I know 
 it doesn’t make any difference .90	 -.07 .00
  3 –   FNE I am afraid that people will find fault with me .87 -.05 .05
  1 –   FNE Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other 
 people think of me .86	 -.02 -.08
  7 -   FNE I am usually worried about the kind of impression I make .86	 .05 .04
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  5 –   FNE  When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may 
 be thinking of me .85	 -.13 .09
  12 – FNE  If I now that someone is judging me, it tends to bother me .83	 -.13 .00
  10 – FNE It bothers me when people form an unfavourable impression of me .81	 -.05 .12
  6 –   FNE I am afraid that others will not approve of me .80	 .15 .04
  8 –   FNE  I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings .73	 .14 .08
  11 - FNE I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things .71	 .22 -.11
  28 - ASI It scares me when I feel faint .05 .79	 -.01
  39 - ASI It scares me when I feel shaky .00 .72	 .09
  37 - ASI It scares me when I become short of breath .09 .72	 -.06
  27 – ASI It scares me when my heart beats rapidly -.03 .72	 .04
  32 – ASI When my stomach is upset, I worry that I might be seriously ill -.12 .70	 .11
  33 – ASI When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be 
 seriously ill -.00 .69	 -.00
  31 – ASI  When I notice that my heart is beating rapidly, I worry I might have a 
 heart attack .02 .60	 .11
  35 – ASI  When I am nervous, I worry that I might be mentally ill .07 .58	 -.04
  30 – ASI It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task .17 .55	 .00
  25 – ASI  It scares me when I am nauseous -.03 .47	 .26
  36 – ASI It scares me when I am nervous .33	 .39	 -.08
  34 – ASI Unusual body sensations scare me .18 .36	 .37
  14 – ASI  It is important to me to stay in control of my emotions .30	 .19 -.06
  13 – ASI It is important for me not to appear nervous .41	 -.02 .00
  29 – ASI  It embarrasses me when my stomach growls .25 .25 .09
  38 – ASI  Other people notice when I feel shaky .16 .09 .18
  21 – ISI It would be awful to be injured in any way .05 -.21 .84
  15 – ISI  I am frightened of being injured -.05 .13 .81
  16 – ISI  The thought of injury terrifies me .09 -.10 .72
  18 – ISI  The thought of physical illness scares me -.09 .19 .68
  24 – ISI  I get scared if I think I am coming down with an illness .02 .18 .65
  17 – ISI I worry about becoming physically ill -.09 .33	 .62
  26 – ISI  I can’t stand the thought of being injured .03 .10 .62
  20 – ISI I worry that I might get a serious physical illness in the future .03 .24 .55
  19 – ISI I worry about being injured -.05 .29 .47
  22 – ISI It would be awful to have a serious physical illness .05 -.16 .48
  23 – ISI I worry about my physical health .08 .28 .30
 Eigenvalue 12.9 5.1 2.3
 Variance (%) 33.2 13.2 6.0
NoTe: AS, Anxiety Sensitivity; IS, injury/Illness Sensitivity; FNE, Fear of Negative Evaluation. Salient loadings ≥ 
|0.30| are listed in boldface type
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Descriptive Statistics and internal consistencies of the Sensitivity Index. Mean scores 
on the SI for both males and females are summarized in Table 2. Possible gender differences 
were investigated by means of independent sample t-tests for both test times separately. No 
differences on either the SI or the subscales were found. To evaluate the internal consistency of the 
SI, Cronbach’s alphas were computed. All scales had excellent reliability with alphas of .94, .88, 
.88, and .96 for the SI, the ASI, the ISI, and the FNE respectively. 
  Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sensitivity Index and its three subscales in study 1
  Males (n=42)  Females (n=150)  Total (n=192)
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD
  SI total  65.05 17.24 66.74 18.77 66.37 18.41
  ASI   14.57 4.23 14.69 4.59 14.67 4.50
  ISI  23.36 7.55 23.42 7.35 23.41 7.38
  FNE  27.12 9.62 28.63 11.60 28.30 11.19
NoTe. SI total, Sensitivity Index, total score; ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index (the four problematic items excluded); 
ISI, injury/Illness 
Sensitivity Index; FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale
Fundamental Fears and Trait Anxiety. The contribution of the factors in the explanation of 
trait anxiety was explored with linear regression analysis (Table 3). We first examined the separate 
contribution of AS, IS, and FNE in three separate regression models with trait anxiety (STAI-T) as 
dependent variable. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) ranged between values of 1.61 and 1.80, 
indicating no severe collinearity between the independent measures. These analyses showed 
that FNE, AS, and IS accounted independently from each other for 34%, 21%, and .05% of 
the variance of trait anxiety. Next, the final model was created in which all three fears were 
entered simultaneously as predictors in the model. A total of 40% of the variance in trait anxiety 
was explained by the three fundamental fears together; but, whereas both FNE and AS share 
sufficient variance with trait anxiety, IS does not significantly contribute to it in the final regression 
model. 
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  Table 3. Results of Regression Analyses with trait anxiety (STAI-t) as dependent variable
 ß R² Adj. R² F Df p
		Model	1	     
  FNE .59 .35 .34 102.19 1,190 .000
  Model	2     
  AS .46 .22 .21 52.03 1,190 .000
		Model	3     
  IS .23 .06 .05 11.04 1,190 .001
  Model	4     
  FNE .48 .41 .40 43.30 3,188 .000
  AS .32   
  IS -.12
NoTe. FNE, Fear of Negative Evaluation; AS, Anxiety Sensitivity; IS, Injury/illness sensitivity
Fundamental Fears, Fear of Pain, and Pain Catastrophizing. The differential contribution 
of AS, IS, and FNE to the explanation of the pain-related measures was examined with linear 
regression analysis. In these analyses, trait anxiety was entered in the first block of the model, and 
the three factors – AS, IS, and FNE – were inserted in the second block. Entering trait anxiety in the 
first step of the analysis allows us to disentangle the specific influences of the fundamental fears 
from the overlapping explanations through trait anxiety. All VIF’s were below 3 (ranging between 
1.63 and 1.96), indicating no severe multi-collinearity between the independent variables. Table 4 
shows that IS is the only significant predictor of fear of pain and pain catastrophizing. Both AS and 
IS are significant predictors of the PASS total score. 
In order to test for differences in predictive value of both AS and IS for the dependent 
measures, we tested the magnitude of the partial correlation coefficients against each other. 
A partial correlation coefficient reflects the specific association between the predictor and the 
dependent variable, while the influence of the other predictor is controlled for. The comparison 
between the partial correlations between the ASI and the PCS on the one hand and the ISI and the 
PCS on the other hand was significant (z = - 4.89; df = 190; p < 001), indicating that the ISI was 
the best predictor for pain catastrophizing. The partial correlations between the ASI and the ISI with 
the FPQ also differed significantly from each other (z = -5.02; df =190; p < .001). Comparison of the 
partial correlations for AS and IS with the PASS revealed no significant effects. We subsequently 
performed a post hoc regression analysis on the four subscales of the PASS. Comparison of the 
partial correlation coefficients with the subscales of the PASS showed that IS (partial r = .34) was 
more strongly related to the escape/avoidance subscale than AS (partial r = .12) (z = - 3.57; p < 
.001). The PASS fearful appraisal of pain subscale showed a trend towards a stronger association 
with IS (partial r = .41) than with AS (partial r = .30), but this difference was not significant (z = -
1.78; p = .075). AS, on the other hand, was a stronger predictor of the PASS physiological anxiety 
subscale, showing partial correlation coefficients of .36 and .07 with AS and IS, respectively (z = 
4.73; p < .001). The PASS cognitive anxiety subscale showed partial correlation coefficients of .26 
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and .21 with AS and IS, respectively, and this did not result in a significant difference between both 
predictors for this subscale. FNE did not contribute significantly to the prediction of any of the four 
PASS subscales. 
Table 4. Results of Regression analyses with Fear of Negative Evaluation, Anxiety Sensitivity, and Injury/illness 
sensitivity as predictors in Step 2 of fear of pain measures, and trait anxiety entered in Step 1
  Dependent variable Step Variable entered R2 ΔR2 ΔF df p ß (Step 2) Part r
  FPQ 1 STAI-t .02 .02 5.63 1, 190 .019 -.03 -.02
 2 FNE .23 .22 16.68 4, 187 .000 .15 .14
  AS      .03 .02
  IS      .40** .34
  PCS 1 STAI-t .14 .14 30.00 1, 190 .000 .21* .20
 2 FNE .40 .26 26.91 4, 187 .000 .00 .00
  AS      .12 .11
  IS      .45** .41
  PASS 1 STAI-t .16 .16 35.77 1, 190 .000 .18* .19
 2 FNE .46 .30 34.20 4, 187 .000 -.05 -.05
  AS      .36** .33
  IS      .32** .31
NoTe. STAI-t,= Spielberger’s state-trait anxiety inventory (Trait version); AS, Anxiety Sensitivity; IS, Illness/Injury 
Sensitivity; FNE, Fear of Negative Evaluation; FPQ, Fear of Pain Questionnaire; PCS, Pain Catastrophizing Scale; 
PASS, Pain Anxiety Symptoms Scale.; * p< .01; ** p< .001
StuDy 2
Predictive Validity of Fundamental Fears for Responses to Pain Induction. The 
three fundamental fears were correlated with anticipated fear for each of the three pain induction 
procedures. FNE and AS did not correlate with anticipatory fear, whereas IS showed a significant 
correlation with fear of the ischemic pain test (r = .36 p < .01), fear of electrical stimulation (r 
= .35, p < .01), and fear of heat pain stimulation (r = .41, p < .01). Regression analyses (VIF’s 
ranging between 1.34 and 1.93) also showed that IS contributed most in the explanation of 
anticipatory fear of pain for the three pain induction procedures (Table 5). For pain tolerance, 
mixed results were found. None of the fundamental fears correlated with time until termination 
of the ischemic pain test. Pain tolerance for the electrical stimulation correlated -.26 (p < .05) 
with AS and -.27 (p < .05) with IS. Pain tolerance for heat pain stimulation showed a significant 
correlation of -.27 (p < .05) with AS only. When all three fundamental fears were entered 
simultaneously in a regression analysis after controlling for trait anxiety (for the three pain tests 
separately), neither AS, IS or FNE contributed significantly to the explanation of pain tolerance 
(Table 5).
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Table 5. Results of Regression analyses with Fear of Negative Evaluation, Anxiety Sensitivity, and Injury/illness 
sensitivity as predictors in Step 2 of pain tolerance and anticipatory fear of pain, and trait anxiety entered in Step 1
  Dependent variable Step Variable entered R2 ΔR2 ΔF df p ß(Step 2) Part r 
  Fear ischemic  1 STAI-t .06 .06 3.54 1,58 .065 .13  .10
 2 FNE .15 .09 1.97 4,55 .13 -.09  -.07 
  AS      .06  .06
  IS      .27*  .27
  Fear electrical 1 STAI-t .12 .12 7.69 1,58 .007 .26  .20 
 2 FNE .17 .06 1.27 4,55 .29 .00 .00 
  AS      -.04  -.03 
  IS      .27+  .25
  Fear heat  1 STAI-t .01 .01 .61 1,58 .44 .00 .00
 2 FNE .18 .17 3.88 4,55 .01 -.09 -.07
  AS      -.04 -.04 
  IS      .46*** .40
  Tolerance ischemic 1 STAI-t .00 .00 .02 1,58 .88 .01 .01
 2 FNE .06 .06 1.16 4,55 .33 .17 .13
  AS      -.08 -.06 
  IS      -.21 -.19
  Tolerance electric 1 STAI-t .04 .04 2.13 1,58 .15 -.13 -.10
 2 FNE .13 .09 1.96 4,55 .13 .24 .19 
  AS      -.24 -.18 
  IS      -.18  -.16
  Tolerance heat 1 STAI-t .06 .06 4.11 1,58 .047 -.24 -.18 
 2 FNE .11 .05 .99 4,55 .41 .22 .17 
  AS      -.22 -.17 
  IS      -.03 -.03
NoTe. STAI-t, Spielberger’s state-trait anxiety inventory (Trait version); AS, Anxiety Sensitivity; IIS, Illness/Injury 
Sensitivity; FNE, Fear of Negative Evaluation; FPQ, Fear of Pain Questionnaire; PCS, Pain Catastrophizing Scale; 
PASS, Pain Anxiety Symptoms Scale;  +p<.10   * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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dIsCussIon 
The main aim of this research was to examine the contribution of fundamental fears to 
fear of pain and pain catastrophizing. However, first we evaluated the psychometric properties of 
the instrument that measures fundamental fears, the Sensitivity Index (SI). The SI showed good 
to excellent internal consistencies for the scale as a whole and for the three subscales (ASI, ISI, 
FNE). The factor analysis on the Dutch version of the SI resulted in a 3-factor structure, thereby 
replicating Taylor’s findings (Taylor, 1993). The three factors were labelled as corresponding to 
FNE, AS, and IS. The three factors together explained 52% of the total variance, but correlated low 
among each other. This indicates that it is likely that the factors do measure distinct constructs. 
The magnitude of the loadings revealed that most items were good representatives for the scales 
they belonged to. However, some items of the ASI had secondary loadings or loaded onto another 
factor, whereas two items didn’t load substantially on any factor at all. This was also the case in 
Taylor’s study, and raises questions about the applicability of some of the items. We created a 
revised version of the ASI scale, in which five problematic items were omitted, and this was used 
throughout all further analyses in this study. As an additional check, we also conducted concordant 
analyses with the original ASI scale to check whether results would deviate from our findings 
when the problematic items were kept in the scale. These concordant analyses revealed the same 
pattern of results as the one that is reported in this manuscript, and indicates that although some 
items appear bad representatives of the scale in the factor analyses, their inclusion does not affect 
the value of the ASI in this study. We therefore suggest considering the use of an adapted version 
of the ASI in subsequent studies. Throughout the literature, there have been several suggestions 
for dealing with the dubious items of the ASI through the use of revised scales. In line with our 
findings, some authors already suggested the use of a shortened version of the ASI, consisting 
of two lower-order factors (fear of somatic sensations and fear of loss of control) (e.g., Blais et 
al., 2001; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Schmidt & Joiner, 2002). Other studies suggest to use 
an expanded version of the ASI, consisting of 36 items, that support a four-factor structure of AS 
(beliefs about the harmful consequences of pain, fear of publicly observable anxiety reactions, 
fear of cognitive dyscontrol, and fear of somatic sensations without explicit consequences) (e.g., 
Deacon, Abramowitz, Woods, & Tolin, 2003; Taylor, 1995).
Following Taylor (1993), we also examined the relationship between the three factors of 
the SI and trait anxiety as measured by the STAI-T. According to the hierarchical model proposed by 
Lilienfeld (1996) and later extended by Keogh and Asmundson (2004), AS, IS, and FNE form lower-
order factors that are nested within the higher-order factor of trait anxiety. The three fundamental 
fears do indeed explain variance in trait anxiety when their contribution to trait anxiety is examined 
independently from each other. The values of the Beta weights indicate, however, that the ability to 
account for variance in trait anxiety is smaller for IS than for the other two fears. When all three fears 
were subsequently entered together in the regression model, IS did not contribute to trait anxiety at 
all, in contrast to FNE and AS. This finding raises question about whether IS is indeed a lower order 
factor of trait anxiety, as one would expect that IS should explain unique variance in trait anxiety 
that is not accounted for by AS and FNE. Further investigation of the association between IS and 
trait anxiety is clearly warranted. This should also include other measures of trait anxiety or anxiety 
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disposition in addition to STAI-t, e.g., the Behavioural Inhibition Scale. It is possible that STAI-t 
does not encompass all aspects of fear or anxiety that people experience in daily life.
The strong relation between FNE and trait anxiety is a replication of Taylor’s (1993) 
findings. Taylor stated that FNE probably is the most fundamental fear of the three, since it is 
responsible for many common fears, which are displayed most often in the daily society (e.g., 
social fears, animal fears, and general anxiety).
The main focus of study 1 concerned the differential contribution of AS and IS in the 
explanation of pain-related fear and pain catastrophizing. Results of the regression analyses 
showed that both IS and AS contribute to the explanation of pain-related fear and catastrophizing, 
whereas FNE does not contribute significantly to these fears. In accordance with our hypothesis, IS 
was a stronger predictor of fear of pain (FPQ) and pain catastrophizing (PCS) than AS. Both AS and 
IS were approximately equally predictive of PASS total scores. However, post hoc analyses on the 
subscales of the PASS indicated that AS and IS may be differentially related to some of the PASS 
subscales. Most notably, IS was significantly stronger associated to the escape/avoidance subscale 
of the PASS than AS, whereas AS was significantly stronger related than IS to the physiological 
anxiety subscale. This may be a product of the item content of the different subscales. Items of 
the PASS physiological anxiety subscale concern the symptoms that are physiologically related to 
the experience of pain. This can explain the better prediction by AS, defined as the general fear of 
physical sensations. The PASS escape/avoidance subscale consists of items that possess the so-
called ‘harm-effect’: the thought that pain is a predictor of a serious disorder or injury. This thought 
makes people engage in avoidance behaviour to avoid the development of injury. 
In study 2, the differential predictive power of the fundamental fears was investigated 
for pain tolerance and anticipatory fear of pain for the three pain induction procedures separately. 
IS proved to be the only predictor for imminent fear of an impending pain stimulus. This unique 
association between IS and anticipatory fear of pain demonstrates that IS represents a specific 
sensitivity for the threat of pain and the fear of potential consequences that may go with injury and 
illness. This finding also supports the finding of an association between IS and pain catastrophizing 
and between IS and the escape/avoidance subscale of the PASS, since both of these measures 
also pertain to the fear and catastrophic appraisal of the forecast of pain. When examining the 
relation between the fundamental fears and pain tolerance, significant correlations were found for 
the electrical tolerance score with both AS and IS, and the thermal heat tolerance score with AS. 
However, in the regression analyses, pain tolerance was not predicted by the fundamental fears 
in any of the pain induction procedures. This finding may be ascribed to the characteristics of the 
pain tests and the lack of ecological validity that originates from them. Participants were aware 
that they would take part in a controlled study, in which pain duration and pain intensity would 
be limited (in comparison to real-life situations). Further investigation on the relation between the 
fundamental fears and the objective and subjective pain measures is therefore warranted. 
The current study is the first to address the role of IS in predicting pain-related variables. 
However, some limitations should be taken into account when interpreting these results. Although 
informative, the present findings are still preliminary and resulting from multiple regression analyses, 
thereby leaving room for inflated type I errors. Subsequent research should further validate 
the relationships and findings that are currently discussed, using more elaborative statistical 
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approaches, like structural equation modelling, that allow deriving conclusions on hierarchical 
relations between the variables, thereby accounting for the dependency between the dependent 
variables. The use of more sophisticated analyses can also give a clearer insight into the nature 
of the relationship between the fundamental fears (particularly IS) and trait anxiety. The absence 
of predictive power of IS for trait anxiety might raise questions on the value of the STAI-T as 
an accurate measure for trait anxiety. Second, the lack of predictive power of the fundamental 
fears for pain tolerance measures needs further attention in subsequent studies that should try 
to establish realistic pain situations. Third, it would be interesting to examine the association with 
the Tampa Scale of Kinesiophobia (TSK). The TSK is less suitable in a pain-free population, but 
especially with respect to pain-related fear, identifying the association between IS and the TSK 
would be valuable. It would furthermore add value to the SI research to test its predictive value in 
experimental paradigms, comparing the self-report data with more explicit or implicit behavioural, 
psychophysiological, and cognitive measures. 
Despite these limitations, the current study is the first to provide evidence for the 
suggestion that IS might be equally or even more important than AS when identifying predictive 
traits in the (chronic) pain process. Although AS has provided valuable information in pain research, 
IS possibly forms a more relevant, if not crucial, construct in this area. Future research should 
therefore more thoroughly investigate the differential contributions of AS and IS to pain-related fear 
and pain catastrophizing, as well as to the pain process in general.
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A hierarchical representation of negative 
emotionality constructs contributing to pain: an 
empirical examination of the underlying dimensional 
and componential structure of its individual 
components
This chapter is submitted for publication as:
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Hierarchical model
abstraCt
Research has identified several general (i.e., negative affectivity, trait anxiety) and more 
specific (i.e., anxiety sensitivity, injury/illness sensitivity, fear of pain, pain catastrophizing) anxiety-
related constructs to contribute directly or indirectly to the onset and maintenance of (chronic) 
pain. These constructs might be conceptualised within a hierarchical structure, from which the 
relative importance of and the relation between constructs can be understood. The current study 
sought to find evidence for the hierarchical organization of pain-relevant anxiety constructs by the 
conductance of exploratory analyses on the perceived similarity data of the individual items of the 
self-report measures commonly used to assess each construct. Results demonstrated that persons 
who are relatively naïve with respect to the theoretical constructs and their operationalizations 
created cluster groups of items that could be well interpreted along the lines of the constructs in 
the model. Moreover, resulting cluster groups corresponded largely to the self-report measures. 
In addition, multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) indicated that the items could be structured 
along a specificity dimension that ran from general negative affective concerns towards pain-
specific negative concerns. A second interpretable dimension, running from inter-to intrapersonal 
concerns regarding pain was found in the MDS analysis as well. Implications and limitations of 
these findings are discussed in terms of evidence for the hierarchical model and the use of several 
individual self-report instruments to assess constructs residing in the model. 
IntroduCtIon
Chronic pain patients are often characterized by a negative orientation towards stimuli 
in both the external and internal environment that entail a possible link to pain, disability, or 
illness. Congruent with findings in other emotional disorders (e.g., anxiety, depression) it has been 
proposed that this negative orientation is to a great extent fostered by elevated individual levels 
of negative emotionality constructs (Lang & Craske, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Öhman, 
2000). Corroborating this view, several general (i.e., negative affectivity, trait anxiety) and more 
specific (i.e., anxiety sensitivity, injury/illness sensitivity, fear of pain, pain catastrophizing) anxiety 
and fear-related constructs have been proposed to contribute directly or indirectly to the onset 
and maintenance of (chronic) pain (e.g., Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Vancleef, Peters, Roelofs, 
& Asmundson, 2006). As such, negative affectivity (NA) and trait anxiety (TA), which are both 
conceived as the general and stable tendency to view the world in a negative way and to react 
fearfully to a broad range of situations (Lilienfeld et al., 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992), have found 
to be associated with increased pain severity, pain intensity and disability by pain, and with less 
adequate coping with pain (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). In addition, research has emphasized the 
role of anxiety sensitivity (AS) and injury/illness sensitivity (IS) in the development and exacerbation of 
chronic pain. AS is defined as the fear of anxiety-related symptoms and sensations (e.g., sweating, 
nausea, hart palpitations) that arises from the belief that these sensations are the precursors 
of serious somatic, psychological, or social harm (Reiss et al., 1986). Although AS was initially 
considered as a risk factor in the development of panic disorder specifically (Cox, 1996; Reiss, 
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1991), a large body of research is currently available on the role of AS in determining dysfunctional 
responses to pain, in both clinical and non-clinical populations (e.g., Asmundson et al., 2000; 
Stewart & Asmundson, 2006). IS, or the catastrophic fearfulness of getting injured or becoming 
seriously ill (Reiss, 1991; Taylor, 1993), has received significantly less research interest than AS for 
its role in (chronic) pain. Nevertheless, its intrinsic referral to somatic complaints (i.e., injury and or 
illness) has lead some authors to propose that this factor is at least as important for understanding 
(the chronic course of) pain as AS (Carleton et al., 2005; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Taylor, 
1993; Vancleef et al., 2006). Together with TA and NA, both AS and IS might constitute latent 
vulnerability traits that can predispose individuals towards maladaptive responses to (potential) 
pain. Because of the specific referral to somatic sensations, both AS and IS can be proposed to 
be more directly related to affective responses to the confrontation with (the threat of) pain than NA 
and TA (Reiss, 1987; Taylor, 1993). Pain catastrophizing (PC) and fear of pain (FoP) are conceived 
to be most proximally related to the actual confrontation with pain, and to influence responses to 
painful experiences directly (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). Both latter factors have been suggested 
to play a crucial role in the transition from acute to chronic pain (e.g., Lethem et al., 1983; Philips, 
1987; Vlaeyen et al., 1995; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). To date, a large body of research in clinical as 
well as non-clinical populations has supported the role of PC and FoP in the amplification of pain 
and pain-related disability (e.g., Crombez et al., 1999; McCracken et al., 1996; McMurtry, 2005; 
Peters et al., 2002; Severeijns et al., 2001; Sullivan et al., 1995; Sullivan et al., 1998; Vlaeyen & 
Linton, 2000).
Each of the aforementioned anxiety and fear-related constructs has thus demonstrated to 
possess explanatory value for different maladaptive responses to (the threat of) pain. Nevertheless, 
the growing body of evidence on the role of each individual factor has stressed the need for 
an integrative view on the conceptualisation of these factors in relation to one another (Keogh 
& Asmundson, 2004). Drawing on earlier work on the structure of personality and emotional 
constructs (Lilienfeld et al., 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992), it has been proposed that a hierarchical 
model might offer an elucidating theoretical framework within which these relations can be 
understood (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Lilienfeld et al., 1993). This hierarchical model can be 
derived from the hierarchical model of ‘negative emotional constructs’ that was earlier proposed 
by Lilienfeld and colleagues (1993; see Figure 1), as a solution for the ongoing debate in the 
literature on the conceptual difference between the constructs of TA and AS in their contribution 
to anxiety and anxiety disorders (see Lilienfeld et al., 1998 for details on this controversy). It has 
been suggested that such a hierarchical model includes both general and more specific elements 
(Lilienfeld et al., 1998; Watson & Clark, 1992). More precisely, the lower levels of the model are 
assumed to represent content-specific constructs that are nested hierarchically within more 
general higher-order constructs. A hierarchical structure allows each individual construct to covary 
with the higher-order factor that it subordinates to, as well as with co-existing constructs at the 
same hierarchical level, whilst each construct is also assumed to possess unique variance that 
is unrelated to the higher-order factors and is predictive of specific affective responses (Lilienfeld 
et al., 1993). In the hierarchical model of ‘pain-relevant negative emotional constructs’ (Keogh & 
Asmundson, 2004; see Figure 1), NA sits at the very top of the model, comprising three lower-
order factors that reflect the affect types subsumed in NA: aggression, alienation, and trait anxiety 
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(Watson & Clark, 1992). Trait anxiety is further subdivided into three lower-order factors, AS, IS, 
and fear of negative evaluation (FNE), which are conceived as fundamental fears or ‘sensitivities’ 
that exert specific influences on common fears and the specific psychopathological conditions 
that we encounter in daily society (i.e., panic disorder, blood phobias, social fears) (Lilienfeld et al., 
1993; Reiss et al., 1988; Taylor, 1993). In this view, both AS and IS have been suggested to be of 
particular importance to consider for their contribution to pain and associated disability (Keogh & 
Asmundson, 2004; Vancleef et al., 2006). At the lowest level of the hierarchy, and entailing the only 
addition to the originally proposed hierarchical structure by Lilienfeld et al. (1993), the pain-specific 
fear constructs (i.e., fear of pain and pain catastrophizing) are incorporated as lower-order factors 
of IS (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). Furthermore, physical concerns, cognitive concerns, and social 
concerns are conceived as lower-order factors of AS (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004)1. Taken together, 
the hierarchical model offers an attractive conceptual framework for understanding and structuring 
the various anxiety-related construct relatively to each other, and can be of help for researchers 
who wish to understand the (in)direct contribution of each construct to the development and 
maintenance of chronic pain complaints. 
Negative 
affectivity
Trait Anxiety Agression Alienation
Fear of Negative 
Evaluation
Injury/illness 
sensitivity Anxiety sensitivity
Pain Catastrophizing Fear of pain Mental concerns Physical Concerns Social concerns
Figure 1. Representation of the hierarchical model as proposed by Lilienfeld (1993), and the modified hierarchical 
model for pain (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). The constructs assumed relevant for pain are printed in bold.
 It should be noted that this proposed hierarchical structure is not definite, and that it is open to the restructuring of its components  
 or the addition of other, yet to be identified constructs 
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Along the lines of the hierarchical model, studies have demonstrated --through the simultaneous 
consideration of several constructs in the prediction of responses to pain-- unique contributions 
of the separate constructs for divergent responses to pain, despite correlations between them
(e.g., Drahovzal, Stewart, & Sullivan, 2006; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2004; McCracken et al., 1996; 
Vancleef, Peters, Gilissen, & de Jong, 2007; Vancleef et al., 2006). Furthermore, there is consensus on 
the conceptualisation of subparts of the hierarchical model, such as the higher-lower- order relation 
between NA and TA, or between TA and AS (e.g., Lilienfeld et al., 1998; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & 
Norton, 2003; Watson & Clark, 1992). Nevertheless, the hierarchical model of ‘pain-relevant negative 
emotional constructs’ has never been formally tested yet. Before doing such a test (e.g., with 
confirmatory factor analyses, structural equation modelling), it may valuable to examine some of the 
basic tenets of the model first; that is the appropriate operationalisation of the constructs in the model 
and the varying degrees of specificity that are assumed to characterize the constructs in the model. 
It goes without saying that working with the constructs of the hierarchical model, as goes 
for working with any personality construct, often obliges researchers to rely on self-report measures 
that serve as their operationalisation. In the area of pain, a diversity of self-report instruments 
has been developed that intend to provide specific assessments of the higher and lower-order 
factors that reside in the hierarchical model. Often, researchers choose to work with one particular 
measure (often the most prevalently used measure in the field of research) to represent one 
particular construct, partially because of practical considerations (e.g., limiting time and workload 
constraints). In this light, it is important to point out that despite careful psychometric and validity 
evaluations of each self-report measure, caution is warranted in assuming a one-to-one relation 
between a self-report instrument and the latent construct that it represents (e.g., Kline, 2000). 
Careful inspection of the item content of the different self-report instruments demonstrates at least 
some content-overlap in their items. This content-overlap is qualified by similarities in the broad 
meaning or content of particular items, although slight deviations in item formulation reflect their 
belongingness to different instruments. For example the items ‘I worry that I might get a serious 
physical illness in the future ’(ISI), ‘When my stomach is upset I worry that I might be seriously 
ill’ (ASI), ‘I worry all the time whether the pain will end’ (PCS), and ‘I worry when I am in pain’ 
(PASS), all refer in a broad sense to worrying about injury and illness, despite their belongingness 
to different scales. It can be questioned if respondents are capable to understand and respond to 
these items along the lines intended by constructors of the measures, and whether they are thus 
sensitive to subtle differences in item content that determine the placement of items in different 
scales. Furthermore, it can be questioned whether these different self-report measures do indeed 
tap unique latent constructs, or if the segmentation in various measures has merely resulted in 
several separate measures that are reflective of one and the same latent construct. 
The present study explored the way in which the separate items of some prevalently used 
measures of constructs in the hierarchical model group together on the basis of their perceived 
similarity. In addition, it was examined whether the operationalisations of these constructs offer 
support for the specificity dimensionality that is assumed to characterize the constructs in the 
hierarchical model. For these purposes, a large group of participants has performed a card-sorting 
task, in which the individual items of the questionnaires (written separately on small cards) had to 
be sorted into piles on the basis of perceived similarity in item content. As such, each different 
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pile of cards is assumed to contain only those items that are perceived as belonging to the same 
theoretical construct. Prior studies have used the similarity sorting task to detect the underlying 
dimensional structure and the components of pain behaviour as described by a broad range of 
pain descriptive words (Clark, Ferrer Brechner, Janal, Carroll, & Yang, 1989; Clark, Janal, Hoben, 
& Carroll, 2001; Turk, Wack, & Kerns, 1985; Verkes, Van der Kloot, & Van der Meij, 1989; Vlaeyen, 
van Eek, Groenman, & Schuerman, 1987), or to detect the organizational structure of implicit 
personality theory or human goals (e.g., Chulef, Read, & Walsh, 2001; Rosenberg & Gara, 1983). 
method
partiCipantS 
A total of 294 students performed the card-sorting task collectively at either Ghent 
University (Belgium) or Maastricht University (The Netherlands). The Ghent group (N=151) consisted 
of 151 master students at the faculty of Pedagogical and Psychological Sciences, majoring in 
psychology. The students of the University of Maastricht (N=143) were bachelor students at 
the faculty of Health, Medicine, and Life Sciences, enrolled in the health science programme. 
Participation to the card-sorting test was voluntarily, and participants received compensation for 
participating in the form of a sweetener. All participants provided information on age, gender, 
and the presence and duration of pain complaints at the moment of testing. After data reduction 
(see data reduction and statistical analyses paragraph), analyses were conducted on the card-
sorting outcomes of 249 participants. Two participants in this group provided missing data on 
the demographical information. The total group consisted of 214 females, and had a mean age 
of 21 years (sd = 1.80, range = 18-29). 37 % of the respondents indicated to experience pain at 
the moment of testing. In the group experiencing pain, 21 % reported that the pain complaints 
persisted over three months, and 20 % reported that the pain interfered with the performance of 
daily activities. 
materialS anD meaSureS 
Card sorting task and selection of sorting stimuli. The items of 10 questionnaires (125 
items; see appendix A) were printed on small cards (approximately 7 x 4 cm) without the inclusion 
of answer alternatives. The self-report measures were chosen to represent well-validated measures 
for the relevant hierarchical constructs (i.e., NA, TA, AS, IS, FoP, PC, physical concerns). To minimize 
the possibility that items would be sorted on the basis of lexical or grammatical similarity, some 
items were reformulated, and reversely scored items were excluded. In addition, questionnaires 
with a salient item format were replaced with another questionnaire assessing the same construct 
if possible (see description of questionnaires below for details). Whenever possible, the shortest 
questionnaire was chosen when more questionnaires representing one construct were available.
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Negative affectivity is represented by all items of the Negative Emotionality subscale 
(NEM) of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen, 1982). The NEM consists 
of 14 items, which do not refer directly to a somatic or health-related content. High scores on the 
NEM indicate a nervous, apprehensive, irritable, and emotionally labile personality profile. All items 
of the NEM were included in the task.
To represent the trait anxiety construct, items from the anxiety subscale from the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS; Spinhoven, Ormel, Sloekers, & Kempen, 1997; Zigmund & 
Snaith, 1983) and the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-t; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) were included. A high score on these scales is interpreted as 
reflective of a high general anxiety disposition. The HADS was originally developed for the fast 
assessment of the presence of generalized anxiety and depression symptoms in clinical and 
community samples. The items of the HADS do not relate to physical symptoms (Spinhoven et al., 
1997; Zigmund & Snaith, 1983), which makes the questionnaire insensitive to biased responses 
because of medical conditions. The anxiety subscale of the HADS contains 7 items, of which 
6 items were included in the present study while 1 item was excluded because of its reversed 
scoring format. The STAI-t contains 20 items, of which only the 10 negatively worded items were 
included in the current study.
The Injury/illness Sensitivity Index (ISI; Taylor, 1993) and the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; 
Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987) were incorporated to represent AS and IS, respectively. The ASI 
consists of 16 statements that assert the negative consequences of experiencing anxiety. The ASI 
total score is used to represent anxiety sensitivity, but it has been suggested that the questionnaire 
composes three lower-order subscales, namely physical concerns (8 items), cognitive concerns 
(4 items) and social concerns (4 items) (e.g., Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987; Zinbarg, Barlow, & 
Brown, 1997). Recent studies have suggested that especially the physical concerns subscale is 
important to consider in the context of pain (e.g., Keogh, 2004; Stewart & Asmundson, 2006). The 
ISI contains 11 items of which 6 pertain to the fear of illness and 5 refer to the fear of injury. All items 
of both the ASI and the ISI are incorporated in the present study.
Several questionnaires were included to represent the specific pain-related constructs 
that are situated at the lowest level of the hierarchical model. As such, pain catastrophizing was 
represented by all 13 items of the Pain Catastrophizing Scale (PCS; Sullivan et al., 1995). Because 
the items of the PCS are characterized by a typical wording format (e.g., ‘When I am in pain…I 
cannot think of anything besides my pain’), these items were slightly reworded (e.g., ‘I cannot 
think of anything besides my pain’). All items of the short form of the Pain Anxiety Symptoms 
Scale (PASS-20; McCracken & Dhingra, 2002) were included to represent pain-related fear. This 
measure contains 4 subscales, being fearful appraisal of pain (5 items), cognitive anxiety (5 items), 
physiological anxiety (5 items), and escape/avoidance behaviour (5 items). In addition, 13 items of 
the Tampa Scale of Kinesiophobia (TSK; Miller, Kori, & Todd, 1991) were incorporated to assess 
fear of (re)injury due to movement. Four items of the total TSK are excluded from the current study 
because of their reversed scoring format. With exclusion of the inversely scored items, the TSK 
is proposed to consist of two subscales: somatic focus (8 items) and activity avoidance (5 items) 
(Goubert, Crombez, Van Damme et al., 2004; Roelofs, Goubert, Peters, Vlaeyen, & Crombez, 
2004). All 16 items of the Fear Avoidance Beliefs Questionnaire (FABQ; Waddell et al., 1993) were 
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incorporated to represent the fearful beliefs regarding the influence of work and physical activities 
upon pain, and the avoidance of activities. The FABQ contains the following two subscales: beliefs 
regarding work-related activities (11items) and beliefs regarding physical activity (5 items). To date, 
no exact questionnaire is available to assess the physical concerns construct as residing at the 
lowest level of the hierarchy to our knowledge. It has been suggested that the physical concerns 
subscale of the ASI reflects this construct best. However, it can be argued that the FABQ and 
the PASS both possess subscales that can be conceived as measures of this construct as well. 
Nevertheless, at the stage of selecting measures for the present study, no definite allocation of one 
of the above described measures to the physical concerns construct has been made.
In addition to the questionnaires representing the anxiety-related hierarchical constructs, 
we incorporated 6 items of the Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Marlowe & Crowne, 1961) to serve 
as control items in the present study. Because of the clearly deviating content of these items from 
all other items, it is assumed that these items will be sorted in one and the same category when 
participants perform the card-sorting task conscientiously. 
Task validity checks. VAS scales were administered to assess participants’ perceptions 
regarding specific properties of the card-sorting task. Three of these VAS scales ask about the 
extent to which the participants judged the task as tiring, boring, and interesting. One question 
is included that asks about the extent to which the cards of the sorting task were found legible. 
An additional question inquires the level of concentration that the participant had during task 
performance. All VASs are rated on a 10-mm horizontal line, anchored ‘not at all’ at one extreme 
and ‘extremely’ at the other extreme.
proCeDure 
At both locations (Ghent and Maastricht), participants were tested in a lecture hall of the 
respective university buildings. Testing took place as an addendum to a lecture that participants 
attended for course requirements (i.e., health psychology course). Prior to the start of the lecture, 
students were informed about the experimental study that would be conducted afterwards, and it 
was emphasized that participation at the study was anonymous and voluntarily. After the lecture, 
a 10-minute break was introduced to allow students who wished to refrain from participation to 
leave the lecture-hall. The remaining students were asked to spread over the lecture-hall leaving 
open places in between two persons. This way, we aimed at minimizing undesirable influences that 
might originate from students working together.
Prior to taking their places, all participants received a large envelope containing the 
demographical questionnaire, the validity check questions, a written card-sorting instruction sheet, 
a stack of cards each on which one of the 125 items was printed in 12pt Arial font, and some 
rubber bands. Participants were instructed to keep the envelope closed until the experimenters 
had provided additional verbal instructions and gave the signal to open the envelope.
In the verbal instruction, participants were invited to read the instruction sheet on 
		part one
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the card-sorting task carefully before initiating the sorting task. Furthermore, participants were 
instructed to perform the card-sorting task first, and to fill out the demographical questionnaire and 
the validity checks subsequently. Participants were asked to replace the completed questionnaires 
and the piles of cards back in envelope in which they had received them. The instruction on the 
card-sorting task was formulated as follows:
‘On each of these cards, you will find one statement or sentence. Your task is to create piles with 
these cards. You can do this by placing cards into one and the same pile when you are in the 
opinion that these cards share a similar meaning. So, each card with a similar meaning ends up 
in the same pile. You can create as many piles as you think are necessary.’
During the sorting phase, which lasted between 20 and 80 minutes, the experimenters 
answered any individual questions that participants still might have after receiving and reading 
instructions. However, no help or information was provided with respect to the placements of 
cards in piles. When data collection was completed, the students were in the opportunity to attend 
a short debriefing session in which the exact goals and aims of the study were explained. 
Data reDuCtion anD Data preparation 
Participants who handed in an incomplete dataset, or who created less than three 
piles in the sorting task were excluded from further analyses (N = 27). We suspected that the 
formation of maximally two sorting piles was indicative of non-conscientious task performance. 
This suspicion was strengthened by the observation that participants who created maximally 2 
sorting piles also assigned scores to the VAS concentration measure that were equal or below 
the 10th percentile score (<= 14), and has lead to the exclusion of these participants from further 
analyses. Furthermore, participants who placed less then three of the control items in one and 
the same pile were excluded as well (N= 21). As such, card-sorting data of 249 participants were 
analyzed. 
The mean scores on the validity checks in Table 1 indicate that the remaining participant 
group rated the task as moderately tiring and boring, and to a lesser extent as interesting. 
Furthermore, the self-reported concentration level during task performance was moderate. In 
addition, the individual items on the cards were judged to be well legible. A mean number of 8 piles 
(sd = 4; range = 3-22) were created in the card-sorting task. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the validity checks in the participants group that is included in data analyses  (N= 249)
 Mean sd   Range
  VAS tiring 48.43 28.74 0-100
  VAS concentration 54.29 20.23 2-100
  VAS interesting 33.83 22.72 0-100
  VAS legible 78.93 19.40 14-100
  VAS boring 56.71 26.88 0-100
A 125x125 frequency matrix was created on the basis of the sorting data of 249 
participants. Each cell in this matrix represented the number of times that participants had placed 
two cards together in the same pile. The maximum value in a cell is thus 249 and the minimum 
value is 0. The resulting matrix is called a similarity matrix, in which higher cell numbers indicate a 
higher perceived similarity between the two items that are connected by that cell. 
StatiStiCal analySeS
Multidimensional scaling (MDS; proxscal, SPSS 11.0) was used to identify the meaningful 
underlying dimensions of the obtained data. MDS represents the items in a geometrical configuration 
of points in such a manner that highly similar items are placed closely to each other, and items 
with low similarity are placed at a larger distance from each other. The stress value, which is the 
principal measure of model fit, was inspected to decide on the most appropriate dimensional 
solution (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).
In order to explore how the individual items of the card-sorting task grouped together 
into interpretable clusters on the basis of their proximity relation, additive tree analysis (ADDTREE/
P; Corter, 1982) was conducted. An additive tree represents the items as nodes in a connected 
graph with path-lengths between two nodes representing the distance between these two nodes. 
In an additive tree, inter-cluster distances are allowed to exceed intra-cluster distances, and 
the distance between an object outside a cluster and all objects in a cluster is not forced to be 
equal. Additive trees have been proposed to be less restrictive and more flexible than ultrametric 
models (e.g., hierarchical cluster trees), and to be more suitable to represent the relations between 
observed items or objects in a similarity matrix (Corter, 1996; Sattah & Tversky, 1977). ADDTREE/P 
has been proposed as a highly flexible, easily interpretable program that makes use of an efficient 
and robust combinatorial algorithm to fit tree structures to a dataset (Corter, 1996; Corter, 1982). 
This algorithm examines and compares all possible quadruples (combinations of four elements) of 
objects to find an optimal set of objects to be combined at each step, based on the neighbours 
relation (see Corter, 1996 for mathematical details). When in one stage pairs of objects are joined, 
they are considered as one single object in each following stage. The tree construction procedure 
results in a robust measure of closeness between each pair of objects. The tree construction is 
independent of the model distances (arc lengths), and employs a least-square criterion to estimate 
		part one
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the parameters of the tree. In the graphical tree representation, the horizontal distance from an 
object in the tree to the root of the tree reflects how similar this object is to all other objects, relatively 
to the other objects that join the particular object in the same subtree. Moreover, the distance of 
each object to the root may be interpreted as indicative of the typicality of this object for the whole 
set of objects. The arcs (connecting lines) between an object and its node can be interpreted as 
the weight of this object in the cluster, or as the distinctiveness of a cluster (Corter, 1996). 
results
multiDimenSional SCaling (mDS)
MDS solution. Solutions in 1 to 6 dimensions were obtained from the MDS analyses. The Scree 
plot in Figure 2 illustrates the stress values for the 1 to 6 dimensional solutions. This graph shows 
a “stress elbow” at two dimensions, suggesting that two dimensions are the most appropriate way 
to interpret the data. A two-dimensional solution was furthermore supported by an observed stress 
value of .021, accounting for 98% of the variance in the obtained data set. In addition, the decision 
for two dimensions was supported when the interpretability of each dimension was taken as an 
additional decision criterion (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). 
Figure 2. Scree plot MDS
Labelling. Labels were assigned to the dimensions by examining the items that fall at their 
extreme poles. Figure 3 situates each item within the two-dimensional representation of the MDS 
solution, as determined by the coordinates on each dimension. The first dimension was labelled 
‘general – specific‘ and appears to offer support for the specificity dimension that is assumed to 
run through the hierarchical model.  Some examples of items that reside at the positive pole of 
the first dimension are: ‘I feel restless as if I have to be on the move’ (HADS), ‘It is important to me 
to stay in control of my emotions’ (ASI), ‘My feelings are rather easily hurt’ (NEM), ‘I feel nervous 
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and restless’ (STAI), and ‘When I make a mistake, I will not resent admitting this’ (control item). 
At the negative pole of dimension 1, the following items were situated: ‘Pain lets me know when 
to stop exercising so that I don’t injure myself’ (TSK), ‘My pain was caused by physical activity’ 
(FABQ), ‘My work aggravated my pain’ (FABQ), and ‘As soon as pain comes on I take medication 
to reduce it’ (PASS). The items on the positive pole of this first dimension thus refer to negative 
emotions, feelings, and anxiety, whereas descending this dimension involves increasing specificity 
with respect to the content and object of the negative feelings, anxiety and worrying regarding 
pain. 
The second dimension that resulted from the MDS can be labelled as ‘intrapersonal 
concerns– interpersonal concerns’. Some examples of the items that are situated at the negative 
pole are: ‘It scares me when my heart is beating fast’ (ASI), ‘When I notice that my heart is beating 
rapidly I worry that I might have a heart attack’ (ASI), ‘I worry that I might get a serious physical 
illness in the future’ (ISI), and ‘I worry about becoming physically ill’ (ISI), whereas the following 
items are situated at the negative pole of the second dimension: ‘My work is too heavy for me’ 
(FABQ), ‘I have a claim for compensation for my pain’ (FABQ), ‘I never hesitate to offer help when 
someone is in trouble’(control item), ‘People aren’t taking my medical condition seriously enough’ 
(TSK), and ‘Other people notice when I feel shaky’(ASI). These items appear to reflect the concerns 
that individuals have about the consequences, meaning and impact of pain and health problems 
for themselves, whereas items that are situated towards the positive pole of this dimension reflect 
concerns about the way in which individual pain and health complaints will have an impact on the 
evaluation by others and the work environment of the individual. By adopting a two-dimensional 
solution from the card sorting data, a meaningful dimensional structure could be assigned to the 
obtained data (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Two dimensional MDS solution with Dimension 1 running form pain specific concerns to general 
negative affective concerns and Dimension 2 running from intrapersonal concerns to interpersonal concerns
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ADDTREE solution. The additive tree is presented in Figure 4. The mathematical solution of 
this tree resulted in a stress score of .07, accounting for 87% of the variance of the observed 
similarities. The additive tree in Figure 4 reveals four main groups of items (see Table 2), and within 
those four groups, various meaningful subgroups can be detected (see Table 3). 
Interpreting main groups and subgroups in the additive tree. The first main group contains 
all items from the NEM, the HADS, and the STAI, as well as the control items, the items of the social 
sensations subscale of the ASI, and two items out of the mental concerns subscale of the ASI. 
Items in this group refer to negative mood, negative emotions, distress, worrying, nervousness, and 
anxiety, without entailing a specific referral to pain, physical health, or bodily symptoms As such 
this first main group can be labelled as representing ‘general negative emotions and anxiety’. 
The first main group clearly distinguishes two subgroups. The first subgroup contains the 
control items, the items of the social concerns subscale of the ASI, and 1 TSK item (‘People aren’t 
taking my medical condition seriously enough’). This subgroup reflects negative cognitions about 
the way in which people’s behaviour or health problems are perceived and evaluated by others. 
The label ‘negative view on others perceptions’ therefore seems to summarize this subgroup 
appropriately. The second subgroup consists of all items of the STAI, the NEM, two items of the 
mental concerns subscale of the ASI, and all but 1 item of the HADS. This second subgroup 
reflects negative emotions, distress, worrying, nervousness and anxiety in general, and can thus 
be labeled as ‘negative affect’. 
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One item of the HADS (‘I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is about 
to happen’) is only loosely linked to this second subgroup. This item might be perceived as more 
distinct from the other items because of its content. More specifically, this item describes the 
negative feeling that accompanies the expectation that something terrible will and can happen at 
any given time, and thereby implies the direct expectation for a terrible future event to happen. 
This direct expectancy of future disaster is not implied in the other items in this second subgroup, 
which are more hypothetically formulated. It might thus be suggested that this singular item refers 
to generalized anxiety in particular.
The second main group forms a tight, distinct, and small combination of two items of 
the mental concerns subscale of the ASI. The close relation between these two items can be 
understood from their specific content. These two items refer to concerns and negative beliefs that 
persons can have when they are not able to keep their mind on a task. Unlike any other item that is 
included in the dataset, these items refer to attentional and concentration problems, and as such, 
this cluster might be labelled as ‘cognitive performance concerns’.
Table 2. Four main Clusters in additive tree solution
 Items in cluster Content items  Label cluster
  1 NEM ; HADS; STAI; Control-items;  negative mood, negative emotions, distress,  Negative emotions
 ASI 1 4 8 9 10 14 (social concerns  worrying, nervousness, and anxiety, without and anxiety
 and two mental concerns)  specific referral to pain, physical health, or 
  bodily symptoms 
  2 ASI 5 16 (mental concerns subscale)  worrying about task performance in terms of  Cognitive performance
  attentional and concentrational levels concerns
  3 ISI; ASI 2 3 6 7 11 12 13 15 (physical  anxiety, worrying, and catastrophizing about  Physical health concerns
 concerns); TSK 9 (‘I’m afraid that I   health, injury, illness, and the meaning of 
 might injure myself accidentally’) internal bodily sensations 
  4 PCS; PASS; TSK (except item 9 5);  catastrophic cognitions on negative impact  Pain-specific concerns
 FABQ  of pain on physical and mental functioning; 
  the uncontrollable nature of pain; feelings of 
  helplessness; worrying about impact of work 
  and activity on pain 
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  Main cluster Sub clusters Items Item Description
  1. Negative  1.1 Negative view on  Control items;  Negative cognitions concerning the way
   emotions and  others perceptions ASI 1 4 9 14;  in which ‘others’ perceive and evaluate a
 anxiety  TSK 5  person’s physical health complaints
  1.2 Negative affect NEM; Negative mood, negative emotions, 
   HADS;  distress, worrying, nervousness, and 
   STAI;  anxiety with no specific referral to pain, 
   ASI 8 10  physical health, or bodily symptoms 
  1.3 Generalized anxiety HADS 2  ‘I get a sort of frightened feeling as if  
    something awful is about to happen.’
  2 Cognitive  ASI 5; Attention, concentration
  performance   ASI 16
 concerns  
  3  Physical health 3.1 Physical concerns ASI 2 3 6 7 11 Fear of anxiety related bodily sensations, e.g.,
   concerns  12 13 15  sweating, nausea, heart   
    palpitations
  3.2 ISI 1 2 4 5 6 7 Worrying and catastrophizing thoughts about
   8 10 11;  potential physical illness or injury 
   TSK 9
  3.3 ISI 3;  ‘I would be awful to have a serious illness’;
   ISI 9  ‘It would be awful to be injured in any way.’
  4. Pain-specific  4.1 Catastrophizing PCS 1 2 3 4 5 6  Catastrophic cognitions concerning the 
 concerns  7 8 9 10 11 13 negative impact of pain on physical and  
   PASS 1 5 12 14 mental functioning, the uncontrollable nature  
   17 21 22 24 25 26 of pain; feelings of helplessness
   32 33 34 37   
  4.2 Escape/Avoidance PCS 12; Impact that activity and work will have on the
   PASS 7 15 19 23 deterioration and persistence of pain  
   36 39; problems 
   FABQ;  
   TSK 1 2 17 14 10 13 15 
  4.3 Harm TSK 6 3 11 7  Cognitions on body as signaler of harm
The third main group combines all items of the ISI, the items of the physical concerns 
subscale of the ASI, and one TSK item (‘I am afraid that I might injure myself accidentally’). Items in 
this cluster reflect anxiety, worrying, and catastrophic cognitions concerning health, injury, illness, 
and the meaning of internal bodily sensations, and are thus characterized by the specific referral to 
physical health and putative consequences of future physical health problems. This cluster might 
best be labelled as representing ‘physical health concerns’. Two demarcated subgroups can be 
derived within this third main cluster. The first subgroup contains ASI physical concerns items only, 
Table 3. Meaningful sub clusters within four main groups of additive tree solution
Fear of 
injury and 
illness
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and can be labelled ‘physical concerns’. The other subgroup contains all but two items of the ISI 
and one TSK item, and can therefore be labelled as ‘fear of injury and illness’. In addition to these 
two subgroups, a third subgroup combines two ISI items that reflect how terrible it would be to get 
injured someday in one or the other way, and how terrible it would be to have a serious physical 
injury. It might be suggested that these two items are found to form a distinct cluster because 
of their salient negative formulation (i.e., ‘awful’; ‘vreselijk’ in Dutch). Based on the content of 
the items, it might be suggested that they are most appropriately considered and interpreted as 
belonging to the fear of injury and illness cluster.
The fourth main group that resulted from the additive tree contains all items of the PCS, 
the FABQ, the PASS, and all but two items of the TSK. As such, this cluster covers catastrophic 
cognitions and negative beliefs regarding the impact of pain on physical and mental functioning, 
and on the uncontrollable nature of pain. This group can be labelled as ‘pain-specific concerns’ 
and subsumes two larger subgroups of items. One of these subgroups can at its turn be 
subdivided in two interpretable subgroups. According to Corter (1996), interpretability forms a 
criterion for deciding on the demarcation of coherent entities in the tree model. Consequently, 
three meaningful and interpretable clusters are considered to exist within the fourth main group of 
the additive tree. The first subgroup entails all items of the fearful appraisal, the cognitive anxiety 
and the physiological anxiety subscales of the PASS, as well as all but one items of the PCS. This 
subscale reflects catastrophic cognitions that one can hold concerning the negative impact that 
pain exerts on physical and mental functioning, the uncontrollable nature of pain, and feelings of 
helplessness because of the pain. This cluster can be labelled as ‘catastrophizing’. The second 
subgroup contains the items of the FABQ, items of the TSK activity avoidance subscale (except the 
items that appeared in main group 1 and 3), and the items from the escape-avoidance behaviour 
subscale of the PASS. As such, this subgroup can be labelled as ‘escape/avoidance’. The third 
subgroup, then, contains items of the harm subscale of the TSK only, and can be labelled ‘harm’. 
Interpreting relative distances from items to the root of the tree. The additive tree that 
results from the ADDTREE program provides information on the extent to which items form a 
typical representation of the entire set of items as well (Corter, 1996). Since all items of the card-
sorting task were derived from self-report instruments assessing pain-relevant negative emotionality 
constructs, the entire dataset (i.e., all items) is assumed to reflect the broad concept of negative 
emotions relevant for pain. By inspecting the distance from each item to the root of the tree, one 
can derive conclusions about each item’s representativeness for this broader concept. Figure 3 
shows that items of the ASI, the ISI, and the physical sensations subscale of the PASS show the 
smallest distance to the root of the tree, suggesting that these items are the best representatives 
of negative emotions relevant for pain within the current dataset. On the other hand, the control 
items of the SDS and the FABQ items show the largest distance to the root of the tree, indicating 
that these items are less good representatives of pain-relevant negative emotions. 
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dIsCussIon
The present study explored the dimensional and organisational structure of various pain-
relevant negative emotional constructs that have been proposed to reside within a hierarchical 
model of pain-relevant negative emotional constructs (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Lilienfeld 
et al., 1993). Since these emotional constructs are commonly assessed by means of separate 
self-report measures, empirical study methods were used to examine the cluster formation and 
the underlying dimensional structure of the most elementary representatives of the hierarchical 
model: the individual items of self-report scales that function as operationalisation of the theoretical 
constructs in the model. Results of these analyses demonstrated that naïve persons structured 
and perceived the content of the self-report items in a way that echoes the proposed theoretical 
hierarchical structure significantly.
The additive tree analysis revealed four main clusters to exist within the current data set: 
(1) negative emotions and anxiety, (2) cognitive performance concerns; (3) physical health concerns; 
and (4) pain-specific concerns. Tracking these clusters back to the hierarchical model, cluster 1 
can be conceived as representing the upper two ‘general negative construct’ levels, cluster 2 and 
cluster 3 represent the ‘fundamental fear’ level, and cluster 4 reflects the ‘pain-specific’ lowest level 
of the model (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). Moreover, meaningful subgroups could be detected 
within each main cluster, which corresponded largely to the individual constructs that reside in the 
model (i.e., negative affect, physical concerns, fear of injury and illness, catastrophizing, escape/
avoidance, and harm). 
The additive tree solution reveals a number of noteworthy findings regarding the formation 
of clusters within the current dataset in relation to the self-report measures that were chosen as 
representatives for the theoretical constructs within the hierarchical model. First, items of ‘general’ 
constructs (i.e., NEM, HADS, and STAI) were found to be scattered within their main cluster and 
over its subclusters, whilst items of ‘specific’ constructs (ASI, ISI, and specifically the fear-of pain 
measures) showed less dispersion within and across (sub)clusters. This finding can be interpreted 
as additional support for the general and specific content of these self-report scales. Hence, items 
of the NEM, the HADS, and the STAI all refer to general negative affectivity without them being 
focussed at a specific object of negative emotionality. Conversely, the ASI, ISI, PASS, TSK, PCS, 
and the FABQ are directly focussed at a specific feared object (i.e., injury, illness, disability, bodily 
sensations, etc.) and this can account for the formation of more tight clusters with these particular 
items. Furthermore, the spreading of NEM, HADS, and STAI items over different subclusters 
corroborates the suggestion that negative affectivity and trait anxiety are likely to reflect the same 
psychological construct because of similarity in their primary characteristics (Barlow, 2000; Zinbarg 
& Barlow, 1996). 
Second, when the four main groups are taken as the cluster criterion, it is remarkable 
that for most self-report measures (i.e., the NEM, the STAI, the ISI, the HADS, the PCS, the FABQ, 
and the PASS) items belonging to one of these scales are found to cluster together with the other 
items of this specific scale. This indicates that items of each of these scales are perceived as 
highly similar to each other, supporting the robustness of the separate measures in reflecting a 
homogeneous and coherent content. At the lower levels of the additive tree solution, meaningful 
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(sub)clusters are rarely found to contain items of one and the same self-report measure only, but 
are formed by the combination of items that originate from different questionnaires. From this 
finding, additional support for the constructional strength of the self-report instruments can be 
derived. After all, it is well acknowledged that a ‘good’ questionnaire needs to have a balanced 
degree of variability and overlap in its item content, in order to capture all components of the 
construct that it aims to tap (e.g., Kline, 2000). Nevertheless, since the meaningful subclusters 
that correspond to the theoretical constructs of the hierarchical model are formed by inter-scale 
clustering predominantly, caution is warranted in relying on one singular self-report measure when 
one wants to tap one latent psychological construct of the model. 
When inspecting the item content of the meaningful (sub)clusters, it is remarkable that 
items of the ASI, the PASS, and the TSK cluster on the basis of their subscales. The items of the 
ASI physical concerns subscale consistently cluster together in a ‘physical concerns cluster’, and 
form the main ‘physical health concerns’ cluster in combination with items of the ISI. Based on 
this observation, it might be speculated that associations between the ASI and the ISI in previous 
studies might have originated predominantly from associations between the ISI and the physical 
concerns subscale of the ASI (Carleton et al., 2005; Vancleef & Peters, in press; Vancleef et al., 
2007; Vancleef et al., 2006). Moreover, corroborating the suggestions made by several authors, 
it might be argued that the ASI physical concerns subscale, rather than the other two subscales, 
is particularly important to examine in relation to maladaptive behavioural patterns in the context 
of pain (e.g., Hunt, Keogh, & French, 2006; Keogh, 2004; Stewart & Asmundson, 2006). The 
social concerns and the cognitive concerns subscales of the ASI are found to cluster together 
with items that refer to general negative emotions and anxiety. The spreading of ASI subscale 
items is suggestive of different levels of specificity to be perceived in the content of the ASI items 
in the current card-sorting context, and may pose difficulties for considering the ASI total score in 
examining the influence of AS in the context of pain. It has been recognized that various levels of 
specificity contribute in a different extent to varying responses to pain (e.g., Hadjistavropoulos et 
al., 2004; McCracken et al., 1996). 
The PASS and the TSK were also found to group on subscale level. Three of the four 
PASS subscales cluster together with the PCS items in the ‘catastrophizing’ cluster. The escape/
avoidance subscale of the PASS was found to cluster in the ‘escape/avoidance’ cluster with the 
FABQ and activity avoidance items of the TSK. The splitting of the PASS into its subscales is 
perfectly matched to the content and supposed measurement of each subscale, and stresses the 
importance and relevance of working with the subscales of the PASS in predicting responses to 
pain (Coons, Hadjistavropoulos, & Asmundson, 2004; McCracken & Dhingra, 2002) Unlike the ASI 
subscales, the PASS subscales are found to cluster within the same main cluster group (i.e., pain-
specific concerns’), indicating that all PASS items are perceived to possess a similar specificity 
level. Congruently with advocates of a two-factor structure of the TSK (i.e., ‘somatic focus’ and 
‘activity avoidance’), the current results furthermore offer support for the consideration of two 
subscales in the TSK (Goubert, Crombez, Van Damme et al., 2004; Roelofs, Goubert et al., 2004), 
although TSK subscales do not cluster coherently together, with some items falling into other main 
cluster groups as well. Recently, it was suggested that an 11-item version of the TSK (i.e., with 
exclusion of the reversely scored items, item 9, and item 14) is a psychometrically more sound 
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measure than the 17-item TSK (Roelofs et al., in press; Woby, Roach, Urmston, & Watson, 2005). 
Sustaining this suggestion, item 9 was found to deviate significantly with respect to its content 
from the other TSK-items in the additive tree solution as well. Taken together, observations on 
the splitting of the ASI, the PASS, and the TSK in their subscales offer reasons to reconsider the 
usage of total scores of these questionnaires as representatives for specific constructs, and argue 
in favour of working with the respective subscales of these constructs. Conversely, the FABQ, the 
ISI, and the PCS are not found to group together on the basis of their subscales. Therefore, it may 
be speculated that it is not meaningful to adopt the subscales of these measures in pain research 
since respondents perceive items of these subscales as similar in content. 
In addition to information on the grouping of individual items into meaningful clusters, the 
additive tree offers information on the belongingness of each individual item to the general concept 
of ‘pain-relevant negative emotional constructs’. Showing the smallest distance to the root of 
the tree, the items of the ISI, the physical concerns subscale of the ASI, the escape/avoidance 
subscale of the PASS, and the somatic focus subscale of the TSK can be interpreted as the most 
‘prototypical’ examples of the general concept that is represented by the total item set. All of 
these items refer directly to worrying and anxiety on the meaning and consequences of (potential) 
physical sensations, injury, and illness. It may be proposed that these (sub)scales are particularly 
suitable to adopt when one wants to examine pain-relevant affective states. Conversely, together 
with the control items, the FABQ items are found to be most distally related to the general concept 
of pain-relevant negative emotions. The FABQ items refer to cognitions and beliefs that persons 
hold concerning the impact of work and activity on the causation, persistence and deterioration 
of pain complaints (Waddell et al., 1993). Since these fear/avoidance beliefs are directed at the 
deteriorative effects of activity and work on pain, rather than being directed at negative affective 
states because of the pain (anxiety, worrying, catastrophizing), they are less suitable to reflect pain 
relevant negative emotions. In a similar vein, items of the escape avoidance subscale of the PASS 
and the activity avoidance subscale of the TSK are also found to show rather distal relations with 
the concept of pain-relevant negative emotions. 
Besides support for the hierarchical organization of distinguishable pain-relevant negative 
constructs, the current study furthermore provided empirical evidence for the proposed general-
specific dimensional structure to underlie the constructs in the hierarchical model (Lilienfeld et al., 
1993; Watson & Clark, 1992). More specifically, the MDS analyses resulted in two interpretable 
dimensions, of which one could be easily labelled as running from general negative concerns 
on one pole to pain-specific negative concerns on the other pole. In addition, the MDS analysis 
revealed a second underlying dimension along which the items of the current data set could be 
structured. This second dimension was labeled to run from inter- to intra personal concerns. 
Although not originally expected, this dimension makes sense within the current biopsychosocial 
view on pain that stresses the importance of biological, psychological, and social influences on 
pain and pain-related disability (e.g., Turk & Flor, 1999). Moreover, it has been suggested that a 
wide range of fears, affecting varying life domains, does occur in the context of pain. These fears 
are not restricted to the actual presence of pain, injury, and illness; but are directed at future 
possible health status and interpersonal relationships as well (Morley & Eccleston, 2004). The 
finding of two dimensions to underlie the items in the current task indicate that respondents who 
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performed the card-sorting task do acknowledge and recognize this range of feared objects in the 
items of the incorporated self-report measures.
Some limitations have to be taken in consideration when interpreting the current findings. 
Obviously, there is a considerable degree of subjectivity in interpreting resulting dimensions and 
clusters that is inherently connected to the exploratory methods that are used to detect meaningful 
clusters and underlying dimensionality. The current study should therefore be perceived as a first 
step towards detecting meaningful clusters in the categorization of items of general anxiety and 
pain-relevant anxiety constructs. Replication in other samples, including pain patient samples is 
warranted. Furthermore, further studies should address the issue of external validity of the current 
findings by including self-report measures that intend to tap the same constructs as the self-
report measures that have been incorporated in the current study (e.g., the Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scale (DASS), the posttraumatic stress disorder checklist (PCL), the survey of pain attitudes 
(SOPA), the fear of pain questionnaire (FPQ) etc…). Relating to this latter issue, it is furthermore 
evident that the self-report items that were chosen to be included in the card-sorting task (i.e., 
the input) determine the resulting organizational structure in clusters and dimensions (i.e., the 
output). In this perspective, the incorporation of only pain-relevant self-report measures might 
have impeded sorting of the items that do not directly refer to pain or physical health. The current 
findings can therefore not be generalized to the broadened area of negative emotional disorders. 
Other cluster solutions might be revealed when self-report measures for other negative emotional 
constructs had been incorporated as well (e.g., fear of negative evaluation scale (FNE); Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI); Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI), etc. ). 
In sum, the present study demonstrates that naïve persons, who do not possess 
prior knowledge on the organisational structure of the 125 items in the card-set, are well able to 
categorize items of different self-report measures into the theoretical constructs that they intend to 
represent. To our knowledge, this study is the first to provide empirical support for the hierarchical 
structure of pain-relevant negative emotional constructs by examining the individual items of self-
report measures that are commonly used to reflect these constructs. Further research, including 
formal statistical testing of the hierarchical model, will be needed to clarify the merits of working 
with the hierarchical constructs in explaining maladaptive behavioural, cognitive and affective 
responses to pain and disability. 
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  appeNdix. Items in the card-sorting task
  
  Item	 Item	description	Dutch	 Item	description	English	translation
  NEM-3 Ik wissel vaak van een gelukkig naar een droef gevoel,  I often change from a happy to a sad feeling or reversed
 of omgekeerd, zonder dat daar een goede reden voor is.  without having any good reasons for it
  NEM-4 Ik voel me dikwijls ‘gewoon ellendig’ zonder enige goede reden. I often feel ‘just miserable’ without any good reason for it
  NEM- 6 Kleine tegenvallers ergeren me soms teveel.  Minor setbacks sometimes irritate me too much.
  NEM-7 Ik raak dikwijls geërgerd door kleine irritaties.  Often I get irritated at little annoyances.
  NEM-10 Ik maak me vaak bezorgd over iets I often find myself worrying about something
  NEM-11 Mijn gevoelens worden nogal snel gekwetst. My feelings are rather easily hurt
  NEM-12 Ik lijd aan zenuwachtigheid. I suffer from nervousness.
  NEM-14 Mijn stemming gaat dikwijls op en neer. My mood often goes up and down.
  NEM-16 Af en toe ervaar ik sterke emoties (zoals angst, woede) zonder  Occasionally I experience strong emotions – anxiety, 
 dat ik echt weet wat ze veroorzaakt. anger- without really knowing what is causing them
  NEM-18 Ik schrik vlug van dingen die zich onverwacht voordoen. I am easily ‘rattled’ at critical moments.
  NEM-19 Ik raak vaak in een toestand van spanning en onrust als ik aan  I often feel tensed and agitated when thinking about daily
 dagelijkse dingen denk matters
  NEM-21 Ik laat mijn slaap soms omwille van mijn zorgen. I often find it difficult to sleep at night.
  NEM-23 Er zijn dagen dat ik voortdurend het gevoel heb dat ik het niet   I often feel fed up.
 aankan.
  NEM-24 Ik ben gevoeliger dan goed voor me is. I am more sensitive than is good for me
  HADS-1 Ik voel me de laatste tijd gespannen. I feel tense or ‘wound up’.
  HADS-2 Ik krijg de laatste tijd het angstige gevoel alsof er elk moment I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something awful is  
 iets vreselijks zal gebeuren.  about to happen.
  HADS-3 Ik maak me de laatste tijd ongerust. Worrying thoughts go through my mind.
  HADS-5 Ik krijg de laatste tijd een soort benauwd, gespannen gevoel in  I get a sort of frightened feeling like ‘butterflies’ in my mijn  
 maag.  stomach.
  HADS-6 Ik voel me de laatste tijd rusteloos. I feel restless as if I have to be on the move.
  HADS-7 Ik krijg de laatste tijd plotseling gevoelens van angst en paniek. I get sudden feelings of panic.
  STAI-2 Ik voel me nerveus en onrustig. I feel nervous and restless
  STAI-4 Ik kan een tegenslag maar heel moeilijk verwerken. I find it difficult to cope with misfortune
  STAI-5 Ik voel me in vrijwel alles tekort schieten. I feel like putting short in lots of things
  STAI-8 Ik voel dat de moeilijkheden zich opstapelen zodat ik er niet  I feel as if the difficulties are accumulating so I can’t stand  
 meer tegenop kan. them no longer
  STAI-9 Ik pieker te veel over dingen die niet zo belangrijk zijn. I worry about things that are 
  STAI-11 Ik word geplaagd door storende gedachten. I am teased by unpleasant thoughts
  STAI-12 Ik heb gebrek aan zelfvertrouwen. I have a lack of self-confidence
  STAI-17 Er zijn gedachten die ik heel moeilijk kan loslaten. There are thoughts that I find difficult to let go of
  STAI-18 Ik neem teleurstellingen zo zwaar op dat ik ze niet van me  I take disappointments so hard that I cannot let go
 af kan zetten.
  STAI-20 Ik raak helemaal gespannen en in beroering als ik denk aan  I feel tensed and agitated if I think of my latest concerns
 mijn zorgen van de laatste tijd.
  ISI-1 De gedachte aan verwonding benauwt me. The thought of injury terrifies me.
  ISI-2 Ik kan de gedachte dat ik gewond zou kunnen raken niet  I can’t stand the thought of being injured.
 verdragen.
  ISI-3 Het is vreselijk om een ernstige lichamelijke ziekte te hebben. I would be awful to have a serious illness.
  ISI-4 Ik maak me zorgen dat ik in de toekomst een ernstige  I worry that I might get a serious physical illness in the   
 lichamelijke ziekte kan krijgen.  future.
  ISI-5 Ik maak me zorgen over mijn lichamelijke gezondheid. I worry about my physical health.
  ISI-6 Ik word bang als ik er aan denk dat ik ziek ga worden. I get scared if I think I am coming down with an illness.
  ISI-7 Ik ben bang om gewond te raken. I am frightened of being injured.
  ISI-8 De gedachte aan lichamelijke ziekte maakt me angstig. The thought of physical illness scares me.
  ISI-9 Het zou verschrikkelijk zijn om op enigerlei wijze gewond  It would be awful to be injured in any way.
 te raken.
  ISI-10 Ik maak me zorgen om geblesseerd te raken. I worry about being injured.
  ISI-11 Ik maak me zorgen om lichamelijk ziek te worden. I worry about becoming physically ill.
  ASI-1 Ik vind het belangrijk om niet zenuwachtig over te komen. It is important to me not to appear nervous.
  ASI-2 Als ik merk dat mijn hart snel klopt, maak ik me zorgen dat ik  When I notice that my heart is beating rapidly I worry that  
 een hartaanval zal krijgen.  I might have a heart attack.
  ASI-3 Het maakt me bang als ik misselijk ben. It scares me when I am nauseous.
  ASI-4 Andere mensen merken het aan me als ik me trillerig voel. Other people notice when I feel shaky.
  ASI-5 Het maakt me bang als ik mijn gedachten niet bij een taak  It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a kan  
 houden.  task.
  ASI-6 Ik ben bang als ik me slapjes voel (trillerig). It scares me when I feel shaky (trembling).
  ASI-7 Het maakt me bang als mijn hart snel klopt. It scares me when my heart is beating fast.
  ASI-8 Als ik nerveus ben maak ik me zorgen dat ik mentaal niet  When I am nervous, I worry that I am mentally ill.
 in orde ben.
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  ASI-9 Ik schaam me als mijn maag rommelt. It embarrasses me when my stomach growls.
  ASI-10 Ik word bang als ik zenuwachtig ben. It scares me when I am nervous.
  ASI-11 Het maakt me bang wanneer ik me wee voel. It scares me when I feel faint.
  ASI-12 Het maakt me bang wanneer ik buiten adem raak. It scares me when I am out of breath.
  ASI-13 Ongewone lichamelijke gevoelens maken me bang. Unusual body sensations scare me.
  ASI-14 Ik vind het belangrijk om mijn emoties de baas te blijven.  It is important to me to stay in control of my emotions
  ASI-15 Als mijn maag van streek is maak ik me zorgen dat ik ernstig  When my stomach is upset, I worry that I might be ziek  
 ben.  seriously ill.
  ASI-16 Als ik mijn gedachten niet bij mijn werk kan houden maak ik  When I cannot keep my mind on on a task, I worry that I  
 me zorgen dat ik gek word.  might be going crazy.
  PCS-1 Ik vraag mij voortdurend af of de pijn wel zal ophouden I worry all the time about whether the pain will end.
  PCS-2 Als ik pijn heb voel ik dat ik zo niet verder kan. When I am in pain I feel I can’t go on.
  PCS-3 Als ik pijn heb is dat verschrikkelijk en denk ik dat het nooit  If I am in pain, this is terrible and I think it’s never going to  
 beter zal worden.  get any better.
  PCS-4 Pijn is afschuwelijk en overweldigt mij. Pain is awful and overwhelms me.
  PCS-5 Als ik pijn heb voel ik dat ik het niet meer uithoudt. If I’m in pain I feel as if I can’t stand it anymore.
  PCS-6 Ik word bang dat de pijn erger zal worden. I become afraid that the pain may get worse.
  PCS-7 Ik blijf denken aan andere pijnlijke gebeurtenissen. I keep thinking of other painful experiences.
  PCS-8 Ik verlang hevig dat de pijn weggaat. I anxiously want the pain to go away.
  PCS-9 Ik kan de pijn niet uit mijn gedachten zetten.  I can’t seem to keep the pain out of my mind.
  PCS-10 Ik blijf eraan denken hoeveel pijn het wel doet. I keep thinking about how much it hurts.
  PCS-11 Ik blijf eraan denken hoe graag ik zou willen dat de pijn ophoudt. I keep thinking about how badly I want the pain to stop.
  PCS-12 Er is niets dat ik kan doen om de intensiteit van de pijn te  There is nothing I can do to reduce the intensity of the   
 verminderen.  pain.
  PCS-13 Als ik pijn heb vraag ik mij af of er iets ernstigs kan gebeuren.  When I’m in pain I wonder whether something serious   
 may happen.
  PASS-1 Ik denk dat als mijn pijn te erg wordt, hij nooit meer minder  I think that if my pain gets too severe, it will never zal   
 worden.  decrease.
  PASS-5 Wanneer ik pijn voel, ben ik bang dat er iets vreselijks gaat  When I feel pain, I am afraid that something terrible will  
 gebeuren.  happen.
  PASS-7 Ik ga onmiddellijk naar bed wanneer ik hevige pijn voel. I go immediately to bed when I feel severe pain.
  PASS-12 Ik begin te trillen wanneer ik bezig ben met iets dat de pijn  I begin trembling when engaged in an activity that   
 erger maakt.  increases pain.
  PASS-14 Ik kan niet helder nadenken wanneer ik pijn heb. I can’t think straight when in pain.
  PASS-15 Ik houd op met waar ik ook mee bezig ben als ik pijn voel  I will stop any activity as soon as I sense pain coming on.
 opkomen.
  PASS-17 Pijn lijkt mijn hart te laten bonzen of sneller te laten kloppen. Pain seems to cause my heart to pound or race.
  PASS-19 Zodra pijn opkomt neem ik medicijnen om het te verminderen. As soon as pain comes on I take medication to reduce it.
  PASS-21 Wanneer ik pijn voel, denk ik dat ik ernstig ziek zou kunnen zijn. When I feel pain I think I might be seriously ill.
  PASS-22 Tijdens perioden met pijn is het moeilijk voor me om aan iets  During painful episodes, it is difficult for me to think of   
 anders dan de pijn te denken.  anything besides the pain.
  PASS-23 Ik vermijd belangrijke bezigheden wanneer ik pijn lijd. I avoid important activities when I hurt.
  PASS-24 Als ik pijn bespeur, voel ik me duizelig of slap. When I sense pain, I feel dizzy or faint.
  PASS-25 Pijngevoelens zijn angstaanjagend. Pain sensations are terrifying.
  PASS-26 Als ik pijn lijd, dan denk ik voortdurend aan de pijn. When I hurt, I think about the pain constantly.
  PASS-32 Van pijn word ik misselijk. Pain makes me nauseous.
  PASS-33 Wanneer pijn sterk opkomt, denk ik dat ik verlamd of meer  When pain comes on strong I think that I might become  
 gehandicapt zou kunnen worden.  paralyzed or more disabled.
  PASS-34 Ik vind het moeilijk om me te concentreren wanneer ik pijn lijd. I find it hard to concentrate when I hurt.
  PASS-36 Ik vind het moeilijk mijn lichaam tot rust te laten komen na  I find it difficult to calm my body down after periods of   
 perioden met pijn.  pain.
  PASS-37 Ik maak me zorgen wanneer ik pijn heb. I worry when I am in pain.
  PASS-39 Ik probeer bezigheden te vermijden die pijn veroorzaken. I try to avoid activities that cause pain.
  FABQ-1 Mijn pijn is het gevolg van lichamelijke activiteit. My pain was caused by physical activity.
  FABQ-2 Door lichamelijke activiteit wordt mijn pijn erger. Physical activity makes my pain worse.
  FABQ-3 Lichamelijke inspanning kan schadelijk zijn voor mijn rug. Physical activity might harm my back.
  FABQ-4 Ik zou geen lichamelijke activiteit moeten verrichten waardoor  I should not do physical activities which (might) make my  
 mijn pijn erger wordt of zou kunnen worden.  pain worse.
  FABQ-5 Ik kan geen lichamelijke activiteit verrichten waardoor  I cannot do physical activities which (might) make my   
 mijn pijn erger wordt of zou kunnen worden.  pain worse.
  FABQ-6 Mijn pijn is het gevolg van mijn werk of van een ongeval  My pain was caused by my work or an accident.
 op mijn werk.
  FABQ-7 Door mijn werk is mijn pijn verergerd. My work aggravated my pain.
  FABQ-8 Ik heb een eis tot schadevergoeding ingediend vanwege  I have a claim for compensation for my pain. 
 mijn pijn.
  appeNdix (coNTiNued)
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  FABQ-9 Mijn werk is te zwaar voor mij. My work is too heavy for me.
  FABQ-10 Door mijn werk verergert mijn pijn of, als ik zou werken,  My work makes or would make my pain worse.
 zou mijn pijn verergeren.
  FABQ-11 Mijn werk kan schadelijk zijn voor mijn rug. My work might harm my back.
  FABQ-12 Ik zou mijn normale werk eigenlijk niet moeten doen met de  I should not do my normal work with my present pain.
 pijn die ik nu heb.
  FABQ-13 Ik kan mijn normale werk niet doen met de pijn die ik nu heb. I cannot do my normal work with my present pain.
  FABQ-14 Ik kan mijn normale werk niet doen zolang ik niet word  I cannot do my normal work till my pain is treated.
 behandeld voor mijn pijn.
  FABQ-15 Ik denk niet dat ik binnen drie maanden mijn normale  I do not think that I will be back to my normal work within  
 werk weer kan doen.  3 months.
  FABQ-16 Ik denk niet dat ik ooit mijn normale werk kan hervatten. I do not think that I will ever be able to go back to my   
 normal work.
  TSK-1 Ik ben bang om bij het doen van lichaamsoefeningen letsel  I am afraid that I might injure myself if I exercise.
 op te lopen.
  TSK-2 Als ik me over de pijn heen zou zetten, dan zou hij erger worden. If I were to try to overcome it, my pain would increase.
  TSK-3 Mijn lichaam zegt me dat er iets gevaarlijk mis mee is. My body is telling me I have something dangerously   
 wrong.
  TSK-5 Mijn gezondheidstoestand wordt door anderen niet serieus  People aren’t taking my medical condition seriously   
 genoeg genomen.  enough.
  TSK-6 Door mijn pijnprobleem loopt mijn lichaam de rest van mijn  My accident has put my body at risk for the rest of my   
 leven gevaar.  life.
  TSK-7 Mijn pijn betekent dat er sprake is van letsel. Pain always means I have injured my body.
  TSK-9 Ik ben bang om per ongeluk letsel op te lopen. I am afraid that I might injure myself accidentally.
  TSK-10 De veiligste manier om te voorkomen dat mijn pijn erger wordt,  Simply being careful that I do not make any unnecessary  
 is gewoon oppassen dat ik geen onnodige bewegingen maak.  movements is the safest thing I can do to prevent my   
 pain from worsening.
  TSK-11 Ik had wellicht minder pijn als er niet iets gevaarlijks aan de  I wouldn’t have this much pain if there weren’t something  
 hand zou zijn met mijn lichaam.  potentially dangerous going on in my body.
  TSK-13 Mijn pijn zegt me wanneer ik moet stoppen met  Pain lets me know when to stop exercising so that I don’t  
 lichaamsoefeningen doen om geen letsel op te lopen.  injure myself.
  TSK-14 Voor iemand in mijn toestand is het écht af te raden om  It’s really not safe for a person with a condition like mine  
 lichamelijk actief te zijn.  to be physically active.
  TSK-15 Ik kan niet alles doen wat gewone mensen doen, omdat ik te  I can’t do all the things normal people do because it’s too  
 gemakkelijk letsel oploop.  easy for me to get injured
  TSK-17 Ik zou geen lichaamsoefeningen hoeven doen wanneer ik No one should have to exercise when he/she is in pain.
 pijn heb.
  CONT-3 Ik heb wel eens van iemand geprofiteerd. There have been occasions when I took advantage of   
 someone
  CONT-4 Als ik een fout maak, ben ik altijd bereid deze toe te geven. When I make a mistake, I will not resent admitting this 
  CONT-5 Ik ben altijd beleefd, zelfs tegen onprettige mensen I am always polite, even if people are not polite to me
  CONT-6 Ik aarzel nooit me in te spannen om iemand te helpen die in  I never hesitate to offer help when someone is in trouble
 moeilijkheden verkeert
  CONT-7 Als ik iets niet weet, vind ik het helemaal niet erg om dat toe  When I don’t know something, I don’t at all mind 
 geven  admitting it
  CONT-11 Ik heb nooit iets met opzet gezegd waardoor de gevoelens  I have never deliberately said something that hurt van een  
 ander werden gekwetst  someone’s feelings
  appeNdix (coNTiNued)
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Part II
Experimental studies on the vulnerability role of 
psychological factors in the onset and maintenance 
of pain
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Chapter 4
Understanding the role of injury/illness sensitivity 
and anxiety sensitivity in (automatic) pain 
processing: An examination using the Extrinsic 
Affective Simon Task
This chapter is published as:
Vancleef, L. M. G., Peters, M. L., Gilissen, S M. P., De Jong, P. J. (2007) Understanding the role of 
injury/illness sensitivity and anxiety sensitivity in (automatic) pain processing: an examination using 
the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task. The Journal of Pain, 8, 5-572
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Automatic threat appraisal for pain
abstraCt
Three fundamental fears are assumed to underlie psychopathology: Anxiety Sensitivity 
(AS), Injury/illness sensitivity (IS), and Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE). Both AS and IS may form 
risk factors for the development and exacerbation of chronic pain. The current research examines 
the relation between these fears and automatic threat appraisal for pain-related stimuli. Study 1 
(N=48) additionally examined content-specific associations of AS and FNE with the automatic threat 
appraisal of respectively panic and social evaluative cues. Study 2 (N=60) additionally focussed 
on the association of IS and AS with the engagement in health protecting behaviour, and the use 
of health care services. Both studies found evidence for an automatic threat appraisal of aversive 
stimuli. Study 2 demonstrated a positive association between the automatic threat appraisal for 
pain-related stimuli and individuals’ IS levels. IS was found to be the single best predictor of the 
tendency to engage in health protecting behaviour, whereas AS was the single best predictor of 
the reported use of health care services. 
Perspective. This study contributes to the field of knowledge on putative risk factors for chronic 
pain. Results demonstrate an automatic threat appraisal towards pain-related stimuli that is related 
to vulnerability traits for pain. This automatic threat appraisal might initiate relatively spontaneous 
(non-strategic) pain-maintaining behavioural responses.
IntroduCtIon
When trying to understand why some people develop chronic pain whereas others do 
not, an important role is assigned to the presence of vulnerability factors. One such vulnerability 
factor is anxiety sensitivity (AS). AS is defined as the fear of anxiety symptoms (e.g., heart 
palpitations) arising from the belief that these symptoms will lead to harmful somatic, psychological 
or social consequences (Reiss et al., 1986). Together with injury/illness sensitivity (IS) and fear 
of negative evaluation (FNE), AS is considered to be one of the three fundamental fears that are 
assumed to underlie various psychopathological conditions (Taylor, 1993). AS has been studied 
mostly as a risk factor for panic disorder (Schmidt & Cook, 1999). Yet, since AS is characterized by 
dysfunctional cognitions regarding bodily sensations, AS has also been considered as a potential 
risk factor for maladjustment to (chronic) pain (Asmundson & Norton, 1995; Asmundson et al., 
2000). Accordingly, AS was found to be associated with fear of pain, pain-specific avoidance 
behaviour and elevated medication use in chronic pain patients, and negative pain responses after 
experimental pain induction (Asmundson et al., 2001; Keogh & Birkby, 1999; Keogh & Mansoor, 
2001).
IS, defined as exaggerated and excessive worrying about future injury and illness, may be 
another vulnerability factor for the development of chronic pain and disability (Vancleef et al., 2006). 
In support of this, IS was found to be a better predictor for fear of pain and pain catastrophizing 
than AS, and to be the single best predictor of imminent fear of experimentally induced pain 
(Vancleef et al., 2006). 
		part two
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Besides personality traits, dysfunctional cognitions can be considered as latent 
vulnerability factors for the chronic course of pain. According to the cognitive-behavioural model 
of chronic pain, emotional and behavioural responses to pain are largely determined by the 
interpretation and cognitive appraisal of a situation (Pincus & Morley, 2001). Information processing 
theories state that dysfunctional beliefs and interpretations of innocuous stimuli as threatening form 
the core of anxiety and affective disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997). The identification of a personally 
relevant negative stimulus is assumed to automatically activate a threat-processing template that 
guides reflexive responses on the basis of the initial threat impression (Beck & Clark, 1997). Similar 
processes are assumed to be involved in (fear of) pain. If indeed confrontation with a pain-related 
stimulus automatically triggers an affective evaluation of this stimulus as threatening, this may 
subsequently elicit pain-maintaining behaviours and cognitions, contributing to the chronic course 
of pain. 
The automatic evaluation of stimuli can be studied by means of indirect measures such 
as the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003). Indirect measures overcome the 
disadvantage of limited cognitive accessibility and differential self-presentation tendencies inherent 
to direct, self-report measures (De Houwer, 2003; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Moreover, they offer the 
advantage of studying individuals’ automatic and spontaneous responses that putatively differ 
from their controlled responses (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Huijding & de Jong, 2006). 
In two subsequent studies we used the EAST to examine whether elevated levels 
of IS and AS are associated with the automatic threat appraisal of pain-related stimuli. Study 
1 additionally explored the relation between enhanced levels of the fundamental fears and the 
content-specificity of the automatic threat appraisals. Based on the specific content of each 
fundamental fear, it is expected that FNE and AS will show a strong and unique association with 
a threat appraisal towards social threat and panic-related stimuli, respectively. Although both IS 
and AS are hypothesized to be associated with an enhanced threat appraisal towards pain-related 
stimuli, IS is assumed to show the strongest association with this threat appraisal. 
Study 2 zoomed in on the association between AS and IS and automatic threat appraisals 
of stimuli directly related to health-threats. In addition, Study 2 examined the predictive validity of 
IS and AS for the use of health care services and individuals’ self-reported tendency to engage 
in health protecting behaviours, and the putative additional predictive value of automatic threat 
appraisals over and above IS and AS. 
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StuDy 1
method
partiCipantS
Forty-eight healthy participants (36 female) with a mean age of 21.8 years (range: 18-43, 
SD = 4.36), recruited at Maastricht University’s local community, took part in this study. Inclusion 
criteria for participation were being in good physical and mental health, and having Dutch as 
a mother tongue. Colour blindness and dyslexia were exclusion criteria. Compliance with these 
criteria was verbally checked prior to making an appointment by asking participants directly 
whether they were (i) currently free from acute or chronic (> 3 months) pain complaints, and (ii) not 
currently diagnosed as having a mental health disorder. All participants gave informed consent and 
were financially compensated for their participation. The research proposal was approved by the 
Ethics Committee of the Academic Hospital Maastricht/Maastricht University. 
materialS anD meaSureS
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST). In the present EAST, coloured target words (panic-
related, pain-related and social evaluation-related nouns) and white attribute words (threatening 
and neutral adjectives) were presented one-by-one on a computer screen. Participants are 
instructed to respond to the colour of the target words (green or blue) and to the content of the 
white attribute words (threatening or neutral meaning) by pressing a left or a right response button. 
Participants first practiced with these instructions and the different type of response required 
during two practice phases. In the first practice phase, white attribute words are presented and 
participants learn to react to the content of the words; one button (e.g., left) has to be pressed 
for words with a threatening meaning and the other button (e.g., right) for words with a neutral 
meaning. The assignment of the attribute with either the threatening or neutral meaning to a specific 
response button results in an intrinsic association between the location of the response button and 
the attribute meaning (e.g., left button becomes associated with threat; right button becomes 
associated with neutral). In the second practice phase, the coloured target words are presented 
and participants now learn to respond to the colour of the words; one button (e.g., left) has to be 
pressed for green words, the other button (e.g., right) for blue words. In the subsequent test phase 
of the EAST white attribute and coloured target words are randomly presented and responses have 
to be made as learned in the prior practice phases. The coloured target words of the test phase 
constitute of the critical trials; participants have to respond to colour only and ignore the meaning 
of these words, but it is assumed that this meaning will be processed automatically. Under this 
assumption, compatible and incompatible trials can be identified. The compatible trials are those 
trials in which the response button and the target word share the same evaluative meaning (e.g., 
		part two
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press the left button for coloured pain-related words), and the incompatible trials are those trials 
in which the response button and the target word share a contradictive evaluative meaning (e.g., 
press the right button for coloured pain-related words). It is expected that responses will be faster 
and more accurate on compatible than on incompatible trials.
Panic-related (6), pain-related (6), and social evaluation-related (6) nouns were used 
as target words in the present EAST. The attributes consisted of threatening (6) and neutral (6) 
adjectives (see Appendix 1). All words were presented on a black background on a 17”computer 
screen. Before the presentation of each word, a fixation dot appeared during 500 ms in the centre of 
the computer screen. Participants responded by pressing the right or the left button of a response 
box. The time between the onset of the word and the first key press and response accuracy were 
measured. If the wrong response was given, an error message appeared on the screen, which 
disappeared after the correct response was given. The next word was presented 1200 ms after 
a correct response. To counteract potential response location effects, we counterbalanced the 
location of the required response button over participants, giving four different versions of the 
task. We created a fixed random word list using the following restrictions: (1) the same word was 
never presented on two or more consecutive trials, (2) the same stimulus colour did never appear 
on more than four consecutive trials, and (3) the required response was never the same on four 
or more consecutive trials. The task was implemented with MEL V 2.0 and was executed on a 
Pentium- S, 133 mHz computer.
Self-report measures. In correspondence with our previous studies, the three fundamental 
fears (AS, IS, FNE) are assessed by administering one questionnaire to participants that combines 
items from three scales that measure each fear separately (Vancleef & Peters, 2006; Vancleef et 
al., 2006). As such, this questionnaire incorporates the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) to measure 
AS with 16 items that ask about possible negative consequences of experiencing anxiety. IS is 
assessed with the Injury/illness Sensitivity Index (ISI), of which 6 items pertain to the fear of illness 
and 5 items refer to the fear of injury. The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE) measures 
the fear of negative evaluation with 12 items. Participants indicated their degree of agreement with 
all statements on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all agree) to 5 (absolutely agree). The 
psychometric properties of the English version of the ASI (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987), the BFNE 
(Carleton, McCreary, Norton, & Asmundson, 2006; Leary, 1983) and recently the ISI (Carleton et 
al., 2005) have well been documented. Internal consistency and 6-month test retest reliability of 
the ASI, ISI, and BFNE in our combined questionnaire proved to be satisfactory (Vancleef & Peters, 
2006; Vancleef et al., 2006). 
proCeDure 
Participants were seated behind a pc to perform the EAST and to fill out the questionnaires. 
All participants started with the implicit measure (i.e., EAST) and completed the self-report measures 
subsequently (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). Instructions for the EAST appeared on the 
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screen and encouraged participants to work as fast and accurate as possible. After reading the 
instructions, participants could initiate the task by pressing a button on the response box. In the 
first practice phase, the 12 attribute words were each presented twice in a random order. In the 
second practice phase, the 18 target words were each presented twice – once in each colour– in 
a random order. The test phase consisted of 60 trials, presenting all attribute and target words 
twice. The whole task consisted of 120 trials, and it took about 15 minutes to complete the task. 
The experimenter followed task progress in an adjacent room.
analytiCal plan
Data analyses were conducted on the coloured trials from the EAST test phase only. 
Because affective Simon effects are known to emerge in error data as well, analyses were 
performed on both the reaction time data and the error percentages (De Houwer, 2003). For the 
reaction time analyses, only reaction times on trials with a correct first response were taken into 
account. Following the recommendations made by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998), 
reaction times below 300 ms and above 3000 ms were set at 300 ms and 3000 ms respectively, 
and all reaction times were log-transformed (log-rt). For reasons of clarity, however, raw reaction 
times are used when presenting means and standard deviations (De Houwer, 2003).
 Mean reaction times and error percentages were calculated for the ‘compatible’ trials 
and for the ‘incompatible’ trials. Next, a 3 (category: pain vs. panic vs. social evaluation) x 2 
(compatible vs. incompatible) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the log-rt and the 
errors. The automatic threat appraisal was further examined with paired-t-tests for each category 
separately. Next, an EAST-score was calculated by subtracting the mean compatible score from 
the mean incompatible score for each target category separately, for both the reaction times (EAST- 
rt) and the errors (EAST-error). A positive EAST-score reflects a threatening appraisal of the target 
category. Correlations between the self-report measures and the EAST scores are computed with 
Pearson correlation coefficients.
results
Descriptive statistics for the target categories are presented in Table 1. The 3 x 2 ANOVA 
on the log-rt revealed a main effect of compatibility (F(1,47) = 9.92, p = .003, d = .17). Participants 
responded generally faster when the required response was associated with a threatening 
meaning (compatible trials; M = 662, sd =109) than when it was associated with a neutral meaning 
(incompatible trials; M = 701, sd = 139). There was no main effect of category (F(2,46) = .26, p = 
.77), nor an interaction effect of category x compatibility (F(2,46) = 1.28, p = .28). The repeated 
measures ANOVA on the error data revealed no significant effects.
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Table 1. Mean reaction times (in ms) and mean error percentages (sd) on compatible and incompatible trials, 
calculated separately for the three target categories. N = 48
 Reaction time Error percentage
 Compatible Incompatible Compatible Incompatible
  Panic 654 (124) 699 (147) 9 (14) 11 (19)
  Pain related 661 (139) 711 (181) 10 (14) 9 (15)
  Negative evaluation 672 (136) 692 (155) 9 (13.) 7 (11)
Although the ANOVA revealed a non-significant interaction, inspection of the raw mean 
scores in Table 1 indicates differences within categories. Post hoc t-tests demonstrated significant 
faster responses on compatible trials for the panic category, t(48) = -2.35, p = .023, the pain-
related category, t (48) = -2.99, p = .004, but not for the negative evaluation category, t(48) = -.67, 
p = .51. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the ASI, ISI, and BFNE, and Pearson correlations 
with the EAST scores. Only the correlation between the EAST-error score and the BFNE reached 
significance.
Following De Houwer (2003), the reliability of the EAST was determined by calculating 
the correlations between the EAST-scores on the first and the second half of the experimental test 
phase for each category. For the log-rt data, this resulted in a significant correlation for the panic 
words only, r = .35, p = .015. The correlations for the pain-related words (r = -.042) and the social 
evaluation words (r = .21) were not significant. The same pattern emerged from the error data, r = 
.44, p = .002 for the panic words and non-significant correlations for the pain-related (r = .09) and 
the social evaluation words (r = .12).
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the self-report measures and Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the EAST-scores for the three target categories and the scores on the self-report measures (N = 48)
 Descriptives        
 Mean  Range ASI BFNE EAST-rt  EAST-rt EAST-rt  EAST-err  EAST-err  EAST-err
 (sd)    Pain Panic Neg. Eval Pain Panic  Neg. Eval.
  ISI 23.92  13-48 .66* .13 .06 .17 .19 -.09 -.07  -.02
 (8.34)  
  ASIa 11.19  1-36   1 .43* .25 .12 .10 -.10 -.17  .16
 (7.05)   
  BFNE 27.40  12-55     1 -.04 .10 -.00 .02 -.07  .39*
 (9.86)    
NoTe. EAST-rt = the EAST score for the log-transformed reaction times; EAST-err = the EAST score for the error 
percentage; ASI = Anxiety sensitivity Index; ISI = Injury/illness Sensitivity Index; BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale; a because the scoring format of the ASI in this study (1-5) deviates from the original ASI (0-4), 
we transformed ASI scores to correspond with the original scale to enhance comparability with other research 
reporting about the ASI  * p< 0.01 
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dIsCussIon
Results indicate the presence of an automatic threat appraisal towards the pain-related 
and panic-related words. However, no evidence emerged to sustain the idea that this threat 
appraisal relates to the presence of elevated levels of AS or IS. Likewise, no evidence emerged 
for a specific relation between AS levels and a threat appraisal for panic-related stimuli. However, 
although no significant EAST effect is found for the negative evaluation category, the EAST-error 
score of this category is the only score that correlates positively with FNE. This might be due to the 
affective value of the stimulus words. The words that represent the social evaluation category are 
more ambiguous of nature (e.g., stranger), probably only triggering negative affective valence for 
those who are especially sensitive to the negative content of these words. The pain-related and the 
panic stimuli on the other hand, have a generally negative affective valence (e.g., heart palpitation, 
physician), which might make it difficult to reveal individual variability. The ability to detect these 
individual differences might require a more sensitive EAST than the current one.
We therefore conducted a second study, in which we modified the EAST so that it 
became a more sensitive tool to study the hypothesized association between an automatic threat 
appraisal for stimuli that are reflective of pain, injury, and illness, and individual differences in IS 
and AS levels. Study 2 furthermore incorporates two measures that contribute to studying the 
predictive value of IS and AS for health related behaviours, namely the use of health care services 
and the self-reported tendency to engage in health protecting behaviour.
StuDy 2
method
partiCipantS
Sixty participants (46 female) with a mean age of 22.6 years (range: 18-47; sd = 
5.64), recruited at the local community of Maastricht University participated in Study 2. Inclusion 
and exclusion criteria were identical to Study 1, with the additional exclusion criterion of prior 
participation in Study 1. All participants gave informed consent and received financial compensation 
for participating. Due to technical problems, the EAST data from two participants were missing, 
and data analyses were conducted on 58 participants. The research protocol was approved by the 
internal ethical review committee of the research institute Experimental Psychopathology (EPP).
		part two
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materialS anD meaSureS
EAST. The EAST was modified in order to obtain a more sensitive measure of the automatic 
threat appraisal (De Houwer, 2003). First, we focussed on pain-related stimuli only. This allowed us 
to incorporate more compatible and incompatible trials in the test phase of the EAST, increasing 
task reliability without affecting task duration. It has been suggested that the EAST yields more 
reliable and accurate results as more trials are included, but the advantage of more trials needs to 
be weighed against the potential disadvantage of boredom and fatigue that may accompany long 
tasks (De Houwer, 2003; Teige, Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 2004). Second, because it has 
been suggested that in priming measures such as the EAST, associations are being activated on 
basis of the exemplars of a target category, rather then category labels we replaced some target 
words (De Houwer, 2001). Replacements were based on a pilot in which 15 volunteers rated the 
degree to which putative stimuli words were representative for the categories injury or illness, threat 
or safety. Third, we changed the unipolar attribute dimension (i.e., neutral – threatening) into a 
bipolar attribute dimension (i.e., safe- threatening). Finally, we changed the software that delivered 
the EAST from MEL to E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 2002). The better clock facilities 
of E-prime may contribute to the task’s sensitivity as well.
The target category in the EAST consisted of 6 nouns, referring to illness (e.g., cancer), 
injury (e.g., invalid), and pain (e.g., wound). The attribute categories consisted of 6 ‘threatening’ 
words and 6 ‘safe’ words (Appendix 1). In the first practice phase, each attribute word was 
presented three times, resulting in 36 trials. The second practice phase consisted of 12 trials 
presenting each target word once in each colour. In accordance with De Houwer (2003), the test 
phase started with two warm-up trials that were randomly chosen from the attribute list. Next, 
target words were presented three times in each colour, and the attribute words were presented 
equally often as the coloured words. Increasing the number of attribute words in the test phase 
helps to maintain and strengthen the association between the response buttons and the assigned 
attribute, increasing task sensitivity as well. Following the recommendations of De Houwer (2003), 
two identical test blocks were presented consecutively, creating the possibility to check for eventual 
boredom or fatigue effects.
The test phase consisted of 148 trials (two identical blocks of 74 trials), and the entire 
EAST consisted of 196 trials, taking about 20 minutes to complete. Counterbalancing principles, 
presentation times, and randomization restrictions were applied conform Study 1. The task was 
executed on a Pentium-S, 133mHz computer in a laboratory setting. 
proefschrift165x240_.indd   82 10-09-2007   10:55:43
		|83
Automatic threat appraisal for pain
Self-report measures.
Anxiety sensitivity and Injury/illness sensitivity. Anxiety sensitivity and Injury/illness 
sensitivity were measured with the ASI and ISI (see Study 1). 
Health protecting behaviour. Individuals’ tendency to act in a health-protecting 
manner was assessed with twelve vignettes that were created for this study (see Appendix 2). 
Each vignette contains a description of a situation that implies a certain health risk. Respondents 
need to imagine themselves being in these particular situations. The description is then followed 
by a question that asks about a health-protecting behaviour that can be posed as a reaction 
to the described situation. The vignettes cover two groups of health protecting behaviours; i.e., 
medical help seeking behaviour (6 descriptions) and escape/avoidance behaviour (6 descriptions). 
Participants have to indicate the degree of certainty with which they belief they would engage in the 
proposed behaviour (‘definitely not’; ‘probably not’; ‘probably’; ‘certainly’). The answers to each 
question are scored from 1 to 4, with higher scores on the vignettes indicating more engagement 
in the health protecting behaviour. The internal consistency of the vignette list was satisfactory 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.66).
Use of health care services. A second behavioural measure in this study was 
obtained by administering a self-created 6-item questionnaire, inquiring for the use of health care 
services in the last twelve-months. Three items referred to the number of visits to the general 
practitioner, and the over-the-counter and prescription medication usage in the past three months. 
The other three items referred to the number of visits to a medical specialist, a physical or manual 
therapist, and an alternative healer in the past twelve months. The questions could be answered 
by choosing between four alternatives that quantified the use of the specific health care service 
(‘not at all’; ‘once or twice’; ‘three or four times’, and ‘more then four times’). The answers are 
scored from 1 to 4, and a sum score is calculated with higher scores indicating more use of health 
care services. 
proCeDure
The procedure was largely the same as in Study 1. Upon termination of the EAST, 
participants completed the vignettes, the use of health care questionnaire, the ASI, and the ISI. 
		part two
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analytiCal plan
Data preparation followed the same procedure as in Study 1. After calculating compatible 
and incompatible scores, analyses were performed on the log-rt and the error percentages with 
a 2 (evaluative response: compatible vs. incompatible) x 2 (experiment half: half 1 versus half 2) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Paired-t-tests examined whether participants were faster and more 
accurate on compatible trials than on incompatible trials, and EAST scores (EAST-rt and EAST-
error) were computed. Next, scores on the ISI, the ASI, the vignettes, and the use of health care 
services were correlated with each other and with the EAST scores using Pearson correlation 
coefficients. To examine the contribution of AS and IS in the explanation of the automatic threat 
appraisal we carried out linear regression analyses with AS and IS as the independent variables 
and EAST scores as the dependent. Next, separate linear regression analyses were performed 
with the vignette scores and the use of health care services as the dependent variables. In the first 
step of this regression analysis, AS and IS were entered as predictors. The implicit threat appraisal 
score was entered in the second step to test whether the implicit measure had additional predictive 
value for both behavioural measures.
results
Mean reaction times and error percentages were calculated for the compatible (Mrt = 
618, sd= 136; Merror = 4.07, sd = 4.83) and the incompatible trials (Mrt = 631, sd = 113; Merror = 
8.33, sd = 6.80). The 2 (compatible vs. incompatible) x 2 (half 1 vs. half 2) ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of experiment half (F(1,57) = 5.38, p = 0.024, d = .086) for the log-rt, with faster responses 
in the second half than in the first half of the experiment, and a main effect of compatibility for the 
log-rt (F(1,57) = 5.21, p = .026, d = .084) and the errors (F(1,57) = 19.53, p = .000, d = .25). The 
interaction between compatibility and experiment half was not significant. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the self-report measures, the vignettes, and 
the use of health care services questionnaire. The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows a positive 
correlation between the EAST-rt and the ISI, indicating that higher levels of IS were associated with 
stronger automatic threat associations. The correlation with the ASI was marginally significant (p 
= .066). The correlations between the EAST-error and the ISI or the ASI were not significant. The 
predictive value of IS and AS for the EAST-rt was examined by entering both measures in a linear 
regression analysis. The resulting model did not reach significance (F(2,55) = 2.79, p = .07, R2= 
.09, R2adjusted =.06), with ß = .12, t = .741, p = .46 for AS as predictor, and ß = .22 , t = 1.42, p 
= .16 for IS as predictor. When the same analysis was conducted on the error data, again neither 
AS or IS proved significant predictors. 
The reliability of the EAST was calculated as in Study 1, showing a significant correlation 
between the first and the second experimental half, r = .36, p = .005 for the log-rt data. The 
correlation that was calculated within the error data did not reach significance (r = .19). 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the self-report measures, the use of health care services, and health protecting 
behaviour (N=60), and Pearson correlation coefficients with the EAST-scores (N=58)
 Descriptives
 Mean Range ASI Use health care  Health protect  EAST-rt EAST-err
 (sd)   services behaviour 
  ISI 22.05 11-47 .58** .00 .44** .29* -.00
 (8.38)
  ASIa 8.28  0-40         1 .42** .38** .24+ -.02
 (6.86) 
  Use health care  9.22 6-15                        1 .28* .12 .08
  services (2.30) 
  Health protect
  behaviour 28.65 19-43                           1 .22+ .25+
 (4.87) 
NoTe. EAST-rt = the EAST score for the log-transformed reaction times; EAST-err = the EAST score for the error 
percentage; ASI = Anxiety sensitivity Index; ISI = Injury/illness Sensitivity Index; a because the scoring format of 
the ASI in this study (1-5) deviates from the original ASI (0-4), we transformed ASI scores to correspond with the 
original scale to enhance comparability with other research reporting about the ASI; ** p < 0.01; * p< 0.05; + p< 
0.10
Table 3 also shows that the vignette scores correlate positively and significantly with 
both IS and AS, whereas the use of health care services correlates significantly with AS only. 
Furthermore, the EAST-rt showed a marginally significant (p = .094) correlation with the score 
on the vignettes. Table 4 presents the results of the regression analyses on the behavioural 
measures. Entering both IS and AS as predictors of health protecting behaviour resulted in an 
overall significant model (F(2,55) = 7.66, p = .001, R2 = .22, R2adjusted =.19) with IS being the 
only significant predictor (ß = .33 , t = 2.28, p = .027). Entering the EAST-rt in the second step of 
the analysis did not significantly add explanatory variance to the scores on the vignettes (F(3,54) 
= 5.22, p = .003, R2 = .22, R2adjusted =.18; ΔF(1,54) = .50, p = .48, ΔR2 = .007). The regression 
analysis on the use of health care services showed significance for the overall model when AS and 
IS were entered in the first step of the analysis (F(2,55) = 6.52, p = .003, R2 = .19, R2adjusted = 
.16), with AS being the only significant predictor (ß = .51 , t = 3.44, p = .001). The EAST-rt score 
could not explain additional variance (F(3,54) = 4.33, p = .008, R2 = .20, R2adjusted =.15; ΔF(1,54) 
= .15, p = .70, ΔR2 = .002).
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Table 4. Summary statistics of the regression analyses with the ASI, the ISI and EAST-rt as predictors of health 
protecting behaviour and the use of health care servicesa
 Dependent  Variable B SE B ß t p
 Health protecting behaviour  Step 1 ASI .13 .10 .19 1.31 .20
 (Analysis 1)   
  ISI .19 .09 .33 2.28 .03 
 Step 2 ASI .13 .10 .19 1.29 .22
  ISI .19 .09 .33 2.24 .04 
  EAST-rt 4.47 6.36 .09 .70 .48
 Use of health care services  Step 1 ASI .17 .05 .51 3.44 .001
 (Analysis 2)     
  ISI -.00 .04 -.16 -1.07 .29 
 Step 2 ASI .17 .05 .50 3.37 .001 
  ISI -.00 .04 -.17 -1.12 .27 
  EAST-rt 1.19 3.04 .05 .40 .69
NoTe. Analysis 1, Step 1 R2 = .19, Step 2 ∆R2 = .007. Analysis 2, Step 1 R2 = .19 , Step 2 ∆R2 = .002.; ASI = Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index; ISI = Injury/illness Sensitivity Index; EAST-rt= EAST score for the log-transformed reaction times; 
Significant predictors are presented in boldface
a Regression analyses were performed with an EAST-index as implicit variable as well, which was calculated as the 
average of the z-transformed rt scores and the z-transformed error scores, and is suggested to counteract possible 
speed-accuracy variations, resulting in maximized predictive power of the EAST. Results of the regression analysis 
did not deviate from the results presented with the rt scores however. 
general	dIsCussIon	
Results of both studies showed that aversive stimuli (either pain-related or panic-
related) automatically elicit threat associations. The strength of these threat associations appeared 
independent of individuals’ specific fear levels. The latter finding may be explained by the fact 
that the pain- and panic-related words in the current task hold a generally negative or threatening 
affective connotation. Therefore, it is likely that irrespective of specific fears people will have 
negative attitudes towards these stimuli, and previous research using similar implicit tasks showed 
that general threat words may elicit automatic threat associations irrespective of prior fear (de Jong 
et al., 2003). Similarly, Goubert, Crombez, Hermans, and Vanderstraeten (2003) report about a 
general implicit negative attitude towards back-stressing pictures in healthy individuals, using an 
affective priming task. In Study 2, we implemented several modifications to the EAST to obtain 
a more sensitive measure. To check if the modifications were beneficial for the reliability of the 
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measure, we examined split-half reliabilities of the EAST effects, demonstrating an increase in 
the reliability from Study 1 (-.042) to Study 2 (.36) for the EAST effect on the pain-related target 
category.
As hypothesized, Study 2 demonstrated that higher IS levels were associated with more 
pronounced automatic threat appraisals of health-threatening stimuli. A similar relationship between 
AS and automatic threat appraisal did not reach significance although a trend was observed. It 
should be acknowledged, however, that the target words in Study 2 were chosen in such a way 
that they captured ‘pain-related targets’ that are relevant for a healthy population (i.e., injury, illness, 
and general pain stimuli). This choice has the drawback that these words are less content-specific 
for AS. Using highly specific targets that referred to anxiety-related sensations (e.g., breathless, 
palpitation), it was recently found that high AS individuals automatically associated these stimuli 
with harmful health consequences (Lefaivre, Watt, Stewart, & Wright, 2006). So, it seems that 
the automatic elicitation of threat appraisals depend on whether stimuli are used that correspond 
to the current concerns of the individual. Although the importance of current concerns in the 
occurrence of specific cognitive biases was already demonstrated in previous studies (Riemann & 
McNally, 1995), the suggestion of automatic elicitation of content-specific cognitive bias conflicts 
with the assumption that automatic negative biases do not show content-specificity (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994). 
Up to now, only a few studies have looked into automatic processing biases in relation 
to chronic pain. These studies gave evidence for negative biases at the strategical, but not at the 
automatic level (Snider, Asmundson, & Wiese, 2000). Further research is necessary to establish 
the robustness and conditional circumstances of the operation of automatic biases in chronic 
pain. As such, it remains to be established if AS and IS also relate to automatic threat appraisals 
when target words are specific for chronic pain, like sensory pain (e.g., stabbing, pulsating), or 
emotional pain (e.g., unbearable, killing). However, since the present target words were already 
closely connected to the central cue of chronic pain (i.e., pain), it seems safe to predict that 
automatic threat appraisals will extend to specific pain stimuli as well.
It might be that AS and IS relate to different aspects of biased processing of information 
in which pain is somehow involved. IS has been identified by prior research as the single best 
predictor of fear of imminent pain prior to a pain induction procedure (Vancleef et al., 2006), whereas 
AS has been found to be associated with more pain following pain induction (Keogh & Birkby, 
1999; Keogh & Mansoor, 2001; Lang, Sorrell, Rodgers, & Lebeck, 2006), and elevated analgesic 
use in chronic pain patients (Asmundson & Norton, 1995; Asmundson et al., 2000; Vincent & 
Walker, 2001). Consistent with this IS in the present study was found to be the single best predictor 
of the engagement in health protecting behaviour, whereas AS was the sole predictor for the use 
of health care services. Hence the present findings stimulate further speculation on the specific 
predisposing role that both constructs may play in the pain process. Since IS embodies worrying 
about getting injured or becoming ill, it refers to the expected catastrophic consequences of future 
pain experiences. Likewise, the vignettes tap individuals’ opinion on how they will react should they 
ever encounter the described situation, thereby mirroring future-oriented behaviour. In contrast, AS 
refers to the negative consequences of current bodily sensations. The use of health care services 
reflects action that one undertakes in response to experienced bodily sensations. Thus, the present 
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findings add to the idea that IS and AS may be relevant for explaining complementary aspects 
of pain-related behaviours, and it seems worthwhile to study further their potentially differential 
contribution to the chronic course of pain. Following on from this, it would be interesting to test 
in future research whether IS will be most predictive of automatic threat appraisals for stimuli 
specifically referring to future physical harm (e.g., disability) and AS for automatic threat appraisals 
when stimuli are used that describe common and ‘daily’ painful sensations (e.g., pain, cramp, 
headache). 
Earlier studies using the affective Simon test in the context of substance abuse and 
specific phobia not only demonstrated that implicit attitudes (reflexive associations) can diverge 
from explicit attitudes (reflective associations), they also showed that implicit associations with 
complaint-related stimuli have predictive value for problem behaviours over and above explicit 
attitudes (de Jong et al., 2007; Huijding & De Jong, 2005), and have superior predictive value for 
relatively spontaneous (non-reflective) problem behaviours (Huijding & de Jong, 2006). In apparent 
contrast, the EAST-effects in the present study showed no additional predictive power in predicting 
health behaviour. One testable explanation for the absence of additional predictive value in the 
present study might be that implicit and explicit associations with respect to health threats are 
less discrepant than with respect to alcohol and spiders. In addition, it might be that relatively 
spontaneous (reflexive) behaviours are less important in the context of health threats than in the 
context of phobic complaints and substance misuse. If so, health behaviours would be guided 
predominantly by explicit considerations that can be more efficiently tapped by means of self-
report measures than by performance measures such as the EAST. However, because in the 
present study health behaviours were explicitly measured using self-report measures rather than 
observation or physiological measurement it seems more plausible to assume that the behavioural 
measures did simply not capture spontaneous behaviours that are assumed to be guided by 
automatic associations (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2006). To more definitely settle this issue it would 
be necessary to include indirect measures of strategic and spontaneous pain-related behaviours 
(e.g., reflexive increase in muscle tension when confronted with potential pain-related threat) in 
future research (e.g., Vlaeyen et al., 1999). 
Apart from the lack of an objective behavioural measure, several other limitations need to 
be considered when interpreting the current results. Relatively few studies have used the EAST to 
examine the relation between automatic associations and individual levels of personality constructs 
such as anxiety, stressing the need for replication of the current findings. Moreover, several authors 
report about unsatisfactory reliability of the EAST (Teige et al., 2004), and this concords with the 
low split-half reliability that was observed in Study 1. Nevertheless, Study 2 illustrates the possibility 
to create a more reliable and sensitive EAST by extending the number of trials and by modifying 
target category and attributes. (see also Huijding & De Jong, 2005). In addition, evidence exists 
that the EAST can be sensitive enough to predict actual behaviour (Houben, Gijsen, Peterson, 
De Jong, & Vlaeyen, 2005; Huijding & De Jong, 2005) and to differentiate between individuals 
with and without anxiety complaints (Lefaivre et al., 2006). Furthermore, the tendency to engage 
in health protecting behaviour was measured with situational descriptions that were developed 
for the current study, and further validation of this measure is recommendable. Finally, it cannot 
be ruled out that participants’ current physical or mental conditions may have affected task 
proefschrift165x240_.indd   88 10-09-2007   10:55:46
		|8
Automatic threat appraisal for pain
performance, since compliance with in- and exclusion criteria were only queried when participants 
were scheduled for a test appointment, and not on the day of testing itself. Furthermore, we did not 
use validated questionnaires to assess participant’s mental or physical state. In addition, despite 
the fact that the shift in programming software from the first to the second study is assumed to 
contribute to the measure’s sensitivity, caution is warranted when comparing data between both 
studies because differences might be partly attributable to the programming software. 
To conclude, the present study stresses the need for further research of biases 
in information processing that may originate from fast and automatic associations in memory. 
Furthermore, it opens the way for further research on the relation between automatic evaluations 
of pain-related situations and specific pain behaviour, like escape and avoidance behaviours that 
are frequently observed in chronic pain patients. Finally, the current study provides evidence for 
the importance of both IS and AS as vulnerability factors in pain processing, suggesting that both 
constructs may account for different aspects of the pain process. 
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appeNdix 1: Target and attribute words in Study 1 and Study 2a
 Study	1	 Study	2
Target Panic-related: Hart palpitation (hartklopping), panic (paniek), Health-threatening: Physician (dokter), blood (bloed), 
words tension (spanning), crowd (menigte), dyspnoea (ademnood), infection (infectie), disabled (invalide),  
 nerves (zenuwen)  cancer (kanker), wound (wond)
 Pain-related: Physician (dokter), wheelchair (rolstoel), 
 disabled (invalide), bandage (verband), 
 diagnosis (diagnose), hospital (ziekenhuis) 
 Social- evaluation-related: Stranger (vreemde), criticism
 (kritiek), shame (schaamte), rejection (afwijzing),
  impression (indruk), acceptation (acceptatie) 
Attribute words  Threat: Fatal (fataal), threatening (dreigend), Threatening: Burglary (inbraak), hate (haat), war
 dangerous (gevaarlijk), mortal (dodelijk), hostile (vijandelijk),  (oorlog), hold-up (overval), terrorism (terrorisme),
 terrible (vreselijk), violence (geweld)
 Neutral: Customary (gewoon), neutral (neutraal), objective Safe: Hug (knuffel), nice (lief), home (thuis), enjoyable
 (objectief), adult (volwassen), oval (oval), modern (modern)  (gezellig), friendship (vriendschap), fortune (geluk)
aDutch words in parentheses; words are matched on word length, frequency and number of syllables. 
appeNdix 2. The situational descriptions, formulated in the vignettes assessing the engagement in health protecting
behaviour, divided in medical help seeking behaviour and escape/avoidance behaviour
 Medical	help	seeking	behaviour	
 Situation	 Behaviour
1 Falling while walking on your socks.  Visiting a GP to have your wrist examined
 Break the fall on your wrists. Your wrist hurts.
2 Girl in the neighbourhood has meningitis. You spoke to her two weeks ago Visiting a GP for preventive medication
3 Employer offers opportunity for free medical check-up Participate in the medical check-up
4 Wisdom tooth needs to be removed. You received a prescription to Purchase the analgesics
 purchase analgesics before the procedure, even if probably not
 necessary 
5 Sudden stomach pain during the weekend. Own GP is unreachable,  Visit the unfamiliar GP
 possible to visit unfamiliar GP 
6 Reading about birth marks on the internet and their possible health  Having the spots examined 
 danger
 
 Escape/avoidance	behaviour
 Situation	 Behaviour
7 Hearing about SARS in China after you have booked a trip to China. Still travelling to China as planned *
8 Few weeks ago you twisted your ankle. This has healed;  Agree to go skiing with friends *
 friends ask if you want to go indoor skiing with them?
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9 Legionella bacterium discovered in thermal baths.  Visiting the thermal baths one week after re-opening*
 After cleaning of the water pipes the baths are open for visitors again 
10 Reading about chemical substance in your favorite diet Drink less of your favorite drink
 drink that heightens the risk at cancer 
11 Once in a while problems with your knee. Wearing a supportive brace for your knee
 Family members ask if you will join them in a long walk
12 Anti-RSI adaptations at work.  Use anti-RSI adaptations at home
 At home you work at the computer for your hobby.
* Reversely scored items
		part two
proefschrift165x240_.indd   91 10-09-2007   10:55:46
proefschrift165x240_.indd   92 10-09-2007   10:55:46
		|3
Chapter 5
Examining content specifi city of negative 
interpretation biases with the Body Sensations 
Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ)
This chapter is  in press as:
Vancleef, L. M. G., & Peters, M. L. Examining content specifi city of negative interpretation biases 
with the Body sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ). Journal of Anxiety Disorders.
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abstraCt
Cognitive biases have been suggested to act as latent vulnerability factors for the onset 
and maintenance of affective and emotional disorders. Additionally, several global and specific 
personality constructs are known to influence the course of psychopathology (e.g., trait anxiety, 
optimism, anxiety sensitivity (AS), injury/illness sensitivity (IS), fear of negative evaluation (FNE)). 
The current study examined the specificity of the relation between these constructs and a negative 
interpretation bias. 154 Healthy participants completed the Body Sensations Interpretation 
Questionnaire (BSIQ: Clark et al., 1997), measuring negative interpretations on four domains. A 
confirmatory factor analysis offered support for four factors in the BSIQ. Multiple linear regression 
analyses demonstrated that optimism is predictive of less negative interpretations. AS, IS, and 
FNE are specifically predictive of negative interpretations on the panic, other bodily symptoms, and 
social situations subscale, respectively. In addition, specific pain-related constructs were found 
most predictive of the other bodily sensations subscale. It is concluded that individual variability 
in global and specific psychological constructs is associated with a content-specific negative 
interpretation bias.
IntroduCtIon
It is now widely accepted that cognitive processing biases can act as latent vulnerability 
factors for the onset and the maintenance of emotional and affective disorders (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994). Cognitive theories on emotional disorders state that highly anxious and depressed 
individuals prioritize the encoding of threatening and negative information to prepare themselves 
to flee from potential harmful or dangerous situations (Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1997). Such 
prioritizing of information has been suggested to be specific for information that is congruent to 
the emotional state and current concerns of the individual (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). One 
cognitive bias that has frequently been studied in this light is a negative interpretation bias, which 
reflects the tendency to interpret innocuous situations, symptoms or sensations in a negative 
or threatening fashion. Research has shown that social anxious individuals often interpret social 
ambiguous situations in a negative fashion (Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; 
Vassilopoulos, 2006), and that chronic pain patients negatively interpret ambiguous pain-related 
information (Pincus & Morley, 2001). Furthermore, there is a large amount of evidence that panic 
patients interpret innocuous ambiguous sensations and situations as negative or threatening (e.g., 
Clark, 1986; Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993).
Clark et al. (1997) developed the Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ), 
as well as a brief version of the BSIQ (BBSIQ) to study the specificity of the relation between 
panic disorder and negative interpretations of autonomous bodily sensations relating to panic 
(e.g., heart palpitations, dizziness). The BSIQ assesses interpretations on four different domains: 
(1) panic-related sensations, (2) other bodily symptoms, (3) social events, and (4) general events. 
Patients with panic disorder have been found to make significantly more negative interpretations 
on the panic-related sensations subscale than patients with other anxiety disorders and healthy 
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controls (Austin, Richards, & Klein, 2006; Clark et al., 1997). In non-clinical populations, elevated 
levels of anxiety sensitivity (AS) have been found associated with negative interpretations on the 
panic-related sensations subscale as well (Richards, Austin, & Alvarenga, 2001; Teachman, 2005). 
AS, defined as the fear of anxiety symptoms (e.g., heart palpitations) that arises from the belief 
that these symptoms will lead to harmful somatic, psychological or social consequences (Reiss et 
al., 1986) has been proposed as a specific risk factor for the onset and course of panic disorder 
(Schmidt & Cook, 1999; Taylor, 1995). As such, the negative interpretation bias towards ambiguous 
bodily sensations is considered to form not only a by-product of panic disorder, but to characterize 
healthy individuals who are at risk for developing panic disorder as well. 
Hitherto, the BSIQ has rarely been used to study interpretation biases beyond the 
specified domain of panic. Nevertheless, there are reasons to assume that the measure can provide 
information on biased interpretations in other domains. Clark et al. (1997) have suggested that the 
tendency to negatively interpret bodily sensations might be characteristic of other conditions than 
panic disorder, for example hypochondria. Furthermore, several studies found that panic patients, 
anxiety patients, and healthy individuals high in AS made significantly more negative interpretations 
on all BSIQ subscales compared to healthy individuals low in AS (Clark et al., 1997; Keogh & 
Cochrane, 2002; Keogh et al., 2004; Richards et al., 2001; Teachman, 2005). Even though 
the negative bias was most specifically related to panic-related ambiguity in these studies, it is 
remarkable that anxiety pathology and individual levels of anxiety traits were predictive of negative 
interpretations in other domains as well. Keogh and Cochrane (2002) and Keogh et al. (2004) 
have extrapolated the applicability of the BSIQ outside the research area of panic to this of chronic 
pain. Starting from the knowledge that AS is conceived to serve an important role in the onset and 
maintenance of chronic pain complaints as well (e.g., Asmundson et al., 2000), they demonstrated 
that the negative interpretation bias (as assessed by the BSIQ) acted as a mediating mechanism 
in the relation between AS and affective pain responses to experimentally induced cold-pressor 
pain. This mediating effect was initially observed when the panic-related sensations subscale of 
the BSIQ was taken as the measure of negative interpretative bias (Keogh & Cochrane, 2002), and 
was later replicated when the overall BSIQ score was adopted as the mediating variable (Keogh 
et al., 2004).
The BSIQ is a direct self-report measure, and offers respondents the opportunity to 
reflect on their responses, and to rely on pre-existing beliefs and schemes in providing responses 
to each situational description. As such, the BSIQ is assumed to affect later rather than early stages 
of information processing (Beck & Clark, 1997). According to information processing theories, 
particularly cognitive biases that occur at these later elaborative stages of information processing 
are domain-specific and relate to individuals’ current concerns (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). In 
line with this, it may be suggested that the BSIQ can act as an adequate instrument to measure 
domain-specificity of interpretations in relation to both global and specific emotional constructs 
involved in psychopathology. The current study was set up as a first step to test this suggestion. 
For this purpose, several emotional constructs were included in the current study. These constructs 
were partly adopted from the hierarchical model of negative emotional constructs as proposed by 
Lilienfeld (1996). This model contains several general and specific negative emotional constructs 
that are assumed to be involved in psychopathology (i.e., anxiety). The hierarchical model is built 
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up of several levels with the higher levels representing more global and stable personality traits 
and the lower levels representing more specific constructs that are closely related with specific 
manifestations of psychopathology (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Lilienfeld, 1996; Vancleef et al., 
2006). At the higher levels of this model, dispositional fear or trait anxiety can be found, which is 
conceived as the general tendency to react fearfully to a broad range of situations. Trait anxiety 
is assumed to constitute an important trait in the onset and exacerbation of various emotional 
and affective disorders (e.g., Lilienfeld, 1996; Spielberger et al., 1970). In the current study, it is 
hypothesized that elevated levels of trait anxiety are predictive of the tendency to make more 
negative interpretations on all subscales of the BSIQ. In contrast to trait anxiety, optimism has been 
proposed as a resilience factor for the development and maintenance of psychopathology (for an 
overview see Carver & Scheier, 2005; Scheier & Carver, 1992). Optimism contributes to physical 
and psychological well being in general and thereby protects against maladaptive behavioral 
responses and cognitions (Scheier & Carver, 1992). Therefore, it is hypothesized that heightened 
levels of optimism are predictive of less negative interpretations on all BSIQ subscales. 
Both trait anxiety and optimism are global measures that are assumed to influence 
negative interpretations of ambiguity referring to panic related sensations, other bodily sensations, 
social events, and general events. To study the domain specificity of negative interpretations we 
included measures of AS, injury/illness sensitivity (IS), and fear of negative evaluation (FNE). In the 
hierarchical model of negative emotional constructs, these three constructs are nested directly 
under the higher-order factor trait anxiety. Moreover, AS, IS, and FNE are conceived as three 
fundamental fears that underlie the daily and common fears (e.g., fear of heights, blood phobia) 
that we encounter in daily society (Lilienfeld, 1996; Reiss et al., 1986; Taylor, 1993). As was already 
stated in the previous paragraph, AS is conceived as a specific risk factor for panic disorder, 
and has been suggested to contribute to chronic pain as well (Asmundson et al., 2000; Taylor, 
1995). IS is commonly defined as the exaggerated fearfulness and excessive worrying of getting 
injured or becoming seriously ill in the future (Carleton et al., 2005; Taylor, 1993). Given its intrinsic 
referral to injury and illness, IS is conceived to form a vulnerability factor for the maintenance and 
exacerbation of chronic health disorders, such as chronic pain (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Peters 
& Vancleef, in press; Vancleef et al., 2006). FNE, then, stands for the fear of being negatively 
evaluated by others (e.g., speaking in public, eating in public) and is proposed as an important 
factor in social anxiety and social phobia (Leary, 1983; Taylor, 1993). Corroborating the specific 
content of each fear, Taylor (1993) has reported about specific predictive power of FNE for social 
phobia, IS for blood phobia, and AS for agoraphobia. Furthermore, each fundamental fear has 
been found specifically related to biased processing of content-congruent information. As such, 
several studies have demonstrated the association between elevated levels of AS on the one 
hand, and the memory biases, interpretation biases, and attentional biases in which innocuous 
stimuli are processed as indicators of threat or danger on the other hand (e.g., Keogh & Cochrane, 
2002; Lefaivre et al., 2006; Teachman, 2005). Using an automatic association task, IS was found 
to be specifically related to the automatic threatening evaluation of stimuli that referred to health 
threats (Vancleef et al., 2007). In addition, it has been demonstrated that persons possessing 
elevated levels of FNE react catastrophically to innocuous social events, have a focused attention 
for social threat words, associate positive words implicitly to a smaller degree to themselves than 
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to others, and endorse more negative thoughts when they are in the prospect of performing a 
socially threatening activity (Stopa & Clark, 2001; Tanner, Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006). Regarding 
the content-specificity of the direct negative interpretations in this study, we hypothesized that 
AS, IS, and FNE would be specifically related to negative interpreting ambiguous panic-related 
sensations, other bodily symptoms, and social events, respectively. 
Because the aim of this study is to examine content-specificity of the interpretative bias 
we additionally explored the supplementary predictive value of specific negative constructs that 
are assumed to influence psychopathology directly. More specifically, we included measures of two 
pain-specific constructs that have been proposed to form lower-order factors of IS; Fear of Pain 
(FoP) and Pain Catastrophizing (PC) (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Vancleef et al., 2006). These 
constructs are known to be very closely related to the experience of pain and have been proposed 
as crucial variables in predicting the transition from acute to chronic pain (e.g., Vlaeyen & Linton, 
2000). We expected that these constructs would show a unique association with the negative 
interpretation of items from the other bodily symptoms subscale of the BSIQ only, based on the 
fact that this particular subscale contains items that are reflective of pain, injury and disability. 
In sum, the main aim of the current study is to address domain-specificity of negative 
interpretative bias with the BSIQ by examining the relation between levels of both global and 
more specific emotional constructs and negative interpretations on four domains i.e., panic-related 
sensations, other bodily symptoms, social events and general events. However, in order to be able 
to draw reliable conclusions about associations with each separate BSIQ subscale, it is advisable 
to first examine the factor structure of the BSIQ. The BSIQ was developed to comprise ambiguous 
situations on four domains that are represented by the four subscales of the measure. Both the 
total BSIQ as its subscales have proven to possess well internal consistency (Clark et al., 1997; 
Keogh et al., 2004), and the BSIQ can effectively discriminate between individuals with panic 
disorder and other anxiety disorders (Clark et al., 1997). However, no studies reporting on the 
factor structure of the measure are available to our knowledge. Therefore, we started our study 
with a confirmatory factor analysis on the BSIQ in order to verify whether the four-factor structure 
of the measure does indeed provide the best model fit to the current data.
method
partiCipantS
A total of 154 participants (51 male, 103 female), with a mean age of 26.76 years (SD 
= 9.26; range: 18 –50) was included in the study. Participants were recruited both inside and 
outside the local community of Maastricht University. Participants from within Maastricht University 
(N=79; Magee = 24.03, SD = 6.73) registered by entering their name on enlistment folders that were 
spread throughout the university buildings. Furthermore, the experimenters personally approached 
persons outside the university community (N=76; Mage = 29.06, SD = 10.65) with the question if 
they were willing to participate at the study. This latter group of participants was mainly recruited 
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within the near and far acquaintance environment of the experimenters. All participants were naïve 
as to the study aims of the research. Since all measures were administered on the pc, participants 
within the age group of 18 to 50 years were asked to participate, assuming that this group is likely 
to be acquainted with the use of computers. Before an actual test appointment was planned, the 
experimenters verbally checked whether all inclusion and exclusion criteria were fulfilled by asking 
candidate participants directly whether they were (1) in good mental health (not diagnosed with 
mental disorder- Yes or no), (2) free from acute or chronic (over three months) pain complaints (yes 
versus no), and (3) natively and fluently Dutch speaking (yes or no). 
meaSureS
Interpretation bias : Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ). The BSIQ 
(Clark et al., 1997) consists of 27 ambiguous descriptions that are placed under four subscales: 
(1) panic-related bodily sensations (7 items; e.g., ‘You notice your heart is beating quickly and 
pounding’); (2) other bodily symptoms (6 items; e.g., ‘You have developed a small spot on the back 
of your hand’); (3) social events (8 items; e.g., ‘You go into a shop and the assistant ignores you’); 
and (4) general events (6 items; e.g., ‘A member of your family is arriving home late’). Although the 
first two subscales both refer to bodily sensations, they differ in that the panic related sensation 
subscales contains autonomous sensations that are highly specific for and typically associated with 
panic attacks. The other bodily symptoms subscale relates to non-autonomous sensations and 
symptoms, not typically associated with panic, and referring to injury, illness and pain in general. 
The ambiguous descriptions are presented one-by-one on the computer screen, 
accompanied with the question ‘Why? Each description remains on screen for 5s, enabling 
participants to think about this description and possible explanations for it. Next, three alternative 
explanations are provided, one of which is negative and two neutral explanations. For the item ‘You 
notice your heart is beating quickly and pounding’, the negative explanation states ‘Because there 
is something wrong with your heart’, the two neutral explanations state ‘Because you have been 
physically active’ and ‘Because you are feeling excited’. Participants then indicate which of these 
three alternatives comes closest to their personal interpretation (ranking score). Next, participants 
rate the likelihood of each alternative explanation in percentages (0-100; rating score).
Clark et al. (1997) reported about good content and construct validity of the BSIQ, 
in that the measure was able to differentiate between patients with panic disorder and patients 
with other anxiety disorders. Furthermore, Keogh et al. (2004) have demonstrated satisfactory 
internal consistencies for the subscales of the BSIQ with reliability coefficients ranging between 
0.71 and 0.83. In the current sample Cronbachs alpha values showed satisfactory to good internal 
consistency as well with α = .78 for the panic-related sensations subscale, α = .75 for the other 
bodily symptoms subscale, α = .86 for the social events subscale, and α = .73 for the general 
events subscale.
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Self-report measures. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait form (STAI-T; Spielberger et 
al., 1970) contains 20 items that tap a general anxiety disposition (e.g., ‘I worry too much about 
unimportant things’). Participants have to indicate on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (almost 
never) to 4 (almost always), to what extent these statements apply to them. A high score on this 
scale reflects a high general anxiety disposition. The original and Dutch version (Ploeg van der et 
al., 1980) proved to be reliable and valid measures. 
Optimism was assessed with the Life Orientation Test (LOT; Scheier & Carver, 1985). This 
measure consists of 12 items, of which four are filler items. The remaining eight items consist of 
four positively worded statements (‘I always look on the bright side of things’), and four negatively 
worded statements (e.g., ‘Things never work out the way I want them to’). Participants have to 
respond to each statement on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly 
agree). The LOT has good reliability and validity (Scheier & Carver, 1985). Scheier and Carver 
(1985) originally developed the measure as a unipolar measure of general optimism, with reverse 
scoring of the negatively stated items. Although some authors state that the measure consists 
of two subscales, assessing optimism and pessimism (Andersson, 1996) the constructors of the 
scale argue that the original scoring method can be used to obtain a general measure of optimism 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Moreover, if two subscales are adopted, these subscales 
correlate highly among each other, raising the question if the proposed two-factor solution might 
not originate from the wording of the items, rather than the fact that they measure two separate 
constructs. We choose to follow the original scoring methods of the LOT, with reverse scoring of the 
negatively stated items and calculating a sum score that reflects a degree of general optimism.
The three fundamental fears (AS, IS and FNE) were assessed with the Dutch version 
of the Sensitivity Index (SI) 2 (Vancleef et al., 2006). This questionnaire is a composite measure 
consisting of three subscales (ASI, ISI, FNE), which tap anxiety sensitivity (AS), injury/illness 
sensitivity (IS) and fear of negative evaluation (FNE), respectively. The Anxiety Sensitivity Index 
(ASI) (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987) includes 16 items concerning the negative consequences of 
experiencing anxiety (e.g., ‘It scares me when my heart beats rapidly’). The Injury/illness Sensitivity 
Index (ISI) (Taylor, 1993; Vancleef et al., 2006) contains 6 items pertaining to the fear of illness (e.g., 
‘I get scared when I think I’m coming down with an illness’) and 5 items referring to the fear of 
injury (e.g., ‘The thought of injury terrifies me’). The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE) 
(Leary, 1983) consists of 12 items measuring the fear of negative evaluation (e.g., ‘I worry about 
what kind of impression I make on people’). Participants indicate their degree of agreement with 
all statements of the SI on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very little) to 5 (very much)3. 
Psychometric properties of both the original and the Dutch version of the SI are satisfactory (Taylor, 
1993; Vancleef et al., 2006). Furthermore, the psychometric properties of the ASI (Peterson & 
Heilbronner, 1987; Rodriguez et al., 2004; Sandin et al., 2001), the brief FNE (Collins, Westra, 
Dozois, & Stewart, 2005; Leary, 1983) and recently the ISI (Carleton et al., 2005) separately have 
2 The English version of the Sensitivity Index was translated in Dutch in a state-of-the-art manner, involving back translation,  
 after which  the item content was checked against the original content. The Dutch version of the Sensitivity Index is available  
 from the corresponding author.
 Note that the scoring format from the original ASI (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987) ranges from 0 (very little) to 4 (very much).
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Table 1. BSIQ items with estimated factor loadings and factor intercorrelations, corrected for attenuation
Item   Item content Panic-related Other bodily Social  General 
  sensations  symptoms events events
 1 You notice that your heart is beating quickly and pounding .73   
 2 You feel lightheaded and weak .34   
 3 Your chest feels uncomfortable and tight .67   
 4 You suddenly feel confused and are having difficulty in 
 thinking straight .71   
 5 You feel short of breath .44   
 6 You notice that your heart is pounding, you feel breathless,   
 dizzy and unreal .74  
 7 Your vision has become slightly blurred .76   
 8 You have developed a small spot on the back of your hand  .76  
 9 You have a sudden pain in your stomach  .55  
 10 You have a pain in the small of your back  .37  
 11 You find a lump under the skin on your neck  .78  
 12 You have been eating normally but have recently lost some weight .60  
 13 Your doctor tells you your headaches are caused by tension,  .61
 but he wants you to see a specialist  
 14 You go into a shop and the assistant ignores you   .55 
 15 You are talking to an acquaintance who briefly looks out of the window  .73 
 16 You notice a frowning stranger approaching you in the street   .53 
 17 You are introduced to someone at a party who fails to reply to a question 
 you ask them   .81 
 18 You have visitors round for a meal and they leave sooner than you expected .76 
 19 You notice that some people you know are looking in your direction  .75 
 20 A friend suggests that you change the way that you’re doing a job in your own house .61 
 21 An old acquaintance passes you in the street without acknowledging you  .63 
 22 A member of your family is late arriving home    .69
 23 You wake with a start in the middle of the night, thinking you heard a noise,     
but all is quiet    .60
 24 A crisis comes up at work and you can’t immediately think of what to do   .38
 25 You are under a great deal of pressure and finding it difficult to manage    
 everything you have to do    .65
 26 A letter marked ‘URGENT’ arrives    .43
 27 You smell smoke    .55
 Factor intercorrelations (SE)     
 Panic-related sensation 1   
 Other bodily symptoms  .93 (.03)  1  
 Social events  .60 (.06) .77 (.04)  1 
 General events .77 (.05) .91 (.04) .84 (.04) 1
   
well been documented. 
The Fear of Pain Questionnaire (FPQ: McNeil & Rainwater, 1998) was administered to 
measure fear of pain. In this 30-item measure, respondents indicate how fearful they are of three 
types of pain: severe pain (e.g., ‘Breaking your leg’), minor pain (e.g., ‘Getting a paper-cut on your 
finger’), and medical pain (e.g., ‘Receiving an injection in your hip/buttocks’). The items are scored 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extreme). The psychometric properties of 
the English as well as the Dutch version of the FPQ are satisfactory (McNeil & Rainwater, 1998; 
Roelofs, Peters, Deutz et al., 2005; van Wijk & Hoogstraten, 2006).
The Pain Catastrophizing Scale (PCS; Sullivan et al., 1995) taps pain catastrophizing, 
which is defined as ‘an exaggerated orientation towards pain’. Participants need to recall painful 
past memories, and subsequently indicate on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (all 
the time) to what extent they experienced each of 13 feelings and thoughts during that pain (e.g., 
‘I feel as if I can’t take this anymore’). The original and Dutch version (Crombez & Vlaeyen, 1996) 
of the PCS has proven to be reliable and valid (Osman et al., 1997; Severeijns et al., 2002; Van 
Damme et al., 2002).
proCeDure
Prior to participation, all participants received verbal instructions by the experimenter and 
gave written informed consent. Participants first filled out the BSIQ and subsequently completed 
the other self-report measures. All measures were completed on the computer. Testing occurred 
individually, and at the participant’s own pace. In general, it took about 45 to 60 minutes to fill out 
all questionnaires. When all questionnaires were completed, participants received remuneration in 
the form of a gift voucher. 
The ambiguous descriptions of the BSIQ are presented in the centre of the computer 
screen and remain on the screen for 5000 milliseconds, after which time period the three alternative 
explanations are offered. Each alternative is preceded by the letter A, B, or C, and participants 
choose the alternative that is most likely for them by pressing the corresponding letter as labeled 
on the left (A), right (B), and down (C) arrow key of the keyboard. The chosen alternative then 
lights up in red font color. Next, a textbox appears behind each alternative explanation, and the 
participant allocates a likelihood percentage (rating score) between 0 and 100, using the numerical 
keypad. A rating score needs to be assigned to each alternative, before the program continues 
with the presentation of the next item. Upon finishing the BSIQ, participants completed the self-
report measures (SI, PCS, FPQ, LOT, STAI). 
The test procedure differed for participants recruited inside and outside the local 
community of Maastricht University with respect to the test location. The first group of participants 
completed all measurements on a PC that was situated in a room in the university building, while 
participants who were recruited outside the university completed the measures on a portable PC in 
their home environment. In both settings, the experimenter was present during test performance, 
without interacting with the participant. In order to keep the test procedure in the home environment 
comparable to the laboratory study, the experimenter made sure that the questionnaires were 
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completed in a quiet and silent location, and that no distraction by for example other persons, or 
telephone took place.
Data reDuCtion anD StatiStiCal analySeS
 Because the negative alternative was rarely chosen as first choice interpretation in the 
BSIQ, the ranking scores showed floor effects and little dispersion (M = 8.61%; sd = 10.28). 
Therefore, we performed all analyses on the rating scores of the BSIQ only. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The factor structure of the BSIQ was examined with a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the negative rating scores of the BSIQ items (Lisrel 8.54; 
Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2001). The Maximum Likelihood estimation method was used to assess 
goodness-of-fit, and covariance matrices were analyzed. It was assumed that each item loaded 
onto one single factor in such a way that every item of a specific BSIQ subscale loaded together 
on the same latent factor. The chi-square statistic gives an overall test of the model fit, and should 
result in a non-significant value to indicate good fit of the hypothesized model with the data. 
Multiple fit indices were used to decide on goodness-of-fit of the hypothesized factor structure: 
(a) root mean square error for approximation (RMSEA); (b) the comparative fit index (CFI); (c) the 
non-normed fit index (NNFI); (e) standardized root mean square residual (sRMR). For the RMSEA, 
values of about .08 or less indicate a “reasonable error of approximation”(Browne & Cudeck, 
1993). For the CFI and the NNFI, values above 0.90 indicate reasonable fit, whereas values above 
.95 indicate good to very good fit. For the sRMR, values close to .08 are indicative of good fit (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999).
Interpretation bias in relation to general and specific psychological constructs. 
Mean ratings on negative and neutral alternatives for each item were calculated for the four BSIQ 
subscales separately (note that two neutral alternatives accompanied each item, and that the 
ratings for the neutral alternatives were averaged for each item). A paired samples t-test was 
then conducted to compare the scores on the neutral and the negative alternatives. Subsequent 
analyses were performed on the negative rating scores only, since the neutral rating scores do not 
contribute to the hypotheses of the current study. 
The association between the specific negative interpretation scores and the scores on 
the questionnaire measures was first examined with Pearson correlations. We next performed 
hierarchical regression analyses in order to determine which psychological constructs contribute 
to the explanation of the negative rating scores for each subscale separately. In these analyses, 
age and gender were entered as control variables in the first step of the model, the global trait 
measures (STAI and LOT) were entered in the second step, the more specific fundamental fears 
(ASI, ISI, FNE) were entered as predictors in the third step, and the specific pain related constructs 
(FPQ and PCS) were entered as predictors in the last step of each analysis. 
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results
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Testing the four-factor model resulted in a significant chi-
square statistic (χ 2(317, N= 154) = 647.18; p < .001). Although this value was significant, the 
other goodness-of-fit estimates were found sufficient to good, with an RMSEA = .08; NNFI = .94; 
CFI = .95, sRMR = .07 indicating reasonable fit of the data to the suggested model. The factor 
solution supports a four-factor solution in which each factor corresponds to a subscale of the 
BSIQ (Table 1). When we adapt the criterion that loadings above 0.40 show good belongingness 
to the scale, item 2, item 10, and item 24 show loadings below this criterion. However, inspection 
of the precise content of these items does not provide reasons for removal of these items. 
Although the goodness-of-fit indices indicate relative good fit, high intercorrelations are observed 
between the four factors, in particular between the panic factor and the other bodily symptoms 
factor (Table 1). 4
Interpretation bias in relation to general and specific psychological constructs. Mean 
scores on the BSIQ and the self-report measures are presented in Table 2. For the BSIQ, significant 
higher ratings were given to the neutral alternatives than to the negative alternatives on the panic-
related sensations subscale (t(153) = -41.47, p < .001), the other bodily symptoms subscale(t(153) 
= -29.97; p < .001), the social events subscale(t(153) = -14.70; p < .001), and the general events 
subscale(t(153) = -31.47; p < .001). So, participants generally assign a higher likelihood to the 
neutral than to the negative interpretation of the presented ambiguous situations.
   
 Because of these high intercorrelations, the 3-factor model (factor : panic-related sensations + other bodily symptoms; factor 2:  
 social events; factor 3 general events), the 2-factor model (factor : panic-related sensations + other bodily symptoms; factor 2:  
 social events + general events) and the 1-factor model solutions of the BSIQ were tested as well and compared with the 4-factor  
 model fit by performing delta Chisquare tests (Δχ2). None of the other models resulted as significantly better than the -factor model. 
 Moreover, the fit indices of the 3-factor model, the 2-factor model, and the -factor model resulted in poorer values than these of  
 the 4-factor model. Details on these analyses can be obtained with the corresponding author.
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Table 2. Descriptives for the BSIQ rating and ranking scores and the self-report measures (N=154)
  M SD
 BSIQ Negative Other Bodily Symptoms 15.49 13.04
 BSIQ Negative Panic-related sensations 11.73 10.36
 BSIQ Negative Social Events  27.80 16.79
 BSIQ Negative General events 18.05 12.87
 BSIQ Neutral Other Bodily Symptoms 54.65 12.16
 BSIQ Neutral Panic-related sensations 55.50 11.08
 BSIQ Neutral General events 50.51 11.12
 BSIQNeutral general 57.17 11.73
 STAI-T 36.69   8.19
 LOT 29.71   5.19
 ASI 25.13   4.78
 ISI 22.10   6.64
 BFNE 27.91 10.39
 PCS 12.31   6.76
 FPQ 74.74 14.91
NoTe. STAI, State trait anxiety inventory- trait version; LOT, Life Orientation test; ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ISI, 
Injury/illness sensitivity Index; BFNE, Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale; PCS, Pain Catastrophizing scale; 
FPQ,= Fear of Pain Questionnaire
Further analyses were performed on the ratings for the negative alternatives only. We 
calculated Pearson correlation coefficients to study the association between scores on the self-
report measures and the negative ratings that were assigned to the four subscales of the BSIQ 
(Table 3). As expected, trait anxiety, the fundamental fears and the pain-specific constructs all 
correlate positively with the negative ratings, whereas a negative association was found between 
the optimism score and the negative ratings. Table 3 shows that no unique correlations exist 
between a particular construct and a subscale of the BSIQ corresponding with this construct, but 
that associations are rather generalized in nature. However, careful inspection of the correlation 
matrix does indicate a pattern that might suggest at least some specificity. It is remarkable that 
pain catastrophizing shows the highest correlation coefficient with the other bodily symptoms 
scale, and that the fear of negative evaluation shows the highest correlation with the social events 
subscale.
		part two
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Table 3. Pearson correlations (N=154) between self-report measures and negative rating scores on each subscale
 Panic-related Sensations Other Bodily Symptoms Social Events General Events
 STAI-T  .18  .23 .42 .30**
 LOT -.30** -.36** -.44** -.39**
 ASI .37** .36** .34** .38**
 ISI .22 .33** .29** .20 
 BFNE .23 .30** .57** .43**
 PCS .28** .45** .37** .35**
 FPQ .33** .35** .35** .30**
NoTe. STAI-t, State trait anxiety inventory- trait version; LOT, Life Orientation test; ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index; 
ISI, Injury/illness sensitivity Index; BFNE, Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale; PCS, Pain Catastrophizing 
scale; FPQ, Fear of Pain Questionnaire ** p < .0017 (Significant correlations after Bonferroni correction for multiple 
correlations; α = .05/28= .0017)
We conducted multiple linear regression analyses to further examine specific predictive 
power of the global trait measures, the fundamental fears, and the pain-specific measures for the 
four BSIQ subscales separately. Entering age and gender in the first step of the analysis did not 
reveal significant prediction for any subscale and these variables were therefore removed from all 
further analyses5. When LOT and STAI were considered as predictors of the negative interpretation 
scores, LOT resulted as the only significant predictor for the panic-related sensations subscale (ß 
= -.33, SE ß = .11, t = -3.12, p < .01), the other bodily symptoms subscale (ß = -.37, SE ß = .10, 
t = -3.58, p < 001), the social events subscale ß = -.28, SE ß = 10, t = -2.83, p < .01), and the 
general events subscale (ß = -.34, SE ß = .10, t= -3.31, p < .001). Thus, higher levels of optimism 
are predictive of lower negative interpretations for ambiguous situations implying physical, social 
or general threat.
Entering the three fundamental fears in the second step of the analyses (Table 4) resulted in 
significant model changes for the prediction of the panic-related sensations subscale (ΔR2 = .09; 
ΔF(3, 148) = 5.14; p < .01), the other bodily symptoms subscale (ΔR2 = .11; ΔF(3, 148) = 6.78; 
p <.001), the social events subscale (ΔR2= .16; ΔF(3, 148) = 13.04; p <.001), and the general 
events subscale (ΔR2=.13; ΔF(3, 148) = 8.88; p <.001). Although optimism remains a significant 
general predictor for all subscales, adding the fundamental fears results in specific additional 
predictive value of AS for the panic related sensations subscale, IS for the other bodily symptoms 
subscale, and FNE for the social situations subscale. This finding supports our hypothesis of 
specific predictive power of the fundamental fears for negative interpretations. Both AS and FNE 
are significant predictors of the general events subscale.
5 Parallel analyses were conducted for all regression models in which age and gender were entered as predictors in the first step of  
 each regression analysis. These analyses revealed the same pattern of findings. 
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Table 4. Results of regression analyses (Step 2) with TA, optimism, AS, IS, and FNE entered as predictors for the 
negative interpretation scores on the four BSIQ subscales  (N=154)
  Dependent variable Predictor ß SE ß t p
  Panic-related sensations
  R2= .18 STAI-T -.15 .11 -1.31 .19
  F(5, 148) = 6.30 ;  LOT	 -.24	 .11	 -2.27	 .03
  p< .001. ASI	 .27	 .09	 2.87	 .005
 ISI .03 .09 .36 .72
 BFNE .12 .09 1.27 .21
  Other bodily symptoms
  R2= .23 STAI-T -.15 .11 -1.34 .18 
  F(5, 148) = 9.04 ; LOT	 -.29	 .10	 -2.84	 .005 
  p< .001. ASI .16 .09 1.73 .09 
 ISI	 .17	 .09	 2.06	 .04 
 BFNE .17 .09 1.89 .06 
  Social Events
  R2= .38 STAI-T  -.02 .10 -.24 .81 
  F(5, 148) = 18.39 ; LOT	 -.22	 .09	 -2.44	 .02 
  p< .001. ASI .07 .08 .84 .40 
 ISI .09 .08 1.16 .25 
 BFNE	 .44	 .08	 5.43	 .000
  General events
  R2= .28 STAI-T -.13 .11 -1.24 .22 
  F(5, 148) = 11.66 ;  LOT	 -.26	 .10	 -2.63	 .01 
  p< .001. ASI	 .23	 .09	 2.70	 .008 
 ISI -.04 .08 -.49 .63 
 BFNE	 .33	 .09	 3.79	 .000
NoTe. STAI-t, State trait anxiety inventory- trait version; LOT, Life Orientation test; ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index; 
ISI, Injury/illness sensitivity Index; BFNE, Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale
In an additional linear regression analysis we entered the specific pain-related constructs 
(FoP and PCS) as a third step in the regression model (Table 5). Adding these two variables results 
in significant changes from the previous step for the panic-related sensations subscale (ΔR2= 
.06; ΔF(2, 146) = 5.39; p < .01), the other bodily symptoms subscale (ΔR2= .07; ΔF(2, 146) = 
7.49; p < .01), the social events subscale (ΔR2= .04; ΔF(2, 146) = 5.14; p < .01), and the general 
events subscale (ΔR2= .04; ΔF(2, 146) = 4.70; p < .05). A remarkable finding is that FoP results 
as an additional significant predictor of all four subscales of the BSIQ. Together with FoP, PCS 
becomes an additional significant predictor of the other bodily symptoms subscale, whereas the 
prediction of IS for this subscale (Step 2) disappears after the incorporation of the two specific pain 
constructs in the model. 
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Table 5. Results of regression analysis (Step ) with TA, optimism, AS, IS, FNE, FoP, and PC entered as predictors 
for the negative interpretation scores on the four BSIQ subscales  (N=154)
  Dependent variable Predictor ß SE ß t p
  Panic-related sensations
  R2= .23 STAI-T -.18 .13 -1.67 .10 
  F(7, 146) = 6.31 ;  LOT	 -.24	 .13	 -2.29	 .02 
  p < .001. ASI	 .27	 .11	 2.89	 .004 
 ISI -.07 .11 -.75 .46 
 BFNE .11 .11 1.23 .22
 FPQ		 .27	 .24	 3.17	 .002
 PCS .00 .05 .003 .99
  Other bodily symptoms
  R2= .31 STAI-T -.16 .09 -1.55 .12 
  F(7, 146) = 9.16 ; LOT	 -.24	 .08	 -2.41	 .02 
  p < .001 ASI. .10 .07 1.17 .24 
 ISI .04 .08 .42 .68
 BFNE .16 .07 1.82 .07
 FPQ		 .18	 .17	 2.29	 .02
	 PCS	 .22	 .07	 2.41	 .02
  Social Events
  R2= .42  STAI-T  -.05 .10 -.48 .63 
  F(7, 146) = 15.36 ; LOT	 -.20	 .09	 -2.25	 .03 
  p < .001. ASI .05 .08 .61 .54
 ISI -.01 .08 -.14 .89
 BFNE	 .43	 .08	 5.48	 .000
	 FPQ		 .19	 .18	 2.67	 .008
 PCS .08 .03 1.02 .31
  General events
  R2= .33 STAI-T -.15 .10 -1.48 .14 
  F(7, 146) = 10.09 ; LOT	 -.23	 .10	 -2.39	 .02 
  p < .001 ASI	 ..21	 .09	 2.41	 .02 
 ISI -.15 .09 -1.66 .10
 BFNE	 .32	 .09	 3.78	 .000
	 FPQ		 .19	 .20	 2.43	 .02
 PCS .10 .04 1.17 .25
NoTe. STAI-t, State trait anxiety inventory- trait version; LOT, Life Orientation test; ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index; 
ISI, Injury/illness sensitivity Index; BFNE, Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale; PCS, Pain Catastrophizing 
scale; FPQ, Fear of Pain Questionnaire
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dIsCussIon
The current study examined how global personality traits, fundamental fears, and pain-
specific constructs are related to the tendency to negatively interpret ambiguous information on 
four specific domains, i.e., panic-related sensations, other bodily symptoms, social events and 
general events. 
After introduction of the BSIQ by Clark et al. (1997) several authors have used its 
four subscales, although no studies pertaining the factor structure of the measure have been 
conducted to our knowledge. We performed a CFA to test whether the data of the current study 
supported the hypothesized four-factor structure of the BSIQ. The Chi-square value of model fit 
was significant, while it should have a non-significant value to indicate good fit to data. However, 
because the chi square test is sensitive to degrees of freedom and sample size, it is possible that 
this test will reject or accept a model inappropriately (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Jöreskog, 1990). 
Moreover, other goodness-of-fit statistics resulted in reasonable to good values indicating that 
each BSIQ subscale can independently be adopted as a domain-specific measure. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that the four factors showed close interrelations. One possible explanation for 
these high intercorrelations is that the BSIQ might better be considered as a general threat-specific 
measure, assessing the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening or negative in 
general. This suggestion was not supported by additional analyses however, in which the one-
factor model, the two-factor model and the three-factor model were tested and compared with 
the four-factor model. In these additional analyses, the four-factor model resulted as significantly 
better than all other models. Alternatively, the high intercorrelations might be attributed to the fact 
that the separate BSIQ items share the same skewness in their distributions, resulting in high 
correlations that are based on distribution similarities rather than on item content. Respondents in 
this study were healthy volunteers varying in levels of optimism and the other anxiety constructs. 
A large proportion of these respondents assigned very low or no probability at all to the negative 
alternatives resulting in skewed distributions to the left of the separate item scores. One could argue 
that this skewness violates the necessary condition of normality for performing CFA. However, 
Jöreskog (1990) suggests that in the case of moderate non-normality in continuous scores, the 
goodness-of-fit indices can be interpreted using the ML estimation method in covariance analyses. 
Nevertheless, in interpreting the results of the CFA, the matter of non-normality should be kept in 
mind, and further examination of the factor structure with a more heterogeneous population is 
warranted.
To study domain specificity of the negative interpretation bias, we incorporated several 
measures of psychological constructs that are known to play a role in psychopathology. We 
expected that more global and generalized trait constructs like trait anxiety and optimism would 
be associated with the negative interpretation bias on all BSIQ domains, whereas more specific 
anxieties and fear constructs would be associated with negative interpretations on that subscale of 
the BSIQ that is congruent with the content of the individual’s fear. Although the correlation matrix 
did not provide immediate support for the hypothesized domain specificity, regression analyses 
demonstrated specific predictive value for optimism, AS, IS, FNE, FoP, and PC. A first and robust 
finding concerns the strong predictive value of optimism for all subscales of the BSIQ. Higher levels 
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of optimism are predictive of making less negative interpretations to the ambiguous descriptions of 
the BSIQ. This effect is independent of the influence of other anxiety and fear factors and supports 
the notion that optimism can serve a protective function in the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology (Scheier & Carver, 1992). We did not find support for the hypothesis that that trait 
anxiety would show the opposite effect of optimism. Even when trait anxiety and optimism were 
considered as the only two predictors of the negative interpretation indexes optimism resulted as 
the only significant predictor. 
Second, specific predictive value of AS, IS, and FNE was found for negative interpretations 
made on the panic-related sensations subscale, the other bodily symptoms subscale, and the 
social events subscale of the BSIQ, respectively. This finding supports our hypothesis of domain-
specificity of the interpretation bias in relation to specific fundamental fears. This specific predictive 
value is found to exists independently and additionally to the proportion of variance that was already 
explained by optimism for each subscale. The unique relation between AS and the panic related 
sensations subscale once again stresses the close relation between AS and panic (Richards et 
al., 2001; Teachman, 2005). Furthermore, the fact that IS proves a good predictor for the negative 
interpretation scores on the other bodily symptoms subscale only, indicates the importance of IS in 
pain processing. In line with the expectations, the FNE is the only fundamental fear that contributes 
significantly to the explanation of the negative interpretations in response to ambiguous social 
situations. A third objective of the current study was to explore the influence of the addition of 
two specific pain constructs (PC and FoP) to the prediction of the negative interpretations on the 
four domains. It was hypothesized that these constructs would be particularly associated with the 
negative interpretation scores on the other bodily symptoms subscale based on their proximal 
relation with pain experiences and pain processing (e.g., Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Results indeed 
showed that both FoP and PC were significant predictors of the negative interpretation scores on 
the other bodily symptoms subscale. Moreover, after adding both constructs in the regression 
model the earlier observed predictive power of IS disappeared. This provides extra evidence for the 
high specificity of both constructs in relation to the more fundamental IS factor. Findings were not 
entirely in line with our expectations, however. Whereas PC was found to be uniquely predictive of 
the other bodily symptoms subscale, FoP possesses additional predictive value over and above 
the prediction of optimism and the fundamental fears for each other subscale of the BSIQ as well. 
The predictive value of FoP for the panic-related sensations subscale can be accounted for, given 
that the situations in this subscale involve internal and external bodily symptoms that might be 
interpreted as health threatening, and can thus be related to the fear of pain as well. However, FoP 
also contributes significantly to the other two subscales of the BSIQ, which do not show links with 
pain, injury or illness. This finding is difficult to account for, and needs further examination.
Some limitations and recommendations should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the current results. First, although the CFA supports four factors in the BSIQ, there 
were some problems regarding high factor intercorrelations. These problems are probably inherent 
to the healthy status of the study population. A more heterogeneous population, including patients 
with social anxiety, panic disorder, and chronic pain would probably result in more dispersion on the 
item scores. Additional support for this suggestion can be found in the results from the regression 
analyses, which show specific relations between individual levels of fundamental fears and scores 
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on the BSIQ subscales. This augments the likelihood that the four factors are indeed distinct 
from each other rather than representing one general construct. In line with the research already 
conducted within the area of panic disorder, future research should examine whether the other 
bodily symptoms subscale and the social event subscale can be adopted to discriminate pain 
patients from non pain patients, and social anxious individuals from non-social anxious individuals, 
respectively. Relating to the inclusion of a healthy study population, it is noteworthy to mention that 
the current healthy population was representative for the general community sample with respect 
to the dispersion and mean scores on the anxiety-related constructs. More precisely, mean scores 
and standard deviations on the self-report measures in the current sample were similar to the 
scores as observed in other studies assessing these constructs in college student or community 
samples. This was especially true for the STAI (e.g., Ploeg van der et al., 1980), LOT (e.g., Scheier 
& Carver, 1985; Vinck, Wels, Arickx, & Vinck, 1998), ASI (e.g., Peterson & Reiss, 1992; Sandin 
et al., 2001; Vancleef et al., 2006), ISI (e.g., Carleton et al., 2005; Vancleef et al., 2006), BFNE 
(e.g., Carleton et al., 2006; Vancleef et al., 2006), and FPQ scores (e.g., Roelofs, Peters, Deutz et 
al., 2005; van Wijk & Hoogstraten, 2006). The only exception here constituted the PCS scores, 
for which lower scores were observed (M = 12) in the current sample from prior findings in other 
college student and community samples (M = 16) (Crombez et al., 1998b; Van Damme et al., 
2002). A second limitation in this study concerns the omission of including specific lower-order 
constructs of AS and FNE. AS in particularly consists of lower-order factors that could have offered 
a valuable contribution to the goal of the current study regarding the degree of specificity of the 
negative bias. In the literature, there has been quite some debate regarding the one-dimensional or 
multidimensional nature of AS (Blais et al., 2001; Keogh, 2004; Schmidt & Joiner, 2002). Although 
it is established that AS serves an important role in the pathogenesis of anxiety, pain, and panic, 
recent evidence has suggested that it may be the lower-order factors of AS (i.e., physical concerns, 
mental incapacitation concerns, and social concerns) that explain these findings the best (Brown, 
Smits, Powers, & Telch, 2003; Hunt et al., 2006; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Zinbarg et al., 1997; 
Zvolensky, Goodie, McNeil, Sperry, & Sorrell, 2001). However, since both AS and the subscales 
were measured with the ASI in the current study, it was not possible to study the predictive value 
of its lower-order factors because this would imply serious violations of collinearity assumptions. 
At the time that this study was conducted, we were not aware of any other adequate measure to 
assess the lower-order factors of AS or the overlapping AS construct. In recent studies though, 
the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile (ASP) has been suggested to constitute a good alternative measure 
for assessing AS and lower-order components (Keogh, Barlow, Mounce, & Bond, 2006; Olatunji 
et al., 2005). It is therefore suggested that future studies aiming to detect differential predictivity of 
AS and its lower-order components incorporate the ASP in addition to the ASI. Third, the BSIQ is 
a self-report measure, and is therefore subject to response bias and conscious reconsideration. It 
can be questioned to what extent these conscious processes reflect the spontaneous, automatic 
interpretations that will occur in daily life (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald et al., 1998). Therefore 
it is suggested that in addition to subjective measures further research will have to make use of 
automatic and objective tasks (e.g., lexical decision paradigm, moving window paradigm) to study 
negative interpretation bias in relation to psychopathology more thoroughly (Calvo, Eysenck, & 
Castillo, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 1997). Using automatized paradigms provides insight in the 
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temporal pattern of interpretative responses. Moreover it offers the opportunity to decide whether 
specific negative interpretations are made routinely and immediately upon the confrontation with 
ambiguity or if they are the mere result of a more elaborative process of integrating prior knowledge, 
experiences, and dysfunctional cognitive schemes with new incoming information. Last, due to the 
lack of behavioral measures, it was not possible to investigate if negative interpretation biases on a 
specific domain have a mediating role in the exacerbation of emotional and affective disorders. 
The current study provided preliminary evidence that levels of a global resilience trait 
(optimism), or specific vulnerability traits (AS, IS, FNE) are related with a general or specific negative 
interpretation bias, respectively. Furthermore, there is evidence that proximal and very specific 
vulnerabilities for chronic pain are specifically predictive of the tendency to interpret pain-related 
ambiguous material negatively. The current findings constitute only a first step, though, in studying 
the exact role of a negative interpretation bias in the onset and maintenance of emotional and 
affective disorders. Understanding how emotional traits and cognitive biases act as latent risk 
factors for the development and maintenance of a disorder can contribute to the development of 
treatment approaches. As such, it offers helpful information to the early detection for those at risk 
for developing emotional or affective disorders in acute phases and it helps therapists and doctors 
to tailor treatment to the relevant cognitions.
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Chapter 6
Interpreting ambiguous health and bodily threat: 
are individual differences in pain-related vulnerability 
constructs associated with an on-line negative 
interpretation bias?
This chapter is submitted for publication as: 
Vancleef, L. M. G., Peters, M. L., & De Jong, P. J. Interpreting ambiguous health and bodily threat: 
are individual differences in pain-related vulnerability constructs associated with an on-line negative 
interpretation bias?
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Automatic interpretation bias
 abstraCt
The present study examined the association between individual levels of pain-related 
anxieties and an on-line negative interpretation bias for ambiguous descriptions implying threat 
to one’s body and health (i.e., injury, illness, pain). Healthy volunteers (n=80) performed a lexical 
decision task that indirectly assessed on-line interpretations. Results demonstrated a general 
facilitation of responses to target words that endorsed a threatening resolution of ambiguity. This 
effect correlated positively with individual levels of fear of pain, but was found to be unrelated 
to levels of anxiety sensitivity, injury/illness sensitivity or pain catastrophizing. Implications of the 
findings and recommendations for future research are discussed.
IntroduCtIon
It is nowadays well acknowledged that information processing biases can act as latent 
vulnerability factors for the onset and maintenance of affective and emotional disorders like anxiety 
and depression (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Given the core role of anxiety 
and other emotions in chronic pain, it has been suggested that the same cognitive mechanisms 
that work in emotional and affective disorders may play a role in the development and persistence 
of chronic pain as well (Pincus & Morley, 2001). Indeed, several studies have demonstrated the 
occurrence of information processing biases in relation to (chronic) pain that are characterized by 
the prioritizing of information relating to health threats or pain at both an explicit and an implicit level 
(Asmundson et al., 2005; Keogh, Dillon et al., 2001; Pincus & Morley, 2001; Roelofs et al., 2002).
 One cognitive bias that has been frequently studied in relation to pain is the negative 
interpretation bias, or the tendency to interpret innocuous situations, symptoms, or sensations in 
a negative or threatening fashion. Studies using homophones (words with the same pronunciation, 
but a different spelling: e.g., dye/die (McKellar et al., 2003; Pincus et al., 1994), homographs 
(words with the same spelling, but different meanings: e.g., needle (Pincus et al., 1996), and word-
stem completion tasks (word stem can be completed in different ways: e.g., ten---: tender/tennis 
(Edwards & Pearce, 1994) have demonstrated that pain patients make more threat and pain-
related interpretations in comparison with healthy controls. Additionally, this negative interpretation 
bias has been observed in healthy individuals possessing elevated levels vulnerability constructs for 
chronic pain as well; i.e., trait anxiety, negative affectivity, anxiety sensitivity, injury/illness sensitivity, 
fear of pain, or pain catastrophizing (Keogh & Cochrane, 2002; Pincus & Morley, 2001; Vancleef & 
Peters, in press). Parallel to former research findings in panic disorder and social phobia, it may be 
suggested that the interpretation bias acts as a latent vulnerability construct in the development and 
exacerbation of pain problems in those who are vulnerable for developing chronic pain conditions 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Pincus & Morley, 2001). Corroborating this suggestion, Keogh and 
colleagues (Keogh & Cochrane, 2002; Keogh et al., 2004) recently demonstrated that the relation 
between levels of anxiety sensitivity and tolerance for cold-pressor pain in pain-free participants 
was mediated by a negative interpretation bias. 
There is thus accumulating evidence for the importance of negative interpretation bias 
		part two
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in pain processing. However, up to now, studies have predominantly relied on direct self-report 
measures to assess the interpretation bias. Because these measures are subject to response 
bias and conscious reconsideration, it is not possible to decide if the negative interpretations are 
the result of (1) respondents wanting to comply with experimenter demands, (2) retrospective 
judgements that are made on the basis of negative beliefs and representations at the moment of 
responding, or (3) the routinely, automatic interpretation of ambiguity (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; 
Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). One possible way to overcome these problems is to use paradigms that 
allow the assessment of automatic and spontaneously interpretations (i.e., on-line interpretations), 
like the lexical decision paradigm (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). In the lexical 
decision paradigm, narrative texts that incorporate critical incomplete ambiguous sentences are 
presented to respondents. The incomplete sentences can have a threatening resolution, and they 
are completed by the appearance of a probe word that either confirms or disconfirms the implied 
threat. It is assumed that if respondents make on-line inferences regarding the likely outcome of 
the incomplete sentence, then responses will be faster and more accurate to probe words that 
match this inference. Because respondents are instructed to respond “as fast as possible” to the 
probe words, they are no longer in the opportunity to construe retrospective judgements to the 
probe words. Moreover, the lexical decision to the probe words does not require referral to the 
preceding text and thus fosters spontaneous inferences. 
Using the lexical decision paradigm, the current study examined the relation between 
individual levels of pain-related vulnerability constructs in healthy individuals (anxiety sensitivity, 
injury/illness sensitivity, fear of pain, and pain catastrophizing) and the tendency to make on-line 
negative interpretations of ambiguous situations implying health-threat (relating to pain, injury or 
illness). Both anxiety sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity are conceived as fundamental fears 
that comprise vulnerability factors for the onset and maintenance of chronic pain (e.g., Keogh & 
Asmundson, 2004; Vancleef et al., 2006). Elevated levels of anxiety sensitivity have been found 
associated with heightened medication use, increased disability by pain, and decreased tolerance 
for pain in both clinical and non-clinical populations (Asmundson et al., 2000; Stewart & Asmundson, 
2006). In healthy volunteers, elevated levels of injury/illness sensitivity have been found predictive 
of an enhanced tendency to engage in health protective behaviour (Vancleef et al., 2007), and of 
pain catastrophizing and fear of pain levels (Vancleef et al., 2006). Pain catastrophizing and fear 
of pain are considered very specific pain-related constructs that play a crucial role in the transition 
from acute to chronic pain (e.g., Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Both in pain patients and in a pain-free 
population, pain catastrophizing has been brought into relation with increased pain experiences, 
diminished tolerance for pain, and hypervigilance for pain (e.g., Crombez et al., 1998a; Sullivan et 
al., 1995; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Elevated levels of fear of pain have frequently been found to 
be associated with escape and avoidance behaviour from pain, increased disability and distress 
because of pain, and attentional biases for pain-related stimuli (Keogh, Ellery et al., 2001; Roelofs, 
Peters, Deutz et al., 2005; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). In the current study, it is hypothesized that 
elevated levels of the pain-related anxiety and fear constructs are associated with an enhanced 
tendency to automatically and spontaneously interpret the ambiguous situations in a negative 
manner.
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method
partiCipantS
Eighty participants (69 female; M= 24 years; sd = 6.70) were recruited at Maastricht’s 
University local community to take part in the study. Inclusion criteria constituted being in good 
mental health (no diagnosis of current psychopathology) and being free of acute or chronic (over 
three months) pain complaints. Compliance with these criteria was verbally checked prior to 
inclusion in the study. Participants who were dyslexic or whose mother tongue was other than 
Dutch were excluded from the study. All participants gave informed consent and received financial 
compensation for participating. 
meaSureS
Self-report Measures. Both anxiety sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity were assessed with 
the Dutch version of the Sensitivity Index (SI) 6 (Vancleef et al., 2006). This questionnaire is a 
composite measure consisting of three subscales tapping anxiety sensitivity, injury/illness sensitivity 
and fear of negative evaluation. The latter construct was disregarded since it did not contribute to 
the focus of the study. In the SI, anxiety sensitivity is measured with the 16-item Anxiety Sensitivity 
Index (ASI) (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987) and injury/illness sensitivity is assessed with the 11-item 
Injury/illness Sensitivity Index (ISI) (S. Taylor, 1993). Participants indicate their degree of agreement 
with all items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 5= very much)7. Psychometric properties of 
the SI and its subscales are satisfactory (Taylor, 1993; Vancleef et al., 2006). 
Fear of pain was assessed with the 30-item Fear of Pain Questionnaire (FPQ: McNeil 
& Rainwater, 1998). Respondents indicate how fearful they are of three types of pain; i.e., severe 
pain, minor pain, and medical pain on a 5-point Likert scale (1= not at all; 5 = extreme). The 
psychometric properties of the FPQ are satisfactory, and the measure is appropriate for usage 
in both healthy and clinical populations (McNeil & Rainwater, 1998; Roelofs, Peters, Deutz et al., 
2005).
Pain catastrophizing is assessed with the Pain Catastrophizing Scale (PCS; Sullivan et 
al., 1995). Participants indicate on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not at all; 4= all the time) to what 
extent they have experienced each of 13 feelings and thoughts when they were in pain. The 
PCS has proven to be a reliable and valid measure and was found suitable to measure pain 
catastrophizing in both healthy volunteers and clinical populations (Severeijns et al., 2002; Van 
Damme et al., 2002).
 The English version of the Sensitivity Index was translated in Dutch in a state-of-the-art manner, involving back translation, after  
 which the item  content was checked against the original content. The Dutch version of the Sensitivity Index is available from the  
 corresponding author.
7  Note that the scoring format from the original ASI (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987) ranges from 0 (very little) to 4 (very much).
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On-line interpretation paradigm. The on-line interpretation task consisted of 124 situational 
descriptions with a length of four lines (mean amount of words for each description = 22) (See 
Appendix for examples). The final sentence of each description was incomplete, lacking the 
end word that was presented as the probe requiring a lexical decision. The task incorporated 
52 ambiguous descriptions that could lead to either a health threatening 8 (A_H) or a safe (A_S) 
resolution. Of these 52 ambiguous descriptions, 26 ended on a word leading to a health threatening 
resolution (A_H_W) or a safe (A_S_W) resolution, and the other 26 ended on a non-word leading 
to a health-threatening (A_H_NW) or a safe (A_S_NW) resolution. The non-words were created by 
shuffling the letters of a putative target word through each other. In order to control for the possible 
influence of particular descriptions, both groups of ambiguous word and non-word descriptions 
were again split-up, such that for each participant half of the descriptions were presented in 
their health-threatening resolution and the other half in their safe resolution. These groups were 
counterbalanced over participants so that one and the same ambiguous description was never 
presented in its two possible resolutions to the same participant. Thus, each participant received 
13 ambiguous descriptions with a health-threatening word resolution (A_H_W_1 or A_H_W_2), 13 
descriptions with a safe word resolution (A_S_W_1 or A_S_W_2), 13 descriptions with a health-
threatening non-word resolution (A_H_NW_1 or A_H_NW_2) and 13 descriptions with a safe non-
word resolution (A_S_NW_1 or A_S_NW_2). 
Additionally, forced-inference descriptions were incorporated in the task (see Mathews 
& Hirsch, 2000). These descriptions were created in such a way that they led inevitably to either 
a health threatening (F_H) or a safe (F_S) probe resolution and are therefore reflective of pure on-
line inference responses. Within participants, the forced-inference descriptions shared the end 
word or non-word with the ambiguous descriptions, and they are thus inextricably bound up to an 
ambiguous description. Because the forced–inference descriptions are assumed to yield on-line 
inferences, responses to this type of descriptions can be regarded as baseline measures of making 
on-line inferences, against which the responses to ambiguous descriptions can be set. Last, we 
included twenty control ambiguous descriptions (C) in the task of which half ended on a non-word. 
These descriptions dealt with trivial situations and were not at all related to health-threats. The 
logic for including these descriptions was that they could provide an additional check for the effect 
of individual differences for dealing with ambiguity altogether, in the case that a relation between 
levels of pain-related anxiety and a negative on-line bias is detected. 
The ambiguous descriptions that were used in the task were chosen on the basis of a 
pilot study that was conducted in 17 volunteers. In this pilot, 64 experimenter-created ambiguous 
descriptions were presented with the omission of the end word. Respondents were required to 
first write down the word that they expected to complete the description. Next, respondents were 
offered the two experimenter forecasted end words (health-threatening and safe), and a likelihood 
percentage between 0 and 100 was assigned to each alternative. We first eliminated those 
descriptions in which the spontaneous completion by respondents in no case matched with one 
8 Note that the health threatening resolutions imply resolutions of ambiguity that refer to sickness, injury, pain, or dead. A broad  
 spectrum of health  threatening situations was chosen in order to make the descriptions relevant for this healthy study population  
 that is free from specific pain-related pathology.
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of the intended resolutions of the experimenters. From the remaining descriptions, we selected 26 
descriptions that reached likelihood percentages above 50% for each alternative end word to be 
included in the task.
proCeDure
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen and the on-line interpretation 
task started with six practice trials, to get the participant acquainted with the test procedure 
and the response format. The descriptions appeared line-by-line on the computer screen and 
participants could navigate through each description at their own pace. A next line appeared each 
time when the participant pressed the middle button of a three-button response box. When the 
last line of a description had been presented, pressing the middle button of the response box led 
to the presentation of red fixation crosses in the centre of the screen. These crosses signalled the 
appearance of the probe word and remained on screen for 750 ms In this time frame, participants 
could prepare the lexical decision response by placing their fingers on the outer left (labelled with 
a ‘W’ (word)) and the outer right (labelled with a ‘N’ (non-word)) button of the response box. The 
probe word remained on the screen for maximally 2500 ms. Incorrect responses or responses that 
were not given within 2500 ms were signalled by a sound and the first line of the next description 
was presented at 1000 ms after the response or the sound. Reaction times and errors were 
registered 
To ensure that participants remained concentrated during the task they were led to 
believe that they would be tested on content of the descriptions afterwards. To increase credibility 
of this argument participants already had to answer some questions regarding the content of the 
practice descriptions in between the practice and test phase of the task. Following the completion 
of the task participants answered questions regarding the professions and sports they remembered 
from the descriptions in the task, and they indicated which description was most notable for 
them. Next, participants filled out the self-report measures on the computer and received financial 
compensation.
StatiStiCal analySeS
Based on inspection of the distributions of the dependent variables, one participant 
was deleted from further analyses since error percentage deviated more than three standard 
deviations from the mean error percentage. Altogether, the mean error percentage was 2.03 (sd 
= 1.57), indicating that only few errors were made on the lexical decision trials. Because the error 
percentage was to low in order to conduct meaningful data analyses on them, further analyses 
were conducted on the reaction time data only. Only trials with a correct first response were 
incorporated in these analyses.
In addition to the data analyses that were needed to answer the research hypotheses, 
we first conducted a paired sample t-tests to verify whether responses were faster to the word 
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trials than to the non-word trials. These analyses served as a control for the effectiveness of the 
task in measuring semantic inferences. Reading through the descriptions is assumed to activate 
semantic processing that makes participants expect a word rather than a non-word to finish the 
incomplete sentence. Faster reaction times to the word trials are therefore indicative of semantic 
processing of the descriptions. 
Further analyses were conducted on the data of the word descriptions only, since 
reaction times on these descriptions provide the critical information that is necessary for answering 
our research hypotheses. The effects of description type and valence were examined with a 2 
(Description Type: ambiguous versus forced inference) x 2 (Valence: health-threatening versus 
safe) repeated measures ANOVA on both the reaction times. All variables were within subject. 
We calculated a negative interpretation index (INT-rt) by subtracting the mean rt on the 
ambiguous health-threatening descriptions from the mean rt on the ambiguous safe descriptions. 
To increase the sensitivity of the interpretation bias index (reflecting the advantage of threatening 
interpretations specific for ambiguous descriptions), we next subtracted the difference score for the 
forced inference descriptions (calculated in the same manner) from the obtained difference score 
on the ambiguous descriptions. The interpretation index was thus calculated as follows: INT_rt 
= [(rt_A_S_W -rt_A-H_W)-(rt_F_S_W – rt_F_H_W)]. A positive difference score indicates faster 
responses on the ambiguous descriptions that have a health-threatening resolution. A positive 
value of INT-rt thus reflects the tendency to interpret the ambiguous descriptions in a negatively 
biased manner. The relation between the interpretation bias index and the scores on the self-report 
measures is examined with Pearson correlation coefficients. 
results
The overall mean reaction time in the task was 685.79 ms (sd = 130.11). Sustaining 
the validity of the task, a paired samples t-test showed that responses were significantly faster on 
descriptions that ended on a word (661.33 ms) than descriptions that ended on a non-word (710.24 
ms), with t(78) = -6.62, p <.001. Mean reaction times for the ambiguous and forced inference word 
descriptions, as well as the descriptives of the self-report measures are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviations for the reaction times on the ambiguous and forced inference word 
descriptions (ms), and for the self-report measures (N = 79) 
  On-line inference task Mean SD  
  Ambiguous safe 761.00 188.66  
  Ambiguous health-threatening 703.73 152.26  
  Forced inference safe  566.88 116.84  
  Forced inference health-threatening 606.16 136.98  
  Self report measures Mean SD Min Max
  ASI 24.36 4.84 18 48
  ISI 21.73 6.32 12 39
  PCS 11.64 6.57 0 29
  FPQ 75.28 15.13 40 115
NoTe. ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ISI, Injury/illness Sensitivity Index; PCS, Pain Catastrophizing Scale; FPQ, 
Fear of Pain Questionnaire
The 2 (Description Type) x 2 (Valence) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Description Type (F(1,78) = 188.96, p <.001, d = .71) with faster reaction times on the forced 
inference descriptions than on the ambiguous descriptions (586.52 ms versus 732.36 ms). 
There was no significant main effect of Valence. The Description Type x Valence interaction was 
significant: F(1,78) = 42.06, p< .001. d = .35). The interaction effect was further examined with 
post hoc paired-sample t-tests, demonstrating that on the ambiguous descriptions, reaction times 
were significantly faster for the descriptions with a health-threatening resolution (t(78) = -5.47, p 
< .001), whereas on the forced inference descriptions, reaction times were significantly faster on 
descriptions with a safe resolution (t(78) = 4.91, p < .001). 
We next calculated the interpretation index (M = -146.74, sd = 132.31) that was then 
correlated with the self-report measures (Table 2). Fear of pain correlated significantly with INT_rt. 
None of the other individual difference measures showed a significant correlation with the INT_rt.
Table 2. Pearson correlation between the interpretation bias index and the self-report measures (N=79)
 ASI ISI PCS FPQ
  ISI .44*                             1  
  PCS .53* .50*                             1 
  FPQ .13 .46* .41*                           1
  INT_rt -.12 .03 .15 .29*
NoTe. ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ISI = Injury/illness Sensitivity Index; PCS = Pain Catastrophizing Scale; FPQ 
= Fear of Pain Questionnaire; INT_rt = interpretation bias index
* p<.01
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dIsCussIon
The present study aimed to examine whether individual levels of anxiety sensitivity, 
injury/illness sensitivity, fear of pain, and pain catastrophizing are associated with on-line negative 
interpretations of ambiguous situations implying bodily and health threat. Results demonstrated 
a general facilitation of responses to the ambiguous descriptions that were disambiguated by 
a health-threatening resolution. This effect was most pronounced in participants possessing 
elevated levels of fear of pain. No relation was found between the negative interpretations and 
levels of the other pain-related constructs, i.e., injury/illness sensitivity, anxiety sensitivity, and pain 
catastrophizing. 
These findings suggest that people may be generally inclined to make spontaneous 
and automatic negative inferences when confronted with ambiguity that can imply health threat. 
This echoes results of a recent study in which automatic associations towards verbal stimuli 
representing injury, illness, and pain were examined with an indirect association measure (Extrinsic 
Affective Simon Task ([EAST]; De Houwer, 2003), demonstrating a generalized automatic threat 
appraisal that was even more pronounced in persons possessing elevated levels of anxiety 
sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity (Vancleef et al., 2007). There is thus accumulating evidence 
for negatively biased processing of pain and health-related information in the fast and early stages 
of information processing. The confrontation with information that insinuates health or bodily threat 
seems to automatically activate a negative processing template in healthy individuals, which can 
be enhanced by the presence of pain-related anxieties. It should not be concluded that healthy 
individuals possess a negative interpretation bias in general, however. In contrary, research into 
the occurrence of an on-line interpretation bias for social anxiety-related material demonstrated 
that healthy participants were characterized by a positive on-line interpretation bias, that was 
absent in anxious individuals, who in turn were found to make no on-line inferences at all (Hirsch 
& Mathews, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). The difference between these latter studies and the 
current one concerns the object of implied threat, being either health threat (current study) or social 
threat referring to social encounters, speaking in public, or job interview situations. Mathews and 
Mackintosh (1998) and Mogg and Bradley (1998) offer an explanation for the occurrence of both 
positive and negative information processing bias in healthy individuals by stressing the importance 
of the threat value of target stimuli. According to their cognitive models, stimuli that entail severe 
threat are prioritized and negatively processed by both anxious and healthy individuals because of 
the beneficial effect that the early detection of severe threat can have from an evolutionary point 
of view for all individuals. Conversely, non-anxious individuals are assumed to avoid or positively 
process stimuli entailing moderate or no threat at all (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). Following this perspective, it might be suggested that because of the severe 
threat value of stimuli in the present study (implying death, serious injury, and illness), all individuals 
process these stimuli negatively, irrespective of their pain-related anxiety level. 
It should be acknowledged, however, that it cannot be ruled out on the basis of the 
present study, that the general automatic negative interpretation bias may be (partly) due to 
an undesirable priming effect. Since many of the situational descriptions in the lexical decision 
paradigm related to pain and disease, this might have induced expectations of a pain or disease-
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related resolution for the subsequent ambiguous description. Although descriptions in the task 
were based on a pilot-study and intended to entail full ambiguity, it cannot be ruled out that a 
general negative framework was activated by the task. 
Independent of whether persons generally hold a negative automatic bias towards 
ambiguous health-related situations, or whether this was strengthened by task-specific priming 
effects it is notable that fear of pain resulted as the only pain-related construct that was positively 
related with the negative interpretation bias. Fear of pain has been suggested as a very specific 
construct that forms a lower-order factor of the more generalized anxiety constructs injury/illness 
sensitivity and anxiety sensitivity (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Vancleef et al., 2006). It might be 
suggested that the content-specificity and the proximal relation of the fear of pain construct account 
for the observed unique relation with the interpretation bias. In the past, fear of pain has been 
found associated with hypervigilance an attentional bias for pain-related information (Crombez 
et al., 1999; Peters et al., 2002; Roelofs et al., 2002), and recently, fear of pain emerged as a 
strong predictor of an explicitly measured negative interpretation bias, offering predictive value over 
and above the proportion of variance that was already explained by other pain-related anxieties 
(Keogh & Cochrane, 2002; Pincus & Morley, 2001; Vancleef & Peters, in press). Nevertheless, 
the content-specificity argument cannot form a valid explanation for the non-significant relation 
between pain catastrophizing and the negative bias, considering that both fear of pain and pain 
catastrophizing are assumed to possess similar content-specificity (Keogh et al., 2004; Vancleef 
et al., 2006). The non-significant correlation with pain catastrophizing is puzzling, especially since 
pain catastrophizing refers to the exaggerated orientation towards pain and the meaning of pain 
(Sullivan et al., 1995), and thus holds a threatening interpretation tendency in its definition. One 
possible explanation can be sought in the relative low scores on the PCS (mean = 11.64) in the 
present group of participants. Other studies report remarkably higher PCS mean scores in both 
healthy populations (mean = 16 (Crombez et al., 1998b; Van Damme et al., 2002)), and clinical 
populations (mean = 21.99 in a fibromyalgia sample (Van Damme et al., 2002); mean = 27.96 
in patients with soft-tissue injury (Sullivan et al., 1998). Scores on the FPQ, on the other hand, 
showed a better dispersion, and with a mean score of 75.28, this sample is comparable to other 
healthy samples (e.g., mean = 74 (Roelofs, Peters, Deutz et al., 2005); mean = 69.10 (van Wijk & 
Hoogstraten, 2006); mean = 79 (McNeil & Rainwater, 1998) as well as to a medical sample (mean 
= 78.1) and a chronic pain population (mean =79.7) (McNeil & Rainwater, 1998). Further research 
is clearly warranted in order to examine whether the absence of a meaningful association between 
PCS scores and threat-confirming interpretation bias can indeed be explained by the relatively low 
PCS scores in the present sample. 
Next to the already mentioned limitation of a putative priming effect, other possible 
shortcomings to the current study need to be addressed. One of these shortcomings concerns 
the content of the descriptions in the task. All descriptions were created in such a way that they 
either had a negative meaning involving death, injury, illness, and pain, or a safe meaning involving 
happiness, health, marriage, pregnancy, and other more neutrally valenced resolutions. The safe 
descriptions thus referred to a broad range of situations, whereas the negative descriptions 
could all be chunked together as representative of health threats. The discrepancy between the 
homogeneity in negative meaning and the heterogeneity in safe meaning might have provoked 
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unequal expectations regarding the target word. Participants are primed to expect a putative health 
threatening resolution whereas no clear expectation is raised regarding the alternative putative 
solution of ambiguity. It is therefore suggested that future studies include two well-specified and 
demarcated resolution categories in order to raise equal expectations regarding the potential 
meaning of the target word. Furthermore, the healthy status of participants may be posited as 
another shortcoming of the present study. However, in order to examine whether the pain-related 
constructs act as latent risk factors for development and maintenance of chronic pain disorders, 
it is necessary to study their contributing role in information processing outside the context of 
current pain problems. As such, findings can be interpreted in the light of the presence of elevated 
levels of pain-related constructs, without them being contaminated by present pain problems. 
Nevertheless, future studies could benefit from the inclusion of participants that are selected as 
extreme scorers on the pain-related anxiety constructs. This might allow for firmer conclusions 
regarding the putative differences in the occurrence of negative interpretation bias in both high and 
low pain anxious individuals.
Despite these shortcomings, it should be stressed that the lexical decision paradigm 
emerged as a suitable paradigm to assess the on-line interpretations. Faster and more accurate 
responses were observed in response to word trials in comparison with non-word trials, indicating 
that participants make semantic inferences while reading the descriptions. The lexical processing 
of the descriptions probably activates expectations of a word probe rather than a non-word probe 
to follow the incomplete sentence, leading to a facilitation of responses to word trials. Furthermore 
we are quite confident in concluding that the ambiguity in the descriptions was effective based 
on the finding that within the word trials, responses were faster and more accurate on the forced-
inference descriptions than on the ambiguous descriptions. Responses to ambiguous descriptions 
are thus slowed down, and this is probably due to the fact that inferences can only be made at the 
very end of the ambiguous description, whereas inferences evolve fast and logically in the forced 
inference descriptions.
The current study is the first to our knowledge that attempts to measure automatic 
interpretations in relation to vulnerability constructs for chronic pain. Further research should 
pay attention to the valuable information that studying automatic cognitive biases can offer to 
the understanding of underlying mechanisms of pain maintaining behaviours and dysfunctional 
responses to pain. 
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appeNdix.	Examples of ambiguous word and non-word descriptions and their linked forced inference descriptions 
used in the task.
WORDS	 A_H_W	 F_H_W
Line 1 You are visiting your grandmother. She tells You have a birth mark that itches.
Line 2 you she has a doctor appointment tomorrow You have had it examined by a GP, 
Line 3 for the removal of two spots on the back of her but luckily nothing was wrong. 
Line 4 hand. These spots are a consequence of her The birth mark was no indication of
Target word cancer cancer
	 A_S_W	 F_S_W
Line 1 You are visiting your grandmother. She tells Your grandmother’s sight is getting worse.
Line 2 you she has a doctor appointment tomorrow She needs reading glasses. The optician 
Line3 For the removal of two spots on the back of her told her that it is common that sight
Line 4 hand. These spots are a consequence of her deteriorates when you reach an older
Target Word age age
NON_WORDS	 A_H_NW	 F_H_NW
Line 1 The boy lies in the bed for some The woman is staying at the intensive care 
unit.
Line 2 time now. He lies there very Her family hopes she will ever
Line3 calm and does not respond to you wake up again. Since a grave traffic 
Line 4 He is in a deep accident, she has been in a deep
Target Word moac moac
	 A_S_NW	 F_S_NW
Line 1 The boy lies in the bed for some Your brother has a strange 
Line 2 time now. He lies there very Habit. When he is in his bed
Line3 calm and does not respond to you at night, he speaks out 
Line 4 He is in a deep loud, although he is in a deep
Target Word pesle pesle
NoTe. A_H_W, Ambiguous description with a health-threatening word resolution; A_S_W, Ambiguous description 
with a safe word resolution; A_H_NW, Ambiguous description with a health-threatening non-word resolution; A_
S_NW, Ambiguous description with a safe word resolution; F_H_W, Forced inference description with a health-
threatening word resolution; F_S_W, Forced inference description with a safe word resolution; F_H_NW, Forced 
inference description with a health-threatening non-word resolution; F_S_NW, Forced inference description with a 
safe non-word resolution.
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Pain catastrophizing, but not injury/illness 
sensitivity or anxiety sensitivity enhances attentional 
interference by pain.
This chapter is published as: 
Vancleef, L. M. G. & Peters, M. L. (200). Pain catastrophizing, but not injury/illness sensitivity or 
anxiety sensitivity enhances attentional interference by pain. The Journal of Pain, 7, 2-0.
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Attentional interference
abstraCt
Pain draws upon attentional resources, thereby disturbing the pursuit of ongoing activities. 
Several studies have made use of the primary task paradigm to study the disruptive function of pain 
on attention. In this paradigm, participants perform an attentionally demanding task, while they are 
occasionally distracted by mild electrical stimulation. Deterioration in task performance (in terms of 
speed and accuracy) is then taken as an index of attentional interference. One major finding with 
this paradigm was that pain catastrophizing enhances attentional interference. The current study 
aims to replicate this finding and to explore the possible influence of anxiety sensitivity and injury/
illness sensitivity upon attentional interference. Healthy volunteers (n = 48) performed an auditory 
discrimination task and were thereby occasionally distracted by low electrocutaneous stimulations. 
The performance on the discrimination task was subsequently related to participants’ scores on 
the Pain Catastrophizing Scale, the Anxiety Sensitivity Index, and the Injury/illness Sensitivity Index. 
We were unable to demonstrate an association of either injury/illness sensitivity or anxiety sensitivity 
with attentional interference. Results did however confirm the finding that pain catastrophizing 
enhances attentional interference.
Perspective. The present study showed that pain disrupts ongoing activities. This effect is 
enlarged in those with high levels of pain catastrophizing and is related to the threatening nature of 
pain stimuli. The role of anxiety sensitivity and injury/illness sensitivity seems to differ from the role 
of catastrophizing and needs further research.
IntroduCtIon
Anxiety sensitivity (AS) is defined as the heightened sensitivity or fear of anxiety sensations 
(e.g., hart palpitations) that arises from the belief that these sensations will lead to harmful somatic, 
psychological or physical consequences (Reiss et al., 1986). AS has been suggested to play a role 
in the development and maintenance of various acute and chronic pain-related conditions, such 
as headaches, gastro-intestinal pain, menstrual pain, asthma, low-back pain and musculoskeletal 
pain (Asmundson et al., 2000). Studies in both clinical and non-clinical populations have 
demonstrated the association between anxiety sensitivity levels and pain related variables. AS 
was found to be associated with elevated fear of pain, a heightened reported cognitive disruption 
by pain, and heightened analgesic use in pain patients (Asmundson & Norton, 1995). In a non-
clinical population, high levels of AS were associated with decreased pain threshold and more self 
reported pain in response to a cold pressor task (Keogh & Cochrane, 2002; Keogh & Mansoor, 
2001), and AS proved to be a stronger predictor of cold-pressor pain than fear of pain (Greenberg 
& Burns, 2003). Moreover, AS may be related to cognitive biases for physically threatening and 
pain-related material (Keogh, Dillon et al., 2001; Stewart, Conrod, Gignac, & Pihl, 1998). Using a 
dot-probe task, Keogh et al. found that pain free volunteers high in anxiety sensitivity showed an 
increased attentional bias towards physically threatening material (Keogh, Dillon et al., 2001). In a 
subsequent study, participants scoring high on AS also demonstrated an increased interpretational 
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bias specifically for pain-related situations, which in addition mediated the relation between AS and 
pain threshold in the cold pressor test (Keogh & Cochrane, 2002).
 Thus, evidence is accumulating that AS influences the way people react to pain and 
thereby may be a potential vulnerability factor for chronic pain. However, recently it has been 
suggested that another personality trait, namely injury/illness sensitivity (IS), may play an equally 
or even more important role in determining someone’s reaction to pain (Keogh & Asmundson, 
2004). According to Reiss’s expectancy model (Reiss, 1991), three fundamental fears (also 
called sensitivities) can be distinguished, i.e., anxiety sensitivity, injury/illness sensitivity and fear 
of negative evaluation. These fundamental fears may underlie all common fears that we encounter 
in our daily society (e.g., fear of heights, fear of animals) and can be proposed to explain various 
psychopathological conditions (e.g., panic disorder, blood phobia, social phobia) (Taylor, 1993). 
The fundamental fears itself may in turn be nested within the higher order factor of trait anxiety. By 
administering measures of fundamental fears, common fears and trait anxiety to 100 community 
volunteers, Taylor (Taylor, 1993) was able to demonstrate that the three fundamental fears are 
indeed factorially distinct, minimally intercorrelated, and explain substantial proportions of variance 
in several common fears, as well as in trait anxiety.
Although this study provided evidence for IS as a distinct fundamental fear, its relation to 
common fears and specific forms of psychopathology has – in contrast to AS – remained largely 
unexplored. It was only recently that interest in IS as a potential vulnerability factor for chronic pain 
has arisen. Presenting an adapted version of the hierarchical model of fundamental fears, Keogh 
and Asmundson (2004) have proposed that IS may be a higher order factor of the common fear 
of pain and pain catastrophizing. Vancleef et al. (2006) tested the association between the three 
fundamental fears and other pain-related variables in a correlational study. Results showed that 
both AS and IS were correlated with several pain measures, but that IS was a better predictor of 
pain catastrophizing and fear of pain than AS. Furthermore, IS was found to be associated with 
a heightened fearfulness of an impending pain stimulus prior to the actual stimulus presentation, 
while this heightened anticipatory fearfulness could not be established for AS (Vancleef et al., 
2006). 
The present study further examined the putative role of AS and IS on pain responses in 
pain free volunteers. More specifically, it was investigated whether these two fundamental fears 
would lead to heightened attentional interference by pain on ongoing activities. Cognitive models of 
fear state that an important function of fear is the early detection of potential threatening situations, 
and accordingly fear is accompanied by vigilance or heightened awareness of possible sources 
of threat (Eysenck, 1997). Since IS represents a fearfulness for illness and injury, people with high 
levels of IS may be prone to prioritize signals of potential injury, and show more disruption of ongoing 
activities when confronted with a pain signal. AS may also be associated with increased attention 
towards pain. It has been speculated that a defining feature of AS is an increased awareness of 
bodily sensations in general (Keogh & Cochrane, 2002), and indeed a selective attentional bias 
for physical threat words was found in pain free volunteers scoring high on AS (Keogh, Dillon 
et al., 2001). Moreover, back pain patient with high AS reported to experience greater cognitive 
disruption in response to pain (Asmundson & Norton, 1995).
The attentional interference effect of pain can be experimentally established with the 
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so-called primary task paradigm, in which participants perform an attention-demanding task while 
at some points pain stimuli are administered (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). The critical parameter 
is deterioration of performance during pain. For the present study we used the primary task as 
adapted by Crombez et al. (1998a), in which participants perform a simple tone discrimination 
task, while they are occasionally distracted by low intensity non-painful electrical stimulation. With 
this paradigm, it was demonstrated that in clinical and non-clinical populations the degree of 
interference is determined by the intensity, the novelty, the predictability and the threat value of 
the stimulus (Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1994; Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1996, 
1997; Crombez et al., 1998a, 1998b; Crombez, Eccleston, van den Broeck, van Houdenhove, & 
Goubert, 2002). Since threat appraisal is one of the determining features of attentional interference, 
those who amplify threatening somatic information are expected to show increased attentional 
interference (Crombez et al., 1998b). Indeed, persons with high levels of pain related fear and 
persons who score high on pain catastrophizing showed larger attentional interference than those 
who were low in pain related fear and pain catastrophizing (Crombez et al., 1998b). 
Extending these findings to AS and IS, it can thus be expected that the presence of 
these traits may enhance the threat value of somatic stimuli, thereby resulting in larger disruption 
on attention as well. Persons who are high in IS may amplify the threat value since they perceive the 
somatic stimuli as signallers of injury, whereas persons who are high in AS may do this because they 
generally interpret bodily sensations negatively. In addition, both AS and IS are found to be closely 
related to pain catastrophizing and fear of pain (Vancleef et al., 2006). We therefore hypothesized 
in the present study that the degree of attentional interference by low intensity electric stimulation 
is dependent upon participants’ level of AS and IS. Furthermore, we attempt to replicate previous 
findings concerning the association between pain catastrophizing and attentional interference.
method
partiCipantS 
Forty-eight healthy participants (12 males; 36 females) with a mean age of 21.75 years 
(range: 18-43, SD = 4.36) took part in this study. All participants were recruited at Maastricht 
University’s local community through advertisements in the university paper and posters in the 
university building. Inclusion criteria for participation were a good state of health (free from chronic 
pain symptoms, free from mental illness) and good hearing abilities. All participants gave informed 
consent and received a financial compensation for their participation. Participants were informed 
that they could decline to participate at any given time during the experiment. Two participants were 
excluded from the VAS analysis, because of missing pre-experimental data. The Ethics Committee 
of the Academic Hospital Maastricht/Maastricht University approved the research protocol.
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materialS anD meaSureS
Self-report measures. Pain catastrophizing is assessed with the Dutch version of the Pain 
Catastrophizing Scale (PCS) (Sullivan et al., 1995). In this 13- item scale, respondents indicate 
on a 5-point scale to what extent they experience each of 13 feelings and thoughts when they 
experience pain (e.g., ‘I feel as if I can’t take this anymore’). Both the original and the Dutch version 
of the PCS have proven to be reliable and valid measures (Severeijns et al., 2002; Van Damme et 
al., 2002).
The Dutch version of the Sensitivity Index (SI) 9 (Taylor, 1993) consists of three subscales 
(ASI, ISI, FNE), which tap anxiety sensitivity (AS), injury/illness sensitivity (IS) and fear of negative 
evaluation (FNE) respectively. The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) includes 16 items concerning the 
negative consequences of experiencing anxiety (e.g., ‘It scares me when my heart beats rapidly’). 
The Injury/illness Sensitivity Index (ISI) (Taylor, 1993) contains 6 items pertaining to the fear of 
illness (e.g., ‘I get scared when I think I’m coming down with an illness’) and 5 items referring to 
the fear of injury (e.g., ‘The thought of injury terrifies me’). The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
(FNE) (Leary, 1983) consists of 12 items measuring the fear of negative evaluation (e.g., ‘I worry 
about what kind of impression I make on people’). Participants indicate their degree of agreement 
with all statements of the SI on a 5-point Likert scale. Psychometric properties of both the original 
and the Dutch version of the SI are satisfactory (Taylor, 1993; Vancleef et al., 2006), with internal 
consistencies in the Dutch version of .88 (ISI), .84 (ASI), .96 (FNE) and .94 (whole SI). The test retest 
reliability coefficients for the Dutch version of the SI showed intra class correlation coefficients 
(ICC’s) ranging from .60 to .64 with a six-month test interval. Furthermore, the psychometric 
properties of the ASI (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987; Rodriguez et al., 2004; Sandin et al., 2001), 
the FNE (Garcia Lopez, Olivares, Hidalgo, Beidel, & Turner, 2001; Leary, 1983) and recently the ISI 
(Carleton et al., 2005) separately have well been documented. 
Two Visual Analogue Scales were administered before and after the experimental phase, 
on which participants rate the unpleasantness and the experienced intensity of the electrical 
stimulation. These scales consisted of a horizontal line (10 cm) representing a continuum, ranging 
from ‘not at all unpleasant/ not at all intense’ to ‘very unpleasant/ very intense’. Participants marked 
the line at the position within this continuum that reflects their opinion/experience concerning 
unpleasantness and intensity of the ES.
9 The English version of the Sensitivity Index was translated in Dutch in a state-of-the-art manner, involving back translation,  
 after which the item content was checked against the original content. The Dutch version of the Sensitivity Index is available with the  
 corresponding author.
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Auditory discrimination task. In the auditory discrimination task, high (1000 Hz) and low 
(250 Hz) pitch tones (duration = 200 ms) were presented through a headset to the participants. 
Participants responded to the tones by pressing a button of a two-buttoned console with their 
dominant hand. A total of 48 tones were presented, with an interstimulus-interval between 1200ms 
and 1800 ms (mean=1500ms). Half of the tones presented were high in pitch.
Electrical stimulation. The electrical stimulation (ES) was delivered by a constant current 
stimulator (IDEE, Maastricht University) with an internal frequency of 50 Hz. The electrical stimuli all 
had an instantaneous rise and fall time, and a duration of 1500 ms. The stimulation was delivered 
through one pair of Ag/AgCl electrodes, filled with hypertonic gel (spectra eeg gel), and an inter-
electrode distance of 1 cm. The electrodes were attached at the under-arm of the non-dominant 
arm, after the skin area beneath the electrodes was first rubbed with peeling gel to reduce skin 
resistance. The ES all had an intensity of 0.8 mA. In a pilot study, this intensity was found to be well 
noticeable, although it remained under the pain threshold for all participants. 
proCeDure
Pre-experimental phase. Participants were tested individually after informed consent was 
obtained. They were kept unaware of the true nature of the experiment, to control for possible 
demand characteristics. In line with previous studies by Crombez et al. (e.g., Crombez et al., 
1998a, 1998b) participants were led to believe that they took part in a study that attempted to 
investigate the putative influence of distracters upon a psychophysiological measure of stimulus 
perception, whereby the electrodes were used to measure electrodermal activity. 
Experimental phase. First, the participants were familiarized with the ES. Therefore, a series 
of ES with increasing intensity (0.2 mA- 0.4 mA- 0.6mA- 0.8mA) was administered through the 
attached electrodes. In this familiarization phase, each ES intensity was only presented once to the 
participant. Participants were kept ignorant with respect to which of these intensities they would 
receive in the experimental phase. After this series of ES, participants rated the unpleasantness 
and the perceived intensity of the last received ES, which corresponded to the intensity of the 
ES that would be used throughout the experiment. Next, participants practiced the auditory 
discrimination task without distracters. The tones (15 low pitch and 15 high pitch) were presented 
randomly, with an inter-stimulus interval between 1200 and 1800 ms (mean =1500 ms). Finally, 
participants received further instructions about the progress of the experiment. They were told 
that the primary goal of the study was to investigate the influence of an unfamiliar, painful stimulus 
upon electrodermal activity. Following Crombez et al. (1998b), we enhanced the threat value of 
the ES by providing intrinsically threatening somatic information concerning the ES through telling 
participants that the ES would directly stimulate pain fibres. In addition, we told participants that in 
prior studies, the reactions to ES varied across persons, with some persons judging them as very 
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painful, whereas others did not. Finally, participants were instructed that they should try to ignore 
the pain stimuli and concentrate on performing the auditory task as good and as fast as possible.
When all these preparation phases were fulfilled, the experimental phase began. This phase 
consisted of three identical blocks that were presented to the participant in a serial order, without 
pauses in between. Each block consisted of 8 ES trials that all had duration of 1500 ms and a fixed 
intensity of 0.8mA. Half of the ES trials (4 trials) were combined with the presentation of a tone. In 
two of these, the tone was presented at 250 ms after onset of the ES, whereas in the other two 
ES trials, the tone was presented at 750 ms after ES onset. These two times of tone presentations 
(250ms versus 750 ms) were chosen following Crombez et al. (1996, 1997), who showed that 
the distractive influence of the ES was most pronounced when a reaction was expected at pain 
onset (i.e., 250 ms). Four ES trials without a combined tone were inserted, to avoid the electrical 
stimulation to become predictive of a tone. The amount of tones that preceded an ES varied 
between 4 and 6 (mean =5). Over the three blocks, a total of 144 tones were presented (48 tones 
in each block), of which half were high in pitch.  No more than 3 consecutive trials consisted of a 
tone with the same pitch. The computer registered reaction times and errors while the participant 
executed the experiment. 
Post-experimental phase. Immediately upon finishing the experimental phase, participants 
rated once again the unpleasantness and the experienced intensity of the last presented ES and 
completed the self-report measures (PCS, SI). The self-report measures were administered after 
the experimental procedure in order to avoid demand characteristics. Presenting the questionnaires 
before the experimental procedure might result in transparency of the research aims as studying 
pain processes, thereby affecting the task performance of the participants in an undesirable 
manner.
results
Interference effect. The overall percentage of errors during the task was 1.5%, with a total of 
12 errors (2.1%) occurring during the electrocutaneous stimuli and 90 errors (1.4%) on the stimuli 
that were not presented during a shock. Only 0.6 % of the Reaction times were missing or invalid. 
In accordance with Crombez et al. (e.g., Crombez et al., 1997) invalid reaction times were defined 
as reaction times below 150 ms or above 2000 ms. 
The mean reaction times and their standard deviations on trials within or outside an 
electrical stimulation are depicted in Table 1. We calculated baseline reaction times as the average 
of reaction times on tones occurring outside an experimental event, and experimental reaction 
times as the average of reaction time scores on the tones falling within the duration of an electrical 
stimulus. Interference scores are calculated as the change score in reaction time from the baseline 
scores to the experimental scores. These interference scores are used in the following analyses 
and should be interpreted as the mean deterioration on task performance, caused by the ES. 
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Table 1. Mean reaction times (standard deviations) on Baseline tone trials, Experimental tone trials and 
Interference scores, separately for the three blocks (N= 48)
 Baseline ����Experimental Interference
 Mean RT  (sd) Mean RT  (sd) Mean  (sd) 
  1 460.31  (88.44) 543.89  (115.70) 83.58  (73.94)
  2 436.17  (78.45) 488.16  (115.68) 52.00  (71.57)
  3 430.78  (78.04) 466.88  (94.64) 36.10  (58.51)
  Total 442.42  (82.22) 499.64  (113.15) 57.22  (70.69)
A 2 x 3 repeated measures analysis of variance with Condition (Baseline versus 
Experimental) as within subjects factor and Block (Block 1 versus Block 2 versus Block 3) as 
between subjects factor resulted in a main effect of Condition (F (1,141) = 100.95, p < .001, η² = 
.42) and a main effect of Block (F (2,141) = 4.54, p < .05,η² = .01). The main effect of Condition 
indicates that participants responded faster on the baseline tone trials than on the trials within 
electrical stimulation (Table 1). The main effect of Block shows that participants became faster in 
their responses throughout the experiment, with the slowest responses in Block 1 (mean = 466,19; 
sd = 72.75), faster responses in Block 2 (mean = 439,63; sd = 11,58) and the fastest responses 
in Block 3 (mean = 431,84; sd = 11.24). The Condition x Block interaction was significant as well 
(F (2,141) = 6.00, p < .01, η²= .08), indicating that interference was the highest in the first block 
(Table 1). 
To explore a possible effect of time of tone presentation (250 ms or 750 ms after onset 
ES), interference scores for the tones at 250 ms after ES onset and the interference score for tones 
at 750 ms after ES onset were calculated separately (see Table 2).
Table 2. Mean interference scores and standard deviations for the tones at 250 ms after ES onset and at 750 ms 
after ES onset in the three blocks. (N = 48)
 Interference 250  Interference 750
  Block Mean  SD Mean  SD
  1 108.73 114.19 55.05 94.71
  2 43.54 88.27 60.45 93.51
  3 25.97 72.56 39.32 96.43
An 2 x 3 ANOVA with Time (250 ms versus 750 ms) as within subjects factor and Block 
(1 versus 2 versus 3) as between subjects factor revealed a main effect of Block (F (2,141) = 6.05, 
p < .01, η²= .09) and a significant interaction between Time and Block (F (2,141) = 4.78, p < .05, 
η²= .06). No main effect for Time (F (1,141) = .553, ns) was found. Post hoc analyses with paired 
t-tests showed an effect of Time in the first block only (t (47) = 2.59, p = .013, d = .27), indicating a 
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higher interference score at the 250 ms time than at the 750 ms time. No time of tone effects could 
be identified in block 2 or block 3.
Association between the questionnaire scores and the interference effect. In the 
current sample, the mean PCS score was 14.17 (sd = 7.83). The mean scores for the ASI, the ISI 
and the FNE10 were respectively 27.19 (sd = 7.05), 23.92 (sd = 8.34) and 27.39 (sd = 9.86).
The association between the self-report questionnaires and the mean interference score 
over the three blocks was explored by calculating Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients (Table 
3). The correlations showed a significant correlation between the interference score and the PCS 
(r (48) = .326, p = .024), whereas the ASI (r (48) = .191, ns) and the ISI (r (48) = .044, ns) did not 
correlate significantly with the interference scores11. Furthermore, Table 3 shows the correlations 
between the different measures used in this study. All measures correlate significantly with each 
other. The highest correlations exist between ASI and ISI (r (48) = .668, p < .01) and between ASI 
and PCS (r (48) = .606, p < .01). 
  Table 3. Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between the interference scores and the self-report measures. (N = 8)
 INTERFERENCE PCS   ASI
  PCS .33*  
  ASI .19 .61** 
  ISI .04 .49**   .67**
NoTe. PCS, Pain Catastrophizing Scale; ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ISI, Injury/Illness Sensitiviy Index; 
* p < .05;  ** p < .01
Subjective responses to electrical stimuli. Participants rated the ‘intensity’ and the 
‘unpleasantness’ of the last experienced ES once after the familiarization with the ES and once 
again after the experimental procedure. Table 4 shows that these subjective responses were both 
rated higher before the experimental event than after the experimental procedure. Paired t-tests 
comparing the pre-experimental scores with the post-experimental scores did indeed result in 
significant differences for both ‘intensity’ (t (45)= 5.27, p < .001, d = .61) and ‘unpleasantness’ (t 
(45) = 5.04, p < .001, d = .51) ratings. 
10 Since the FNE scale was not of interest in the current study, this measure was ignored in further analyses. 
11 One way ANOVA on the interference score, with the median-split scores on the questionnaires as between subjects factor , revealed 
 a significant group effect of pain catastrophizing as well (F(,6)= .6, p= .07), but no group effects for the AS or IS were found.
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  Table 4. Pre- and post experimental mean VAS scores on ‘Experienced intensity’ and ‘Unpleasantness’. (N = 4) 
 Pre-experimental  Post-experimental
 Mean SD Mean SD
  Intensity 51.23 21.61 33.28 20.71
  Unpleasantness 48.00 25.12 31.02 22.27
A possible association between the scores on the VAS scales and the questionnaire 
scores was explored with correlational analyses. None of these correlations reached significance, 
with correlation coefficients ranging between .03 and .23).
dIsCussIon
The present study looked into the interruptive nature of pain on attention with the primary 
task paradigm. Thereby, it was examined whether IS, AS, or pain catastrophizing affect the degree 
in which a somatic threatening stimulus distracts attention from the performance on a simple 
cognitive task in pain-free volunteers. 
Results confirmed previous findings concerning the disrupting function of pain on 
attention (Crombez et al., 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Crombez et al., 1999; Eccleston, 1994; Eccleston 
& Crombez, 1999). The administration of a somatic threatening stimulus (the ES) caused task 
deterioration on tone trials that fell within an ES, indicating that the sudden experience of this 
stimulus drew upon the attentional resources of our participants. In addition, we could replicate 
the finding that attentional interference is larger at the onset of the ES, since interference scores 
were larger when a response was required at 250 ms after ES onset, in comparison to a required 
response at 750 ms after onset. Based on conditioning principles (Öhman, 1979) and cognitive 
motivational models (Norman & Shallice, 1986), Crombez et al. (1998a) suggest that the threat value 
of a stimulus primes the attentional system of the individual, thereby disrupting task performance. 
Attention will then be switched to the somatic threatening stimulus, which is subsequently 
evaluated with respect to its meaning and gravity. When this evaluation results in a non-threatening 
appraisal of the stimulus, the individual will pursue the activities that were interrupted by pain onset. 
The difference in interference at 250 ms and 750 ms after ES onset applies to the first test block 
only, which is in agreement with previous findings (Crombez et al., 1996, 1997). Possibly, the easy 
nature of the auditory discrimination task is responsible for the fact that, even though the ES keeps 
slowing down reaction times, the strongest initial influence of pain declines when the participant is 
more familiarized with the task procedure.
The current study furthermore confirmed the previous finding that individual differences 
in pain catastrophizing influence attentional interference scores (Crombez et al., 1998b; Crombez 
et al., 2002). High scores on the pain catastrophizing scale were associated with larger task 
deterioration on the auditory discrimination task. We were, however, unable to demonstrate a 
likewise influence of either IS or AS on task deterioration. The correlations between the interference 
scores and the fundamental fear constructs were small, indicating that the presence of these traits 
		part two
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does not influence the allocation of attentional processes. So, it seems appealing to conclude 
that the hypothesized amplifying effect of both IS and AS on the threat value of the ES does not 
exist. However, some alternative explanations for the lack of finding our hypothesized effect should 
be taken in consideration. With respect to IS, the lack of ecological validity might be responsible 
for the low correlations with the interference effect. IS is related to general negative expectations 
and anticipations of putative future injury and illness. In the current study, participants were aware 
that they take were taking part in a controlled study in which intensity and duration of the used 
stimuli were limited (in comparison to real-life situations), thereby not likely resulting in serious 
tissue damage. Consequently, the anticipative fear of possible long-term health complaints is not 
realistically present in this experimental set-up. 
With respect to AS, it is conceivable that the relation between AS and the interference 
scores could not be detected due to the nature of the threatening bodily sensations that are caused 
by the ES. In the definition of AS, a specific sensitivity for the experience of anxiety sensations is 
stated (Reiss et al., 1986). However, in the current study, the ES is externally administered to the 
person, and may not be evaluated as an internally threatening sensation to the participant. In 
addition, it can be argued that the ES in the current study is not aversive enough to elicit strong 
general anxiety for the experienced bodily sensations. Indeed, Eccleston et al. (1994) reported 
the magnitude of the pain intensity as a crucial variable in its effect upon attentional awareness. 
However, Crombez et al. (1998a) provided evidence that in a healthy population, the threat of pain 
(either internal or external), in combination with the novelty and unpredictability of the ES satisfy 
the necessary conditions to obtain an enhanced disruption on attention in persons with high levels 
of pain catastrophizing (Crombez et al., 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). The 
present results support these findings with respect to pain catastrophizing. Nevertheless, since 
we failed to assess whether the ES used in this study were indeed evaluated as unpredictable 
and threatening to the participants, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that the ES actually 
did not possess our intended threat value and unpredictability. Yet, it is possible that the primary 
task paradigm as adapted in the current study provides not enough sensitivity to obtain likewise 
effects in persons with high levels of AS and IS, since the fundamental fears are less specific and 
of a higher order than pain catastrophizing is. Further research should address the facet of the 
sensitivity of the primary task paradigm as it is used in the current set-up.
An additional interesting and remarkable finding of the current study concerns the 
correlations between the questionnaire measures, more specifically the relation between AS, IS, 
and pain catastrophizing. A prior study showed that although both AS and IS are associated with 
pain catastrophizing, IS was the strongest predictor for this factor (Vancleef et al., 2006). However, 
inspection of the correlations between the questionnaire measures in the current sample learns 
that AS, and not IS correlates the highest with pain catastrophizing. This may be caused by the 
time of assessment of the questionnaires. In the current study, all questionnaires were assessed 
after the experimental procedure, and that may have affected participants’ response tendencies. 
Although AS and IS are both considered as dispositional personality traits, the possibility exists 
that the specific item characteristics of the measures assessing these traits have an undesirable 
effect on the eventual scores on these measures. Both the PCS and the ASI possess items that 
ask directly for experienced pain and experienced bodily sensations. It may therefore be the case 
proefschrift165x240_.indd   138 10-09-2007   10:56:01
		|13
Attentional interference
that respondents take the pain from the experiment as referent in their mind while filling in the 
questionnaires, with a resulting high correlation between the two measures. The ISI consists of 
items that are posited in such a way that they refer to the general fearfulness of experiencing 
injury or illness at some time in the future, and is therefore less applicable to the low intensity 
pain stimulus from the experiment. Comparable findings were recently reported by Thorn et al. 
(2004), who showed that PCS scores that were assessed before an experimental pain induction 
did not predict pain intensity ratings, whereas post PCS scores did. These authors argued that 
the PCS might measure situational catastrophizing when it is administered after experimental pain 
stimulation rather than dispositional catastrophizing, that it measures when it is assessed before 
the experimental pain procedure. Further research should pay attention to state-like properties of 
particularly the ASI that result from the specific item content of this measure. 
Several limitations should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results of the 
current study. First, one could argue that the rather small sample size (N = 48) is responsible for 
the lack of finding significant effects for the ASI and the ISI with the interference scores. However, 
this possibility seems unlikely since the found association between the interference effect and 
pain catastrophizing does not differ substantially from the effects that Crombez and colleagues 
found in earlier studies with resembling sample sizes (Crombez et al., 1998b; Crombez et al., 
2002). Moreover, the strong general interference effect that is found in the current study, gives 
further indication that the failure to find effects with AS and IS are not resulting from sample size 
problems. Particularly with respect to IS, the correlation with the interference score is so small 
that an increase in sample size would still not lead to a sufficient high correlation to obtain the 
hypothesized association. Rather than problems with sample size, however, it is possible that 
extreme values of AS and IS are required to establish their influence on attentional interference. In 
the current study, these extreme values are particularly missing for AS. Future research with these 
factors should considerate a prior selection on extreme values for these traits in order to verify this 
possibility. One could furthermore raise the argument that a clinical research population would 
have yielded better interpretable results. However, the current study was specifically conducted in 
a non-clinical population, for it is theorized that both IS and AS are dispositional risk factors in the 
aetiology of acute and chronic pain, being present before pain develops. Putative results of this 
study can then be assigned to the presence of IS and AS, disentangling their influence from the 
effect that the actual presence of chronic pain could have on the task performance. Moreover, the 
measure that assesses IS, the injury/illness sensitivity index, consists of items that ask for worrying 
and fearfulness of future injury and illnesses. Therefore, it is unadvisable to administer this measure 
in a clinical pain population, since their actual pain experience will affect the interpretation and 
response mode on the questions. 
The lack of evidence for an influential role of both AS and IS on attention interference 
emphasizes the need for further research in the validation of these concepts, and the role they play 
in pain processing. It is possible that IS is not so much related to attentional interference by pain 
once it is there, but rather to the interpretation and validation of future injury or illness. Therefore, it 
may be proposed that the role of IS should be investigated with an interpretation bias paradigm in 
which the schema of a person concerning several (pain related) situations can be investigated. 
Despite the negative findings concerning the role of AS and IS, the current study has 
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proven convincingly that pain has the characteristic of demanding attention and that it interferes with 
other cognitive tasks that have to be fulfilled. Also, this attentional distraction is enhanced in pain 
catastrophizers, who amplify threatening information and exaggerate the negative consequences 
of pain. The role of IS and AS in the (chronic) pain problem needs further attention and research
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Commentary:	the	InterruptIve	effeCt	of	paIn	on	attentIon
A large body of research has been conducted to study the relation between pain and 
attention. It has been suggested that focussing attention on the performance of a high attention-
demanding task can serve as a cognitive coping strategy to deal with pain, as all attentional 
resources will be devoted to task performance. On the other hand, evidence exists that pain can 
automatically enter focal attention, even when attention is being devoted to the performance of 
an attention-demanding task. Eccleston (1994) found that pain patients with high levels of self-
reported pain performed worse on an attention-demanding task than those reporting lower pain 
levels, even though they were instructed to ignore their pain and focus on task performance. When 
trying to explain the disturbing effect of pain on attention, it is important to consider the parameters 
that influence this effect. Several studies have used the primary task paradigm in their search for 
these parameters and revealed that besides the pain intensity, the novelty, the unpredictability, 
and the threat value of pain stimuli enlarge attentional disruption by pain (Crombez et al., 1994; 
Crombez et al., 1996, 1997, 1998a; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Eccleston, Crombez, Aldrich, & 
Stannard, 1997). So, attentional interference by pain is larger when the pain stimulus is new and 
unfamiliar to the individual, or when the pain stimulus holds an implicit or explicit threat. But not 
only qualities of the pain stimulus itself determine the degree in which pain will interrupt attention. 
Individual characteristics may also moderate the attentional interference effect. Research found 
that persons who interpret pain as threatening, and persons who tend to catastrophize on the 
possible meaning and consequences of pain show an enhanced disruptive effect on attention 
(Crombez et al., 1998b; Crombez et al., 2002). 
It can be concluded that pain does interrupt attention, but that its intrusion into focal 
awareness is dependent upon several characteristics of the pain stimulus and the meaning that 
is assigned to it. The apparent contradictive outcomes of the study by Veldhuijzen, Kenemans, 
de Bruin, Olivier, & Volkerts (2006), and our study (Vancleef & Peters, 2006) should be interpreted 
in this light. We made use of an electrical pain stimulus of short duration that we administered 
randomly at several times during task performance. The imminent threat value of the pain stimulus 
was manipulated through instruction. Veldhuijzen et al. used a more tonic pain stimulus (i.e., 
cold pressor pain) that was continuously present during task performance. Previous studies, as 
well as or own study show that interruption by pain on attention is largest immediately after pain 
onset, after which the interruptive effect diminishes quickly (Crombez et al., 1996, 1997, 1998a). 
Immediately upon pain onset, an automatic orienting reflex occurs, in which attention is devoted 
to the pain, and a fast evaluation of the meaning and gravity of the pain is made. When the result 
of this evaluation reveals that the pain is not threatening, attention will be devoted again to the 
task and performance will no longer suffer. In the study of Veldhuijzen et al., the pain stimulus 
may have lost its meaningfulness to the participants due to its long duration, making it easier 
		part two
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to distract from. Furthermore, Veldhuijzen et al. didn’t include measures of individual variability 
between participants. Both our and previous studies convincingly demonstrated that attentional 
interference was enhanced in persons with high levels of pain catastrophizing, fear of pain or 
somatic awareness (Crombez et al., 1998b; Crombez et al., 1999; Crombez et al., 2002; Eccleston 
et al., 1997). 
This commentary is published as: 
Vancleef, L. M. G. & Peters, M. L. (200). The Interruptive Effect of Pain on Attention. The Journal 
of Pain, 7, 21-22.
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Does it hurt less when you are convinced you 
can control it? The infl uence of perceived control 
and self-effi cacy on the subjective evaluation of 
experimentally induced pain.
This chapter is submitted for publication as:
Vancleef, L. M. G. & Peters, M. L. Does it hurt less when you are convinced you can control it? 
The infl uence of perceived control and self-effi cacy on the subjective evaluation of experimentally 
induced pain.
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 abstraCt
Perceived control and self-efficacy (SE) beliefs over pain have been proposed as 
mediators of reductions in pain and pain-related disability and as important factors to consider in 
the management of pain. The present study (N = 79) sought to examine the effects of manipulated 
perceived control and SE beliefs on subjective expectancy and experience ratings (i.e., pain 
intensity, pain unpleasantness, fear of pain) of an experimentally induced electrical pain stimulus. In 
addition, the moderating effects of positive stable personality traits (i.e., optimism and general SE) 
were explored. Results demonstrated that having perceived control over pain influenced the fear 
that was elicited by the pain stimulus. Inducing high SE beliefs regarding the ability to exert control 
over pain resulted in a significant reduction in anticipated pain intensity and pain unpleasantness. 
Additionally, the anticipated pain intensity mediated the relation between SE and experienced pain 
intensity. Optimism and general SE were found to be inversely related with fear of pain ratings only. 
It is concluded that in order to observe beneficial effects of offering control over pain on the actual 
pain experience, it is important that individuals are convinced (i.e., have high SE) that they are able 
to exert this control successfully. 
IntroduCtIon
Although a substantial body of research is available on potential vulnerability and risk 
factors for chronic pain, research into factors and mechanisms that influence the course of pain 
beneficially is still sparse. Nevertheless, gathering knowledge on processes and factors that might 
contribute to reductions in pain and pain-related disability provides useful information for theoretical 
and management perspectives on chronic pain. One cognitive construct that has been proposed 
as a mediator of decreased pain and disability is perceived control, or the belief that one has at 
one’s disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event (Thompson, 1981). In 
(chronic) pain patients, perceived control over pain has been found predictive of patients’ well-being 
and of better patient functioning (less depression, less disability, less interference by pain), and 
was found associated with increased activity levels, lower perceived pain severity, and increased 
patient satisfaction with treatment strategies (Jensen & Karoly, 1991; Pellino & Ward, 1998; Tan et 
al., 2002). In healthy volunteers, perceived control over pain has been found related to increased 
tolerance and prolonged endurance of experimentally induced pain (Arntz & Schmidt, 1989; Feldner 
& Hekmat, 2001). Recently, Janssen, Spinhoven, and Arntz (2004) demonstrated that successful 
control over the pain has a positive influenced on individuals’ mood, whereas repetitive failures in 
controlling pain lead to increased anger and physiological reactivity. It is important to note that the 
idea of being able to control pain already seems to lead to beneficial effects, irrespective of the fact 
whether this control is genuinely effective or utilized (Arntz & Schmidt, 1989). Nevertheless, effects 
of perceived control over pain appear to be restricted to behavioural and emotional responses to 
pain (pain tolerance, pain endurance, happiness). Arntz and Schmidt (1989) have suggested that 
perceived control over pain particularly alters the perceived threat value and thus the meaning 
of the pain, leading to observable benefits in objective responses to pain that do not extend to 
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its subjective sensory experience. Supporting this suggestion, perceived control over anxiety-
related events (interpreted as control over threatening, anxiety inducing situations) appeared to be 
associated with longer tolerance and endurance of cold-pressor pain, but not with decreases in 
subjective pain intensity, heart rate, or pain threshold (Feldner & Hekmat, 2001). 
A second cognitive factor that is assumed to mediate pain and disability is self-efficacy 
(SE), or the belief one has in one’s ability to organize and perform the behaviours that are necessary 
to achieve desired goals (Bandura, 1977). A distinction can be made between generalized SE and 
specific SE. Generalized SE is conceived as a broad and stable personality construct that reflects 
the belief and confidence one has in one’s own capability to achieve desired outcomes in everyday 
life across a broad range of situations (e.g., Luszczynska et al., 2005; Peters & Vancleef, in press). 
Specific SE, on the other hand refers to the belief one has in one’s own capability and quality to 
achieve desired outcomes using a specific task, strategy, or technique (e.g., Litt, 1988; Rokke et 
al., 2004). Most research that examined the effects of SE on responses to pain has focussed on 
specific SE, operationalized as the belief in the ability to use a specific strategy or technique to 
reduce pain, or the belief in the ability to cope with a specific pain stimulus (e.g., cold pressor pain). 
Specific SE has been identified as a mediating factor in the relation between pain intensity and 
disability, and was found predictive of the degree of disability that one experiences (Arnstein, 2000; 
Denison et al., 2004). Furthermore, high SE beliefs appeared to be predictive of pain tolerance 
and pain endurance, irrespective of the amount of pain that one expected to receive (Baker & 
Kirsch, 1991; Litt, 1988; Rokke et al., 2004; Williams & Kinney, 1991). Congruently with findings on 
perceived control, the beneficial effects of SE appear to be predominantly restricted to behavioural 
pain responses, although effects of SE on reported pain intensity have been observed occasionally 
(e.g., Jackson et al., 2002; Rokke et al., 2004). 
Even though most of the research on the influence of perceived control and SE on pain 
has focussed on one of both constructs, it well acknowledged that both constructs are intrinsically 
related to each other (Litt, 1988; Pellino & Ward, 1998; Rokke et al., 2004). Litt (1988) demonstrated 
that the benefits of perceived control over pain on pain tolerance were the greatest for those who 
were most confident (i.e., high self-efficacious) that they were able to exercise this control. In a 
similar vein, Jensen and Karoly (1991) have stressed that in order to achieve a positive influence 
on well-being and activity levels in pain patients, the belief in ones personal ability to control pain 
is as important as the belief in the control strategy itself. Since many of the studies that examined 
the effects of SE beliefs on the perception of pain have operationalized SE as the belief in one’s 
ability to manage pain by the use of a specific strategy or technique, it might be suggested that 
these studies can be understood as studies that examined the influence of SE beliefs regarding 
a perceived control possibility on the pain experience (e.g., Arnstein, 2000; Jackson et al., 2002; 
Rokke et al., 2004). 
The current study was set up to examine the beneficial effects of perceived control and 
manipulated SE regarding this control on subjective ratings of pain intensity, pain unpleasantness, 
and fear of pain as provided prior to and following upon experimentally induced pain. It was 
hypothesized that having perceived control over pain will lead to a decrease in anticipatory and 
experienced subjective responses to pain, and that these beneficial effects will be especially 
pronounced in those who possess high SE regarding the control strategy. We also hypothesized 
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that no effects of SE will be observed for participants in the no perceived control condition: SE 
beliefs are only relevant for participants who believe that they have a control possibility.
In addition, the current study examined the influence of two psychological trait constructs, 
generalized SE and optimism, on anticipatory and experienced subjective responses to pain directly 
and in interaction with the control and self-efficacy manipulations. Generalized SE was found to 
be predictive of better coping after surgery, and higher levels of general SE have recently found 
to be associated with less psychological distress and disability by pain (Schwarzer, Boehmer, 
Luszczynska, Mohamed, & Knoll, 2005; Taylor, Dean, & Siegert, 2006). General SE has been 
associated with a large set of psychological constructs, amongst which optimism (Luszczynska 
et al., 2005). Optimism is conceived as a stable personality characteristic that reflects generalized 
positive expectations about the future and has been proposed as an important personality trait in 
relation to adjustment to chronic illnesses (Scheier & Carver, 1992). In prospective studies, high 
levels of optimism have been found associated with faster recovery and enhanced well-being 
after a surgical procedure, and higher levels of perceived global recovery and higher quality of 
life at 6 months post operation (Fitzgerald, Tennen, Affleck, & Pransky, 1993; Peters et al., 2006; 
Scheier, Matthews, Owens, Magovern, & et al., 1989). It is hypothesized that heightened levels of 
generalized SE and or optimism are associated with lower levels of anticipated and experienced 
pain, irrespective of the manipulations of SE and optimism. In addition, we explored whether 
optimism and general SE moderated the effects of perceived control and specific SE. It might be 
speculated that both the effects of specific SE and of perceived control are especially prominent in 
individuals who possess elevated levels of generalized SE and or optimism.
method
partiCipantS
Participants (N=80; 59 female; M age = 24.49 years, sd= 6.78, range = 18-49) were 
recruited at Maastricht’s university local community. Because pain was induced by administering 
electrical stimulation on the forearm, wearing a pacemaker, suffering from cardiovascular disorders, 
thrombosis, or recent injury at the non-dominant forearm formed exclusion criteria. Because current 
pain complaints at the moment of testing might impact the results in an undesirable way, this was 
also formulated as an exclusion criterion for participation. All exclusion criteria were formulated 
at the recruitment posters as prerequisites for participation at the study, and compliance with 
the criteria was verbally checked when a test appointment was scheduled telephonically, and 
was once again queried when the participant arrived at the test appointment. All participants 
gave informed consent and received financial compensation for participating. One participant was 
excluded from data analyses, because for this person, pain tolerance was not reached within the 
preset boundaries of electrical stimulation intensity (between 0.4 and 10.0 mA). As such, data 
analyses were conducted on 79 participants (59 female, M age = 24.51, sd = 6.83, range = 18 
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- 49). The Ethics Committee of the University Hospital Maastricht/Maastricht University approved 
the research protocol.
materialS anD meaSureS
Electrical stimulation (ES). The electrical stimulation (ES) was delivered through one pair of 
Ag/AgCl electrodes (diameter = 8 mm; interelectrode distance 10 mm), filled with hypertonic gel 
(spectra eeg gel) that was attached to the ventral forearm of the non-dominant arm. The skin area 
beneath the electrodes was first rubbed with peeling gel to reduce skin resistance. The stimulation 
consisted of rectangular pulses at a rate of 2 Hz, produced by a constant current stimulator (IDEE, 
Maastricht University). The electrical stimuli had a duration of 3 s in the calibration phase and 
of 16 s in the experimental phase (procedure section). The intensity of the ES was individually 
established with a maximum intensity of 10 mA. (see procedure section).         
Skin conductance. Skin conductance was (fictively) measured through two 9 mm Ag-AgCl 
electrodes that were attached to the middle bones of the index and third finger of the non-
dominant hand. The participants could monitor the course of their (fictive) skin conductance level 
over a two-minute period on a computer screen that was located in front of them. All participants 
were presented with the same skin conductance pattern on the pc, which was created by 
adding a constant decreasing factor to a genuine skin conductance pattern. This resulted in 
an optical decrease of the skin conductance curve for all participants. After two minutes, a 
pre-programmed number was shown in the bottom right corner of the computer screen that 
reflected the mean (fictive) decrease in skin conductance. This number was generated by the 
computer and was programmed in such a way that this number could either have a high value 
(30 ± 10%) or a low value (10 ± 10%), reflecting high or low decrease in skin conductance, 
respectively. 
Anticipatory and experience variables. Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) were administered to 
assess fear of pain before and during the ES (‘How fearful are you of the pain that will accompany 
the next ES’; ‘ How fearful were you of the ES’), and anticipated and experienced pain intensity 
(‘How painful do you expect the next ES to be’; ‘How painful did you find the ES’), and pain 
unpleasantness (‘How unpleasant do you think the next ES will be’; ‘ How unpleasant did you find 
the ES’). Each VAS had a length of 10mm anchored with ‘not at all fearful/not at all painful/ not at 
all unpleasant’ on one end and ‘very fearful/ very painful/ very unpleasant’ on the other end. 
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Individual difference measures. The Life Orientation Test (LOT; Scheier & Carver, 1985) 
was administered to assess dispositional optimism. This measure consists of 12 statements: 
4 positively worded (e.g., ‘I always look on the bright side of things’), 4 negatively worded 
(e.g., ‘Things never work out the way I want them to’), and 4 filler items. Participants have to 
respond to each statement on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 
4 (strongly agree). The LOT has good reliability and validity (Scheier & Carver, 1985; Vinck et 
al., 1998), and is suitable to obtain a general measure of optimism (Scheier et al., 1994). 
 General self-efficacy was assessed with the General self-efficacy scale (GSES; Schwarzer 
& Jerusalem, 1995). This 10-item questionnaire measures optimistic self-beliefs to cope with a 
variety of difficult demands in life, more specifically the belief that one’s actions are responsible for 
successful outcomes (e.g., “I can usually handle whatever comes my way”). Participants have to 
respond to each item on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (exactly true). 
Both the original and Dutch version of the GSES possess good psychometric properties (Scholz, 
Dona, Sud, & Schwarzer, 2002).
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the manipulation of both perceived control and SE 
was checked immediately after practicing with the biofeedback strategy and the induction of the 
SE beliefs. At this stage, participants were both acquainted with the strategy, and had received 
instructions regarding their ability to use the strategy successful (see Procedure). The effect of the 
perceived control manipulation was checked with the following question: “To what extent do you 
believe that performing this biofeedback strategy will have an influence on the pain stimulus?” The 
effect of the manipulation of SE was queried as follows: “How good do you think that you are in 
practicing the biofeedback strategy in comparison to others?” Both questions were answered on 
a 10mm VAS anchored with “not at all” and “very much”.
DeSign anD proCeDure
For an overview of the experimental procedure see the flowchart in Figure 1. Prior to 
the start of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either the perceived control 
condition or the neutral condition, based on differential instructions as provided prior to the 
experimental session. Within the perceived control condition and the neutral condition, participants 
were randomly assigned to a high SE group and a low SE group. This way, four groups were 
created: (1) perceived control-low SE (N= 21, Mage = 24.14, sd = 6.76); (2) perceived control-high SE 
(N= 20, Mage= 26.45, sd = 8.67); (3) neutral-low SE (N=19, Mage= 23.63, sd = 6.68); and (4) neutral-
high SE group (N= 19, Mage= 23.74, sd = 4.63). Participants were tested individually in a sound-
attenuated room in the university building, specifically designed for experimental procedures and 
the use of the electrical stimulator. The experimental procedure was identical for all participants, 
and differences between the groups could be ascribed to differences in instructions only.
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Figure 1. Flowchart for the experimental procedure. 
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants in the perceived control condition were 
instructed that they took part in a study that aimed to examine the beneficial influence of performing 
a biofeedback strategy on the pain experience. Participants in the neutral condition were instructed 
that they took part in a study that aimed to examine how the administration of a pain stimulus might 
influence the efficacy of performing a biofeedback strategy. These instructions were provided in 
two ways. First, participants read these in the participant information letter that accompanied 
the informed consent form, and which was mandatory to read prior to giving informed consent. 
Second, the experimenter explained the goal of the study verbally, thereby stressing the aim of the 
biofeedback strategy in both conditions. Participants then completed the GSES in order to ensure 
that answers on this measure were not influenced by the SE manipulations that were implemented 
in a later stage of the experiment. The electrodes for the ES were attached and the calibration 
phase was started.
Calibration phase and baseline stimulus (ES 1). The individual intensity level of the ES 
was determined on the basis of the individual tolerance level for this specific pain stimulus (see 
Janssen et al., 2004; Peters et al., 2002; Roelofs, Peters, Deutz et al., 2005). The calibration phase 
consisted of the administration of series of ESs (duration = 3 s) of gradual increasing intensity, with 
a start intensity of 0.4 mA and a stepwise increase of 0.4 mA. Participants had to indicate pain 
treshold (the lowest intensity level that is rated as painful) and pain tolerance (the highest intensity 
Written and verbal instruction by participant information: perceived control / neutral group
GSES
LOT
Anticipatory ratings  
Performance of biofeedback strategy
ES 2
Experience ratings
Manipulation check
Manipulation of high SE/ low SE for biofeedback
Practice biofeedback strategy
Anticipatory ratings
 ES 1
 Experience ratings
Calibration Phase ES
proefschrift165x240_.indd   150 10-09-2007   10:56:04
		|151
Influence perceived control and SE
level that is rated as tolerable). The participant could communicate with the experimenter through 
an intercom that connected the test room with the adjacent experimenter room. The experimenter 
started each ES manually and could stop the presentation of the ES instantly if necessary. In 
addition, participants had an emergency button at their disposal, which could be pushed to 
break off the ES instantaneously in case of extreme distress. The procedure was ended when the 
participant indicated that pain tolerance was reached, and was repeated four times with 1 min 
intervals in between them. Taking into account possible sensitization effects, we disregarded the 
first ES series, and the highest tolerance level out of the last three trials was chosen as the intensity 
that would be administered as the experimental ES. Before the experiment continued, however, it 
was tested whether this intensity level could be tolerated for 16 s, corresponding to the duration 
of the ES that would be adopted in the experimental phase. This was done by administering the 
ES for 16 s under the instruction that participants had to indicate if and when the stimulus was no 
longer tolerable for them. When the ES was not tolerable for 16 s, the intensity level was decreased 
in steps of 0.4 mA and the procedure was repeated, just until the ES was tolerable for 16 s. After 
the calibration phase, a 2-minute break was introduced upon which participants rated anticipated 
pain intensity, pain unpleasantness, and fear of pain. The first experimental ES (ES 1) was then 
administered for 16 s, and ratings of experienced pain intensity, pain unpleasantness, and fear of 
pain were provided. 
Concretization Biofeedback strategy. The skin conductance electrodes were attached and 
participants received instructions about how to perform the (fictive) biofeedback strategy. This 
strategy consisted of making a squeeze movement with the dominant hand (open and close at 
a regular pace) for a total duration of 2 min while the arm rested stretched out on the table. 
Participants were instructed to concentrate and focus attention on this movement while performing 
it. Further instructions regarding the rationale and objective of this strategy differed for participants 
in the perceived control and the neutral group. Participants in the perceived control group were 
led to believe that the biofeedback strategy would enable them to control their pain experience in 
a positive way. They were told that lower pain is experienced in areas with low skin conductance, 
and that the squeezing activity leads to reduction in skin conductance in inactive areas (non-
dominant arm side, i.e., site of ES administration). They were furthermore told that it has been 
scientifically proven that diverting attention away from the pain site to something else can lead to a 
significant reduction of pain, because relaxation and concentration on things other than pain lead 
to lowered skin conductance. Participants in the neutral group were told that scientific medical 
research has demonstrated that individuals are capable of reducing their own skin conductance, 
for example through the use of biofeedback procedures. They were told that it is yet unclear 
however, whether such strategies are still effective in reducing skin conductance level when a pain 
stimulus is administered during performance of the strategy. After these instructions, participants 
in both groups practiced the biofeedback procedure, while the skin conductance was fictively 
measured and a skin conductance curve ran synchronously on the computer screen in front of 
the participants. 
		part two
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Self-efficacy manipulation. After two minutes, the experimenter indicated that participants 
could stop the squeezing movement, and a number that represented the mean decrease in skin 
conductance appeared in the right bottom corner of the computer screen. SE beliefs were then 
induced by comparing this number to a (fictive) norm table. Several studies have shown that 
comparing performance of persons with that of their peers is an effective way to manipulate self-
efficacy expectations (Litt, 1988). Participants in the high SE group were told that they were very 
good in comparison to their peers in reducing their skin conductance, while participants in the low 
SE group were told that they were rather bad in reducing their skin conductance. This SE feedback 
was strengthened by showing participants the norm table. In order to increase credibility of the 
manipulation, participants were then instructed to practice the biofeedback strategy once again, 
to verify whether the first outcome was not biased because it only constituted the first practice 
with the strategy. The number that reflected the decrease in skin conductance was programmed 
to result in a comparable, but not identical value as before, and enabled the experimenter to 
stress whether someone was really good or really bad in reducing the skin conductance. Next, 
participants completed the manipulation check questions.
Test stimulus (ES 2). Before ES2 participants rated anticipated pain intensity, pain unpleasantness, 
and fear of pain. They were then instructed to initiate the biofeedback strategy. Ten seconds later, 
the second experimental ES (ES 2) was administered and participants performed the strategy until 
the ES ended (after 16 s). This time, the skin conductance curve was not shown to participants. 
Immediately after the ES, participants rated the experienced pain, pain unpleasantness, and fear 
of pain. When data collection was completed, all participants received a debriefing letter, explaining 
the exact research hypotheses and the implemented manipulations. 
StatiStiCal analySiS 
The effectiveness of the manipulations of perceived control and SE was tested with 
independent samples t-tests on the manipulation check questions, with Perceived Control (control 
vs. no control) and SE (high vs. low) as group factors, respectively. 
The effects of the manipulations of Perceived Control and SE on the anticipatory and 
experience variables were analyzed with 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA’s with Time (ratings associated with 
experimental ES1 vs. ratings associated with experimental ES 2) as within-subjects factor and SE 
(high vs. low) and Perceived Control (control vs. neutral) as between-subjects factors. Resulting 
main effects and interaction effects were further explored with post hoc t-tests. 
Next, mediation analyses following the recommendations by Baron and Kenny (1986) 
were conducted in order to determine whether the expectations regarding ES 2 mediated the 
relation between the manipulations and the experience ratings as provided in response to ES 2. A 
necessary condition for mediation is that a significant linear relation exists between predictor and 
mediator, predictor and outcome, and mediator and outcome variable. Mediation is then specified 
by a significant decrease in or total disappearance of the significant prediction of the predictor 
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variable on the outcome variable, when both mediator and predictor are considered as predictors 
of the outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). As such, four regression models are conducted in 
order to test for mediation effects for the dependent variable.
To examine the influence of general SE and optimism on the pain ratings, we first 
calculated partial correlations between the personality traits and VAS ratings accompanying ES 1, 
hereby controlling for the effect of perceived control. Furthermore several regression analyses were 
conducted in order to explore the predictive value of the manipulations, the personality constructs, 
and their interactions in the prediction of rating scores accompanying ES 2. In these analyses, both 
perceived control and SE were entered as Dummy variables (0, 1) in the first step of each model. 
The additional predictive value of GSES and LOT was tested by entering these variables separately 
in the second step of the model. Last, we tested whether generalized SE or dispositional optimism 
moderated the effects of the manipulation by entering the interaction terms GSES x perceived 
control, GSES x SE, LOT x perceived control, and LOT x SE one by one in the final step of the 
model for the pain intensity, pain unpleasantness and fear of pain.
results
Pain threshold, pain tolerance and effectiveness of the manipulation. Mean pain 
threshold level in the study was 2.75 mA (sd = 1.15), and mean pain tolerance level was 4.30 mA 
(sd = 1.70). The assignment to either the perceived control or the neutral condition at the start of 
the experiment did not result in differences between both groups for pain threshold (M p= 2.80 mA; 
M n= 2.68 mA) and pain tolerance (M p= 4.54 mA; M n= 4.04 mA).
Supporting the effectiveness of the SE manipulation, participants in the high SE group 
believed to a larger extent (M = 70.43, sd = 14.63) that they were good in reducing their skin 
conductance with the biofeedback strategy than participants in the low SE condition (M = 23.08, 
sd = 14.77), with t(77) = -14.32; p < .001. No significant difference was observed between the 
perceived control group (M = 47.44, sd = 21.71) and the neutral group (M = 45.66, sd = 19.23) 
for the control manipulation check, t(77) = -.39, p > .10. Thus, both groups believed to the same 
moderate extent that the biofeedback strategy would have an influence on the pain stimulus. 
Further post-hoc t-tests demonstrated an effect of SE on the control manipulation check (t(77) = 
-6.58, p < .001), with higher scores in the high SE group (M = 58.92, sd = 14.79) than in the low SE 
group (M = 34.55, sd = 17.94). In addition, participants in the perceived control-high SE group (M 
= 61.80, sd = 16.08) assigned higher scores to the control manipulation check question compared 
to participants in the neutral –high SE group (M = 55.89; sd = 13.03), whereas participants in the 
perceived control-low SE group (M = 33.76; sd = 17.15) and the neutral–low SE group (M = 35.42; 
sd = 19.22) assign comparable scores to the manipulation check question.
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Effects of perceived control and specific SE on anticipatory ratings.	Descriptive 
statistics on the anticipatory ratings accompanying ES 1 and ES 2 are presented in Table 1. 
The 2x2x2 ANOVA resulted in a main effect of Time for all variables, indicating a decrease over 
time for the ratings of pain intensity (F(1, 75) = 29.82,	p < .001), pain unpleasantness (F(1, 75) = 
14.10, p < .001), and fear of pain (F(1,75) = 15.68,	p < .001). A significant Time x SE interaction 
was found for pain intensity (F(1, 75)= 6.31,	p < .05), which was explained by a significant larger 
decrease in pain intensity ratings from ES 1 to ES 2 in the high SE group (M = 13.74,	sd	= 16.18) 
compared to the low SE group (M = 5.05,	sd	= 14.09), t(77)= -2.55, p	<.05. Further independent 
samples t-tests indicated that the effect of SE was significant in the perceived control condition 
only (t(39) = -2.51,	p	< .05), with a larger decrease in pain intensity ratings from ES 1 to ES 2 in 
the perceived control-high SE group (M	= 16.45, sd = 14.59) than in the perceived control-low 
SE group (M	= 4.90,	sd	= 14.88). The 2x2x2 ANOVA furthermore resulted in a Time x Perceived 
Control x SE interaction for the pain unpleasantness ratings (F	(1, 75) = 4.08,	p < .05), specified 
by a significant decrease in pain unpleasantness ratings in the perceived control-high SE group 
only,	t(19) = 2.55,	p < .05. Furthermore, the effect of perceived control was significant for the fear 
of pain rating (F(1, 75) = 4.01,	p	< .05), indicating higher fear of pain ratings in the neutral group 
(M	= 27.92) compared to the perceived control group (M	= 19.12). This overall main effect was 
further examined with post-hoc t-tests on the fear of pain ratings associated with ES 1 and ES 2 
separately. Results indicated lower fear of pain ratings in the perceived control group (M = 22.76, 
sd = 23.11) than in the neutral group (M= 30.79,	sd = 22.07) in the prospect of ES 1 already,	
t(77) = 1.58, p	= .12. The difference between fear of pain ratings prior to ES 2 in the perceived 
control group (M	= 15.68, sd	= 18.13) and the neutral group (M	= 25.05,	sd	= 19.80) was 
significant (t(77) = 2.20,	p	< .05).
Table 1 Means (sd) for the anticipated VAS ratings, displayed per condition (N=79)
 Neutral group  Perceived control group Total
 Low SE High SE Low SE High SE 
  Anticipatory ratings M       (sd)  M       (sd) M       (sd) M       (sd) M       (sd)
  Pain intensity ES 1 57.47 (20.24) 60.26 (16.33) 61.43 (11.15) 55.25 (21.33) 58.63 (17.46)
  Pain intensity ES 2 52.26 (19.36) 49.37 (19.69) 56.52 (15.48) 38.80 (25.62) 49.29 (21.02)
  Pain Unpleasantness ES 1 66.74 (21.27) 63.37 (22.62) 67.14 (11.49) 65.05 (22.79) 65.61 (19.62)
  Pain Unpleasantness ES 2 58.37 (21.58) 60.68 (24.91) 63.05 (15.81) 50.85 (28.79) 58.27 (23.20)
  Fear of pain ES 1 32.68 (25.60) 28.89 (18.41) 26.38 (24.35) 18.95 (21.69) 26.62 (22.83)
  Fear of pain ES 2 29.42 (23.61) 20.68 (14.44) 20.05 (21.41) 11.10 (12.91) 20.19 (19.41)
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Effects of perceived control and specific SE on experience ratings. Table 2 depicts 
descriptive statistics on the experience ratings accompanying ES 1 and ES 2. The 2x2x2 mixed 
ANOVA on the experience ratings resulted in a main effect of Time, indicating a decrease over 
time on all variables, with F(1, 75) = 33.34, p < .001 for the rated pain intensity, F(1, 75) = 31.93, 
p < .001 for the rated pain unpleasantness, and F(1, 75) = 19.10, p < .001 for the rated fear of 
pain. The Time x SE interaction was significant for pain intensity (F(1,75) = 5.07, p < .05), and was 
explained by a significant larger decrease in pain ratings from ES 1 to ES 2 in the high SE group 
(M = 13.56, sd = 14.92) compared to the low SE group (M = 6.05, sd = 15.49), t(77) = -2.20, p 
< .05. Further independent samples t-tests demonstrated that this effect of SE was marginally 
significant for the neutral group (t = -2.02, p = .05), but not for the perceived control group (t = 
-1.08; p >.05). For the experienced pain unpleasantness ratings, no effects of perceived control 
or SE were observed , p> .05. The 2x2x2 ANOVA furthermore revealed significant main effects of 
perceived control (F(1, 75) = 5.06, p < .05) and SE (F(1, 75) = 4.70, p < .05) for the fear of pain 
variable, indicating higher fear of pain ratings in the neutral group (M = 21.60, sd = 15.67) than in 
the perceived control group (M = 13.71, sd = 16.43), and higher fear of pain ratings in the low SE 
group (M = 21.28, sd = 18.79) than in the high SE group (M = 13.64, sd = 12.76). The main effect 
of perceived control was further explored with separate t-tests on the ratings provided in response 
to ES 1 and ES2. A trend towards significant lower fear of pain ratings in the perceived control 
group (M= 16.56 sd= 19.39) than in the neutral group (M= 23.87, sd= 17.39) was observed in 
response to ES 1 already (t(77) = 1.76, p = .08). In response to ES 2, the difference between the 
perceived control group (M = 10.85, sd = 15.04) and the neutral group (M = 19.34, sd = 15.37) 
was significant (t(77) = 2.48, p = .01). The main effect of SE was clarified by a trend towards a 
significant Time x SE interaction (F(1, 75) = 2.77, p = .10), indicating a larger decrease in fear of 
pain ratings in the high SE group (M = 7.07, sd = 10.90) than in the low SE group (M = 3.25, sd = 
9.77). Additional post hoc t-tests demonstrated a significant difference between the high and the 
low SE group (M = 10.10, sd = 10.55 versus M= 19.65, sd = 18.39) on the fear of pain variable in 
response to ES 2 only (t(77) = 2.82, p = .006).
Table 2 Means (sd) for the experienced VAS ratings, displayed per condition (N=79)
 Neutral group  Perceived control group Total
 Low SE High SE Low SE High SE  
  Experience  ratings M       (sd) M       (sd) M       (sd) M       (sd) M       (sd)
  Pain intensity ES 1 53.63 (21.50) 58.95 (18.69) 62.29 (12.60) 50.10 (29.28) 56.32 (21.44)
  Pain intensity ES 2 51.58 (23.72) 46.32 (21.98) 52.62 (17.20) 35.65 (31.76) 46.56 (24.69)
  Pain Unpleasantness ES 1 63.21 (23.35) 64.74 (24.72) 66.38 (15.47) 66.60 (28.03) 65.28 (22.84)
  Pain Unpleasantness ES 2 56.42 (24.65) 52.89 (26.69) 55.62 (18.41) 51.85 (34.26) 54.20 (26.09)
  Fear of pain ES 1 26.05 (18.87) 21.68 (16.00) 20.05 (21.75) 12.90 (16.31) 20.08 (18.70)
  Fear of pain ES 2 24.37 (17.53) 14.32 (11.19) 15.38 (18.51) 6.10   (8.33) 14.94 (15.70)
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Examining mediating effects of the anticipatory variables on the experience variables. 
The analyses of variance indicated an effect of SE on both anticipatory and experienced pain 
intensity ratings. It might be suggested that anticipatory ratings mediate the relation between SE 
and experience ratings. This was examined with mediation analyses following the recommendations 
of Baron and Kenny (1986) (Figure 2). The regression analyses indicated that SE was a significant 
predictor of the experienced pain intensity (path a; ß = -.23, t = -2.07, p = .04), and of anticipatory 
pain intensity (path b; ß = -.25, t = -2.29, p = .02). Furthermore, the experienced pain intensity was 
significantly predicted by anticipated intensity ratings (path c; ß = .77, t = 10.61, p < .001). When 
both SE and the anticipatory pain intensity ratings were simultaneously entered as predictors of 
experienced pain intensity in the last step of the mediation model, SE no longer resulted as a 
significant predictor of the experienced pain intensity (ß = -.04, t = -.50, p = .62). This finding 
confirms a full mediation of the anticipatory pain intensity on the relation between SE and 
experienced pain intensity.
Figure 2. Mediation model
Association between the personality constructs and pain expectancies and 
experiences. The scores on the GSES (M = 31.58, sd = 3.30, range = 25-40) and the LOT (M = 
30.82, sd = 3.71, range = 21-39) correlate significantly (r = .47, p < .001). The partial correlations 
between the trait measures and the VAS ratings associated with ES 1 resulted in significant 
correlations between LOT and anticipatory fear of pain (r = -.36, p = .001), LOT and fear of pain as 
experienced (r = -.33, p = .003), and GSES and the anticipatory fear of pain (r = -.22, p = .05).
The prediction of the VAS ratings that were given in response to ES 2 by the manipulations, 
the trait measures, and their interactions was explored with linear regression analyses (see statistical 
analyses section for an overview of the procedure that was followed in building the regression 
models). Entering the interaction terms as predictor of the dependent variables in the last step 
of each model did not result in additional predictive value for the subjective pain ratings. The only 
exception was the observation of significant predictive value of the GSES x SE interaction (ß= -
2.74, t = 2.73, p = .008) for the anticipatory fear variable (F(4,74) = 5.61, p = .001, R2 = .23). Higher 
scores on the GSES were associated with lower ratings of anticipatory fear of pain in the low SE 
group (r = -.29, p = .07), but not in the high SE group (r = -.03, p = 87). 
Anticipatory Pain intensity
Experienced Pain intensitySelf-Efficacy
a
b c
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dIsCussIon
The current study examined the effects of perceived control and SE on the subjective 
evaluation of experimentally induced pain. It was hypothesized that having perceived control over 
pain would lead to a reduction in pain intensity, pain unpleasantness, and fear of pain ratings as 
provided prior to and following upon pain induction, and this beneficial influence was expected 
to be especially enhanced for those who possess high SE beliefs regarding their ability to exert 
control over pain. In line with this hypothesis, results demonstrated that participants in the high 
SE condition expected the second ES to be significantly less intense and less unpleasant when 
they had perceived control over the pain. Furthermore, participants in the high SE condition 
evaluated the second pain stimulus as significantly less intense, and this was independent of the 
control manipulation. Perceived control significantly influenced fear of pain ratings. These results 
demonstrate that the combination of having at one’s disposal a technique that can reduce the pain 
experience and a high self-efficacy of applying this technique leads to a reduction in the pain intensity 
and pain unpleasantness that one expects as well as in the actually experienced pain intensity. 
Although the predicted control by self-efficacy interaction was only significant for the expected 
pain unpleasantness ratings, expected and experienced pain intensity ratings consistently showed 
the largest decreases in the high perceived control – high self-efficacy condition. Indeed, for the 
expected pain intensity ratings, the effect of the self-efficacy manipulation reached significance 
within the perceived control group only. 
Previous studies have demonstrated the mutually strengthening beneficial effects of 
perceived control and associated SE beliefs on pain tolerance and endurance of pain (Jensen & 
Karoly, 1991; Litt, 1988; Rokke et al., 2004). This study adds to these findings by demonstrating 
similar effects for the subjective experience of pain. Moreover, further analysis indicated that the 
decrease in experienced pain intensity may be mediated by the expected pain intensity, i.e., high 
self-efficacy beliefs regarding the ability to exert control over pain may lead to less pain expectations 
which in turn leads to actually less pain experience. A direct relation between pain expectancies and 
pain reports has been reported in both laboratory and clinical studies, and may be accounted for 
by the self-confirming nature of the pain expectancies (e.g., Devine & Spanos, 1990; Kirsch, 1997; 
Subotnik & Shapiro, 1984). Outside the domain of pain, the self-confirming effects of response 
expectancies have amongst others been found in placebo effects and prevention and treatment 
effects on anxiety disorders, substance abuse and depression (for an overview see Kirsch, 1997). 
It may be noted that several previous studies have shown that the introduction of a pain 
reducing (cognitive) strategy or technique leads to reductions in expected pain intensity (Baker 
& Kirsch, 1991; Bandura, 1983; Devine & Spanos, 1990). Moreover, it has been hypothesized 
that when pain expectancies are dependent upon the performance of a specific skill, they will 
be determined by SE beliefs for that skill (Baker & Kirsch, 1991; Bandura, 1983). In line with this 
suggestion, performing the biofeedback strategy in the present study can be conceived as a skill 
that one has to master in order to obtain beneficial effects on the following pain experience. Taken 
together, the present study stresses the importance of high SE beliefs regarding the ability to exert 
a specific control strategy in order to observe beneficial influences on the subjective perception of 
pain (Arnstein, 2000; Jackson et al., 2002; Rokke et al., 2004). 
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An unexpected finding was that the manipulation of self-efficacy also led to a substantial 
decrease in expected and experienced pain intensity in the group that was supposed to have no 
perceived control. The decrease in the neutral - high self-efficacy condition was somewhat less 
strong than in the perceived control – high self-efficacy condition but the time by control by self-
efficacy effect was non-significant. Based upon this observation, it may be speculated that the 
perceived control manipulation was not as effective as we had intended. The manipulation check 
revealed that participants in the neutral condition believed to the same moderate extent that the 
biofeedback strategy would influence the pain stimulus as participants in the perceived control 
condition. In retrospect the groups may not have been distinctive enough with respect to perceived 
control beliefs because both groups learned a biofeedback procedure and applied this procedure 
during the second pain stimulus. Although we never told the participants in the neutral group that 
the procedure would affect pain experience, we cannot rule out the possibility that participants’ 
expectations on the strategy were affected by the general knowledge that people have about the 
use of biofeedback. The cover-up story in the neutral group that we were interested in whether 
people could still effectively apply biofeedback when in pain, may not have been sufficient to 
alter their pre-existing expectations. This may be especially true in the high self-efficacy condition: 
these participants may have been convinced that since they were very efficacious in applying 
the technique, the pain stimulus would not deter them from using the technique as a means 
to influence pain. The manipulation check indeed indicated that the belief that the biofeedback 
strategy would influence pain was more determined by the self-efficacy manipulation than by the 
control manipulation. In addition, caution is warranted in interpreting the manipulation check of 
perceived control, since this question asks about ‘the extent to which the respondent believes 
that the biofeedback strategy will have an influence on the pain stimulus’. It can be argued that 
the presentation of this particular question to participants in the neutral group might have induced 
perceived control expectations on biofeedback strategy as a possible technique to influence the 
pain stimulus.
An alternative explanation for the observed beneficial influence of high SE in the neutral 
condition might originate by assuming unanticipated general beneficial effects to influence the pain 
experience that result from the mere conviction of being good in something. At least one study has 
come to our attention in which beneficial effects on pain tolerance were observed in participants 
who had induced high SE beliefs on the performance on a task that was not specifically related 
to pain or its reduction (i.e., a mathematical problem solving task) (Bandura, Cioffi, Taylor, & 
Brouillard, 1988). In addition, it might even be speculated that participants in the neutral group 
with high SE beliefs on the biofeedback strategy have benefited from the fact that they practiced 
a skill in which they were good at the same time that the pain stimulus was administered. Hence, 
performing the biofeedback strategy during ES2 might serve as a positive distractor from the 
pain, resulting in reduced experienced pain intensity. In a similar vein, the effect of SE on the 
reduction of experienced fear of pain might be attributed to this same positive distractor effect. 
These alternative explanations are of course post-hoc explanations and need further addressing 
in future studies. 
Although we have reasons to assume that the control manipulation may have been 
suboptimal, perceived control did affect fear of pain. Interestingly, the perceived control group 
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already displayed lower fear levels than the neutral group at ES1. At this time in the experiment, the 
only difference between the neutral and control group was the information that they had received 
in the participant information letter and through the pre-experimental instructions. Participants in 
the perceived control condition were informed that this was an experiment to study the effects 
of biofeedback on pain and that they would learn a technique to control pain. Participants in the 
neutral condition never received information that they would learn a control technique, and since 
the biofeedback technique itself was not introduced yet, they probably had no expectations in 
this direction. Thus it seems that the mere expectation that later on in the experiment a control 
possibility will be offered is sufficient to lower fear of pain. The effect remained during the second 
pain stimulus, with the actual practice of the technique and the self-efficacy manipulation not 
further adding to this effect, i.e., there was no time x control or time x self-efficacy effect for fear. 
In addition to the effects of perceived control and specific SE beliefs, we were interested 
in the influence of optimism and generalized SE on the subjective pain evaluation. Correlations 
between these stable trait constructs and both the expectancy and experience ratings as provided 
in response to the first ES demonstrated that optimism correlated inversely with anticipatory 
and experienced fear of pain, while high levels of general SE were found to be associated with 
lower levels of anticipatory fear as well. These correlations offer additional evidence for the 
hypothesized positive influence of both optimism and general SE on the perception of aversive 
events (Luszczynska et al., 2005; Scheier & Carver, 1992). In addition, we explored whether the 
personality traits moderated the effects of the manipulations by entering the interaction terms 
between the manipulations and the trait constructs in a multiple regression analyses. These 
analyses demonstrated that anticipatory fear of pain was significantly predicted by the interaction 
between generalized SE and manipulated SE. Generalized SE was a significant determinant of 
the fear that is elicited by the forecast of pain in the low manipulated SE condition only. Thus, all 
participants benefited from the induction of the believe that they are good in applying the pain 
reduction technique, but when low self-efficacy was induced individuals with high generalized self-
efficacy beliefs may still hold on to their a prior beliefs.
Some limitations and recommendations are to be considered in interpreting the current 
results. The choice for a biofeedback strategy as control technique might have impacted the 
results in an undesirable way. Although we choose to use of a fictitious strategy that was not 
based on any existing or currently practiced treatment approach, we cannot entirely rule out that 
this strategy has raised pain-reducing expectations in participants who possess prior knowledge 
on the well-acknowledged benefits of biofeedback strategies in diminishing psychopathological 
complaints. This would have been particularly problematic for pain ratings made by participants in 
the neutral control group, who are not assumed to foresee beneficial effects of the strategy on the 
pain experience. In addition, further research should devote attention to the ecological validity and 
the generalizability of the current findings. Participants in this study were all healthy students, and 
were well aware of the fact that the pain stimulus would be administered in a controlled way and 
for a preset limited number of times. Replication of the current findings in a patient population is 
therefore advisable, in order to examine whether the effects of manipulated SE beliefs on a control 
strategy has beneficial effects on the subjective perception a long-term pain experience as well. 
Despite these shortcomings, the current study has demonstrated that the induction 
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of high SE beliefs regarding a pain control method elicits anticipations of less intense and less 
unpleasant pain for an upcoming pain experience. Moreover, the expected pain intensity is found 
to be directly predictive of the pain that is reported after experiencing the electrical stimulus. These 
findings are interesting in the light of treatment approaches aiming at reducing pain and disability. 
As such, they suggest that if one wants to achieve both objective and subjective reductions in 
pain and disability, it is important to not only offer the possibility to exert control over the pain, but 
to induce high SE beliefs regarding this control opportunity as well. These high SE beliefs might 
for example be induced by means of providing positive feedback and motivational support to the 
attempts that patients undertake in managing their pain.
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Contemporary cognitive fear-avoidance models of chronic musculoskeletal pain have 
emphasized that the tendency to exaggerate the negative meaning and consequences of pain 
and the associated fearfulness of pain, (re)injury, or movement, constitute risk factors for the 
development and persistence of chronic pain complaints (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Extending on 
this perspective, the main aim of the current thesis was to provide more insight into psychological 
factors and mechanisms that can predispose or protect persons towards responding to physical 
threat in a fearful or catastrophic manner, and as such constitute putative vulnerability factors for 
the development of chronic pain. More specifically, starting from the conceptualisation of pain as 
an emotional disorder that comprises a large cognitive component (Merskey & Bugduk, 1994; 
Turk & Okifuji, 2002), the relative importance of various pain-related anxiety constructs (chapter 
2 and 3), as well as the relation between individual levels of these constructs and the cognitive 
processing of pain-related information (chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) were examined. Furthermore, this 
thesis aimed to contribute to the scarce number of studies that is currently available on cognitive 
mechanisms that can protect, rather than predispose, persons against responding to physical 
threat in a maladaptive way in one study (chapter 8). The current chapter intends to provide a 
summary and an integrative discussion on the findings of the studies that were described in the 
preceding chapters.
summary	of	maIn	fIndIngs
Part I:  Establishing the role of injury/illness sensitivity in the context of pain and exploring the  
 
evidence for a hierarchical model of pain-related anxiety constructs
In chapter 2, the role of injury illness sensitivity (IS) and its putative differential predictive 
value in relation to anxiety sensitivity (AS) in the explanation of fearful responses to pain was 
addressed in a survey study and an experimental pain induction study. In line with our hypotheses, 
IS resulted as the single best predictor for fear of pain (FoP) and pain catastrophizing (PC) in 
the survey study, and for subjective anticipatory fear ratings in the pain induction study. These 
results were supportive of the suggestion that IS might be an important factor to be considered in 
further research that is directed at understanding fearful responses to pain (Carleton et al., 2005; 
Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). Corroborating previous research findings, chapter 2 furthermore 
demonstrated that besides IS, AS remains a distinctive valuable factor to be considered in the 
explanation of fearful responses to pain as well (Asmundson et al., 1999; Asmundson et al., 2000). 
More specifically, when the multi-componential pain anxiety symptoms scale (PASS) was taken as 
the self-report index of pain-related fear (McCracken & Dhingra, 2002), IS and AS were found to be 
differentially predictive of the escape/avoidance subscale and the physiological anxiety subscale 
of this measure, respectively, whereas both constructs possessed equally predictive power for 
the fearful appraisal of pain and the cognitive anxiety subscales of the PASS. In addition, chapter 
2 offered support for the distinctiveness of AS and IS by demonstrating that both constructs 
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accounted independently for variance in trait anxiety in linear regression analyses that tested the 
unique predictive value of three fundamental fears (IS, AS, and fear of negative evaluation (FNE) 
for trait anxiety.
In chapter 3, further empirical evidence for the hierarchical model was sought by 
conducting two exploratory multivariate classification analyses (i.e., multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
and additive tree analysis (ADDTREE) on the similarity data that were obtained from a similarity 
card-sorting task on the separate items of questionnaires that are most prevalently used to assess 
each pain-relevant anxiety construct that resides in the model. This study was predominantly 
motivated by the observation that the various self-report measures that are used to assess each 
separate anxiety construct in pain research are closely interrelated and show a certain degree of 
content-overlap (Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2004; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). Even though the 
psychometric qualities (e.g., reliability, validity, and factor structure) of these self-report measures 
have been well demonstrated, it can be questioned whether respondents are sensitive enough 
for recognizing the slight differences in the content of the individual items of these instruments. 
Hence, chapter 3 examined which clusters of items were identified within the whole set of individual 
items on the basis of their perceived similarity with an ADDTRREE cluster analysis. This analysis 
resulted in a theoretically well interpretable tree solution, clustering individual questionnaire items 
into meaningful groups that corresponded largely to either the specific subscales or the total 
composition of the self-report measures included in the study. Thus, despite overlap in semantic 
meaning and formulation of the individual items, persons seem to be well capable to differentiate 
between these items and their intended underlying meaning. Chapter 3 furthermore examined 
whether support could be found for the specificity dimensionality that is assumed to run through 
the hierarchical model with MDS analysis (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Lilienfeld et al., 1993; 
Watson & Clark, 1992). Two interpretable dimensions resulted from the MDS: (1) a pain-specific 
– general concerns dimension echoing the suggested specificity in the model as formulated by 
the advocates of the hierarchical model (Lilienfeld et al., 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992), and (2) an 
inter – intra-personal concerns dimension. Given the fact that the hierarchical model aims to reflect 
‘negative emotional constructs involved in pain’, this latter dimension can be easily understood 
within the perspective that pain-related anxiety and concerns are assumed to be directed at the 
individual’s personal state, as well as at the impact of the pain or disability on the individual’s social 
environment, e.g., work, evaluation by others (McNeil & Vowles, 2004; Morley & Eccleston, 2004). 
Taken together, the findings in chapter 2 and 3 favour further work with IS and the other unitary 
anxiety constructs in subsequent research. 
Part II:  Experimental studies on the link between personality factors, cognitive mechanisms, and  
 
responses to pain 
In chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, both implicit and explicit testing paradigms were used to 
examine the cognitive processing of health-threatening or pain-related information in function 
of elevated levels of pain-related anxieties. Extending on the conceptualisation of pain as an 
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emotional disorder and the central role of (pain-related) anxiety in the onset and maintenance of 
pain complaints, these studies were largely fed by the extensive body of research that is already 
available on the role of cognitive processing biases in other emotional disorders, like anxiety and 
depression (Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994; McNally, 1995; Teachman, 2005). 
Using an implicit association measure (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) chapter 4 examined 
whether elevated levels of AS and IS were associated with an enhanced automatic threat appraisal 
towards pain and health-threatening word stimuli. Following information-processing theory, such 
an automatic threat appraisal might prompt reflexive and spontaneous dysfunctional responses 
to pain, that are not under voluntarily control of the individual (Beck & Clark, 1997; Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Nosek, 2007). Results demonstrated that in general, persons showed an automatic threat 
appraisal towards the pain and health stimuli incorporated in the task. More importantly, and 
supporting the main hypothesis of chapter 4, elevated levels of IS, and to a lesser extent AS were 
found to be positively associated with this automatic threat appraisal. Extending on the suggested 
differential predictive power of AS and IS for responses to pain in chapter 2, chapter 4 additionally 
examined the differential and independent predictive value of both constructs for two behavioural 
correlates of pain; that is, the use of health care services and the engagement in protective and 
preventive health behaviour. Results demonstrated AS and IS to be independently and uniquely 
predictive of the use of health care services and the engagement in preventive and protective 
health behaviours, respectively. Based on this finding, it was suggested that both AS and IS might 
be predictive of divergent behavioural responses to pain.
The findings in chapter 4 were congruent with the cognitive model of emotional disorders 
in demonstrating the automatic activation of negative associations with pain and health-related 
stimuli in the early stages of information processing (Beck & Clark, 1997). In chapter 5 and 6, 
further evidence for the occurrence of cognitive processing bias in function of individual pain-
related anxiety levels was sought by focussing on interpretation bias. Relying on explicit measures 
of interpretation bias, former research has demonstrated that pain patients and persons with 
elevated levels of AS are characterized by a tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli in a negative 
or pain-related fashion (Keogh & Cochrane, 2002; Keogh et al., 2004; Pincus & Morley, 2001). It 
has been proposed that cognitive biases that are tapped with explicit measures are reflective of 
elaborative processing in the later stages of information processing, and do therefore possess a 
significant degree of specificity, relating to individuals’ concerns specifically (Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). This proposed domain-specificity was the focus of study in chapter 
5. More specifically, negative interpretations on four domains (panic-related sensations, other 
bodily symptoms, social events, and general events) were examined in relation to individual levels 
of pain-specific and more general anxiety constructs as derived from the hierarchical model of 
pain-relevant anxiety constructs. Multiple linear regression analyses demonstrated that AS, IS, 
and FNE were specifically predictive of negative interpretations on the domains of panic, other 
bodily symptoms, and social events respectively. In addition, PC and FoP were found to be most 
predictive of the pain-relevant other bodily symptoms domain. It is furthermore noteworthy that 
optimism, which was also assessed in this study, proved to be an independent strong predictor 
of less negative interpretations on all domains, whereas trait anxiety did not contribute to the 
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explanation of the negative interpretative bias at all. Despite limitations pertaining the correlational 
design and the healthy study population in this chapter, this study constitutes a good first step 
towards further studying content-specific negative interpretations of ambiguity in the context of 
pain. 
It can be questioned to what extent the explicitly measured interpretation bias in chapter 
5 was reflective of the spontaneous and automatic interpretations that persons make in daily life 
upon the confrontation with ambiguity (Fazio & Olson, 2003). To examine these spontaneously 
made interpretations, chapter 6 made use of a lexical decision paradigm that aims to provide an 
indirect measure of automatic and spontaneous interpretations of ambiguity (Hirsch & Mathews, 
1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). This lexical decision paradigm was borrowed from social anxiety 
research (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000), and was modified for its applicability 
in the context of pain. With this paradigm, it was examined whether individual levels of pain-related 
anxiety and fear (AS, IS, PC, and FoP) were associated with an enhanced tendency to make 
automatic negative interpretations to ambiguous situations that imply physical health threats. Results 
of chapter 6 suggested that irrespective of individual fear levels, persons are generally inclined to 
make spontaneous negative inferences when confronted with ambiguity. As a possible explanation 
for this general negative interpretation bias, it might be suggested the severe threat value of the 
stimulus material in the task was responsible for initiating a negative processing template in the 
majority of individuals, and this irrespective of individual fear level (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Furthermore, the automatic negative interpretation bias was unexpectedly 
found to be especially pronounced in persons possessing elevated levels of pain-related fear, 
and was not found associated with AS or IS. This raised the possibility that automatic negative 
interpretations of health-threatening ambiguity occur in function of the presence of fear that is very 
proximally related to pain only. Nevertheless, given the methodological shortcomings of the study 
on the examination of automatic negative interpretation bias (see discussion section of chapter 6) 
caution is warranted on drawing firm conclusions regarding the observed association between fear 
of pain and the automatic interpretation bias. Although the lexical decision paradigm appeared as 
a promising tool to study automatic negative interpretation bias in the context of pain, it seems 
appropriate to fine-tune this measure in future research in order to enhance its applicability for the 
assessment of automatic negative interpretations biases of pain-related stimuli.
Chapter 7 focussed on the ‘attentional interference effect’, which refers to the disruptive 
effect of pain on attention and ongoing cognitive activities (Crombez et al., 1996, 1998b; Crombez 
et al., 1999; Eccleston, 1994; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). At present, an extensive amount of 
research has established the occurrence of attentional interference by pain, and most of these 
studies have relied on the primary task paradigm to measure this effect. In this testing paradigm, 
persons perform a simple cognitive task (e.g., distinguishing high and low pitch tones) while they are 
occasionally confronted with experimentally induced pain. The effect of the pain administration on 
cognitive task performance is then taken as the measure of attentional interference (e.g., Crombez 
et al., 1998b). Several pain characteristics have been identified to influence the disruptive effect of 
pain on attention, such as the perceived threat value, the novelty, and the temporal unpredictability 
of the pain (e.g., (Crombez et al., 1998a; Van Damme, Crombez, Eccleston, & Roelofs, 2004). 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that attentional interference is especially pronounced in 
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persons who are inclined to amplify the meaning and consequences of painful sensations (i.e., PC) 
(Crombez et al., 1998a, 1998b; Van Damme, Crombez, Eccleston et al., 2004). Chapter 7 aimed 
to replicate prior findings on the occurrence of the interference effect in relation to PC and to further 
extend on these findings by examining the relation between the interference effect and levels of 
AS and IS. The replication part of chapter 7 was successful, and strengthened the evidence for 
an enhanced interference effect in relation to PC. The interference effect did not show significant 
associations with either AS nor IS, though, suggesting that elevated levels of these constructs 
do not incline persons to attend more to pain than necessary allowing pain to interfere with other 
activities.
Chapter 8, finally, describes the findings of a study that was specifically designed to 
examine the putative beneficial influence of cognitive factors on the experience of pain. In an 
experimental study design, the influence of manipulations of perceived control and specific self-
efficacy (SE) on subjective responses to electrically induced pain was examined. Corroborating 
earlier research findings, perceived control was found to be associated with lower levels of 
anticipatory fear of pain (Arntz & Schmidt, 1989; Litt, 1988). Furthermore, induced high SE beliefs 
were associated with a significant reduction in anticipatory pain intensity and pain unpleasantness 
ratings, and the anticipated pain intensity mediated the relation between SE and experienced pain 
intensity. These findings led to the conclusion that high SE beliefs constitute an important role in 
tempering the subjective experience of pain. In addition, chapter 8 examined the moderating role of 
dispositional optimism and general self-efficacy on the effects of perceived control and specific self-
efficacy beliefs. These two stable personality traits are assumed to contribute to general well being 
and the adjustment to pain (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2005; Peters & Vancleef, in press; Schwarzer et 
al., 2005). Prior to the inductions of perceived control and SE beliefs, optimism inversely correlated 
with fear of pain ratings whilst general SE showed an inverse significant correlation with the 
anticipatory fear of pain. Furthermore, analyses on moderating effects of the positive personality 
traits demonstrated that generalized SE was a significant predictor of anticipatory fear of pain 
scores in participants who possessed low induced SE beliefs on their ability to exert control over 
their pain. In sum, findings of chapter 8 have indicated the importance of perceived control and 
especially SE cognitions in determining the subjective evaluations of pain. It is therefore suggested 
that in order to achieve subjective adjustment to pain, it is not only important that one has the idea 
that the pain is controllable, but also the conviction that one is able to effectively exert this control 
over the pain.
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IntegratIve	dIsCussIon	and	theoretICal	ImplICatIons	of	maIn	fIndIngs
ConSiDering SpeCifiC anD general anxiety-relateD perSonality ConStruCtS 
aS vulnerability faCtorS for pain
In the current thesis, trait anxiety (TA; chapter 2, 3, 5), anxiety sensitivity (AS; chapter 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7) injury illness sensitivity (IS; chapter 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), pain catastrophizing (PC; chapter 
2, 3, 5, 6, 7) and fear of pain (FoP; chapter 2, 3, 5, 6) were examined for their putative vulnerability 
role in the chronic course of pain. By studying several anxiety constructs collectively, this thesis 
aimed to add to the understanding of the distinctiveness and relative importance of each of these 
constructs in their contribution to the onset and persistence of pain.
Injury/illness sensitivity as a putative vulnerability factor for chronic pain
Injury/illness sensitivity (IS) has been proposed to constitute one of three fundamental 
fears that underlie the common fears and anxiety-related psychopathology that we encounter 
in daily society (Reiss, 1991; Reiss et al., 1986). Conceived as the exaggerated fearfulness and 
catastrophic appraisal of potential illness and or injury, IS has been suggested to constitute a 
specific vulnerability role in the development of health-related fears (e.g., blood phobia) and 
chronic health conditions (e.g., chronic pain) (Carleton et al., 2005; Carleton, Park, & Asmundson, 
2006; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Reiss et al., 1988; Taylor, 1993). In a review chapter on the 
contribution of emotional factors to the perception and experience of pain, Keogh & Asmundson 
(2004) proposed IS to form a higher-order factor of PC and FoP. Nevertheless, until very recently, 
no empirical studies had been conducted on examining the association between IS and other pain-
related anxiety constructs, or the contribution of IS to dysfunctional responses to pain. Six out of 
the seven chapters in the current thesis have incorporated a measure of IS in order to elucidate the 
precise role and importance of IS in the context of pain. In these studies, IS was measured with a 
Dutch translation (obtained via a back-translation procedure) of the 11-item injury/illness sensitivity 
index (ISI), containing 6 face-valid items for injury and 5 face-valid items for illness (Taylor, 1993). A 
recent factor analytic study suggested a two-factor solution for the scale comprising Fear of Injury 
and Fear of Illness that loaded onto the single higher-order factor Fear of Physical Harm (Carleton 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, the ISI has been demonstrated to possess good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α > .80) and adequate construct validity (Carleton et al., 2005; R. N. Carleton et al., 
2006). Nevertheless, Carleton et al. (Carleton et al., 2005; Carleton et al., 2006) have suggested 
that two items were better to be removed from the scale because of overly inclusive wording 
and poor factor loadings. Since the psychometric analyses of the translated Dutch ISI did not 
reveal similar difficulties with these two specific items (see chapter 2 for details on psychometric 
statistics), it was decided to retain the 11-item ISI in the studies in this thesis. 
In support of the construct validity of IS, moderate to high positive correlations were 
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found between IS and (1) AS, the other fundamental fear considered an important contributor to 
the chronic course of pain (chapter 2, 4, 5, 6, 7); (2) FoP and PC, the pain-specific fear constructs 
considered important in the transition from acute to chronic pain (chapter 2, 5, 6, 7), and (3) 
trait anxiety, the general and stable personality trait assumed to constitute vulnerability for a wide 
variety of anxiety-related disorders (chapter 2, 5) (see the specified chapters for details on exact 
correlation coefficients). Furthermore, a positive association was found between individual levels 
of IS on the one hand and cognitive (automatic threat appraisal, negative interpretation bias), 
behavioural (engaging in health protective and preventive behaviour), and affective (anticipatory 
fear of upcoming pain stimulus) responses to the threat of pain in chapter 2, 4, and 5. 
In their proposal of the hierarchical model of pain-associated anxiety constructs, Keogh 
& Asmundson (2004) have suggested IS as the higher-order factor that subsumes the lower-order 
factors FoP and PC. In this perspective, influences of the distal IS construct on pain and disability 
are assumed to run via the more proximally to pain related constructs FoP and PC (Lilienfeld et 
al., 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992). Several findings in this thesis are supportive of this suggestion, 
including the unique predictive value of IS for FoP and PC (chapter 2) and the observed loss in 
predictive power of IS for the negative interpretation bias when the pain-specific constructs were 
entered simultaneously with IS in the predictive model of this bias (chapter 5). Additionally, the 
MDS analysis in chapter 3 positioned the ISI items higher towards the general pole of the resulting 
general-specific dimension than FoP and PC items, which were positioned more towards the 
specific pole of this dimension. Furthermore, the ADDTREE analysis clearly distinguished the ISI 
items in a well separable cluster as distinct from the PC and FoP items.
Hence, studies within this thesis indicate that IS does entail at least some predictive 
power for fearful responses to pain. Consequently, it seems advisable to incorporate this construct 
in further studies that aim to examine putative risk factors for the development and persistence of 
chronic pain. 
Differential importance of two fundamental fears in the context of pain: anxiety 
sensitivity versus injury/illness sensitivity
In addition to establishing evidence for the role of injury/illness sensitivity (IS) in the 
context of pain, this thesis also attempted to elucidate the putative differential predictive value of IS 
and anxiety sensitivity (AS). This research objective was addressed in chapters 2 till 7. AS has been 
defined as the fear of anxiety-related symptoms (e.g., heart palpitations, sweating) arising from 
the belief that these symptoms will have negative or harmful somatic, psychological, or physical 
consequences (Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987). AS implies the amplification of innocuous internal 
bodily sensations, and was originally proposed to constitute a risk factor for panic disorder (Clark, 
1986; Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987; Reiss, 1991; Teachman, 2005). At present, AS is conceived 
as a risk factor within the development of chronic pain, and to play a role in acute pain episodes 
as well. The relation between AS, pain, and disability has been frequently reported in both basic 
laboratory and applied clinical studies (Andersson, 1996; Asmundson et al., 2000; Stewart & 
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Asmundson, 2006). 
From their definition, it follows that IS and AS entail different, though related concerns 
that might serve independent roles in the contribution to psychopathology. As such, AS is assumed 
to relate predominantly to the amplification of present innocuous bodily sensations because of 
their putative prediction of serious health-damage. Conversely, IS relates to the catastrophic and 
exaggerated worrying on possible future injury and illness in general. This difference in content of 
the fears was clearly demonstrated in chapter 6, where AS was found to be specifically predictive 
of negative interpreting ambiguous descriptions that related to internal anxiety symptoms (e.g., 
sweating), whilst IS was found to be predictive of negative interpreting ambiguous descriptions 
that referred to other (non-anxiety related) bodily symptoms (e.g., skin bulb, digestive pain) that 
might predict serious illness or injury. Furthermore, IS and AS each resulted as the sole significant 
predictor of the self-reported tendency to engage in preventive and protective health behaviour, 
and the self-reported use of health care services, respectively. In addition, IS, but not AS was found 
to predict anticipatory FoP ratings for an upcoming pain stimulus. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that IS and AS might contribute to complementary components of the pain problem.
Despite the fact that several findings in this thesis are indicative that AS and IS are 
sensitive for explaining diverging components of pain behaviour, it can be questioned whether 
these findings have originated from (a) genuine differences with respect to the content and feared 
object of both constructs or (b) apparent differences that resulted from the properties of the 
measures that were chosen to represent IS and AS (i.e., the ISI and the ASI). In other words, are 
IS and AS actually different constructs or do statistical differences originate from drawbacks in the 
usage of the ISI and the ASI for assessing the constructs? This question will be addressed into 
detail in the paragraph below.
Inspecting the results regarding IS and AS in the studies of this thesis, it is notable that 
in some instances, IS resulted as the only significantly associated construct with some outcome 
variables (e.g., automatic threat appraisal in chapter 4, negative interpretations for other bodily 
symptoms subscale of BSIQ in chapter 5), while AS was found to be associated with these 
outcomes in a comparable, yet insignificant extent as well. Moreover, in these studies, the IS-
outcome association and the AS-outcome association were not statistically deviating from one 
another. This suggests the possibility that certain dysfunctional responses to pain-related cues 
can be equally well predicted by AS and IS. It might be suggested that the absence of statistically 
significant relations between AS and the negative responses to pain-related stimuli has resulted 
from the fact that the ASI total score was taken to represent AS in these studies. As was already 
mentioned in the discussion sections of chapter 3 and chapter 5, the composite ASI is considered 
to subsume three lower-order factors: physical concerns, cognitive concerns, and social concerns 
(Carter, Suchday, & Gore, 2001; Taylor & Cox, 1998; Zinbarg et al., 1997). Several authors have 
suggested that the physical concerns subscale of the ASI is particularly important to consider 
when exploring the influence of AS on pain maintaining behaviour, since this subscale pertains 
specifically to fearing the negative physical consequences of experiencing anxiety-related somatic 
sensations (Asmundson et al., 2001; Drahovzal et al., 2006; Keogh, 2004). In this view, it might 
be argued hat the ASI physical concerns factor and IS sensitivity are assessing one and the same 
theoretical construct. This suggestion is tentatively supported by the ADDTREE analysis in chapter 
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3, where the items of the physical concerns subscale were found to cluster together with the ISI 
items on the basis of the perceived content similarity. Furthermore, the other two subscales of the 
ASI were found to group in another main cluster. Thus in contrast to the ISI, the ASI is not perceived 
as a homogeneous measure that entails items that share similar meaning. It is possible that an 
association between ASI-physical concerns and responses to the (threatening) pain stimuli in this 
thesis were statistically counteracted by the absence of a correlation between these responses 
and the other two subscales of the ASI (i.e., cognitive concerns and social concerns). 
To test for this possibility, post hoc analyses with the physical concerns subscale instead 
of the ASI total score have been conducted on the data files of this thesis. First, correlations 
were calculated between the ASI physical concerns subscale, the ISI, and the ASI total score. 
Correlations between ASI physical concerns and ISI were generally found to be slightly (r ranging 
between 0.53 and 0.68), though not significantly, higher than correlations between the ISI and 
the ASI composite score (r ranging between .45 and .67). Furthermore, correlation coefficients 
between the ASI total score and the physical concerns subscale were found to be high, with r 
ranging between .83 and .91. Hence, it can be concluded that the physical concerns subscale of 
the ASI and the ISI share a significant amount of common variance. Nevertheless, the magnitude 
of the correlation coefficients does not provide reasons to assume that both measures are tapping 
the same construct. Second, analyses were re-ran for all data files in which differential associations 
between AS and IS had been found. Overall, these post-hoc analyses revealed the same pattern of 
findings when the physical concerns factor, rather than the ASI total score was examined next to IS 
for its relation with the various outcome variables in this thesis. This finding supports the suggestion 
that both AS and IS are indeed distinct constructs, that contribute uniquely and independently to 
different components of responses to pain and pain-related cues. A recent study that incorporated 
measures of both AS and IS supported this idea by demonstrating that both AS and IS were 
independently associated with other pain-related fears (fear of pain, fear of movement/(re)injury) 
and with a combined score of social anxiety and trauma related symptoms. Along the suggestions 
made in the current thesis, the authors of this study concluded that both AS and IS might constitute 
vulnerabilities for displaying pain-related fears (Asmundson & Carleton, 2005). 
Considering multiple pain-related anxiety and fear constructs in pain research
In addition to AS and IS, this thesis has also studied the influence of other pain-
related anxieties (Fear of Pain (FoP), pain catastrophizing (PC)). These pain-related anxieties 
were conceptualised as individual components of a hierarchical model of ‘pain-relevant negative 
emotional constructs’ (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004; Lilienfeld et al., 1993). In this model, disorder-
common constructs are assumed to reside in the higher levels of the hierarchy whilst disorder-
specific constructs are positioned at the lower levels (Lilienfeld et al., 1993; Watson & Clark, 1992; 
Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). In this view, AS and IS, form lower-order factors of the higher disorder-
common construct TA, and are understood as trait-like factors that possess some degree of 
specificity in their relation with physical health problems and anxiety. Subordinating AS and IS, both 
FoP and PC are conceived as disorder-specific constructs that are very proximally related to the 
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actual confrontation with pain (Keogh & Asmundson, 2004).
One of the merits of the hierarchical structure lies in its premise that constructs in the 
model will be intercorrelated, yet possess unique variance that can explain unique relations with 
specific components of pain (Lilienfeld et al., 1993; Taylor, 1993). Hence, conceptualizing multiple 
pain-related anxieties and fears in a hierarchical structure can account for the fact that moderate to 
high correlations are frequently observed between these constructs (chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in 
the present thesis; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2004; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). More importantly, 
the hierarchical structure can account for findings in which two or more correlated constructs have 
shown to be independently or uniquely related with divergent components of pain. For example, in 
chapter 4 of this thesis, AS and IS showed unique predictive value for the self-reported use of health 
care services and the tendency to engage in health protective behaviour, respectively, despite a 
significant correlation between AS and IS. In chapter 7, PC showed significant correlations with 
AS and IS, yet proved to be the sole construct associated with the attentional interference effect. 
In the study on negative explicit interpretation bias in chapter 5, TA, FoP, AS, IS, and PC were 
substantially intercorrelated (p < .01; p < .001), while specific and independent predictive value 
of each construct was found for negative interpreting ambiguous descriptions in various domains 
(i.e., panic-related sensations, other bodily sensations, social events, and general events). 
Similar findings have been demonstrated in other studies. In a recent study on the 
contribution of PC and AS in the development of persistent headache, Drahovzal et al (2006) 
concluded that PC and AS are empirically separate constructs that show overlap because of 
their common reference to the general domain of fearing physical catastrophe. Irrespective of 
this overlap, independent predictive value was found of AS for weekly headache and headache 
pain intensity and of PC for weekly headache only (Drahovzal et al., 2006). In a prospective study, 
Hadjistavropoulos & Asmundson (2004) examined the combined and unique contribution of TA, 
AS, health anxiety, and pain-related fear to the adjustment to pain over a 3-month period of time 
in musculoskeletal pain patients. Results of this study could be interpreted along the lines of 
the existence of hierarchical relations between the anxiety constructs. Hence, albeit moderate 
intercorrelations (r between 0.38 and 0.56, all p < .01) each of the anxiety constructs showed to 
be related to the adjustment to pain, although the importance of this relation was dependent on the 
specific outcome measure that was adopted for adjustment to pain (i.e., disability, negative affect, 
or perceived control over pain). In addition, Hadjistavropoulos & Asmundson, (2004) reported a 
shift in predictive value of some of the anxiety constructs from the acute onset phase of pain to 
the 3-month follow-up measurement. In the acute phase, disability was best predicted by pain-
related fear, negative affect (emotional distress) was significantly and uniquely predicted by TA, 
pain-related fear and AS, and perceived control was best predicted by TA. Notably, at 3-month 
follow-up, health anxiety became the only significant predictor of disability, and both AS and health 
anxiety were found to be predictive of negative affect. Based on these findings, Hadjistavropoulos 
and Asmundson (2004) suggested that in understanding pain and its consequences, it is important 
to consider the influence of pain-specific fears as well as the influence of more general anxiety 
construct that imply the general tendency to worry about health and future disability, as they are 
reflected by AS and IS for example. In addition, these authors suggested that the former might 
be especially predictive of short-term disability while the latter might be especially predictive of 
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long-term disability. In a comparison of several measurement instruments of FoP, McCracken et 
al. (1996) found that pain-related fears were better predictors of pain, disability and pain severity 
than trait anxiety. Moreover, McCracken et al. (1996) emphasized the value of relying on various 
measures to assess pain-related fear because of the different response modalities that typify these 
measures (e.g., cognitive, motoric, physiological). More precisely, specific predictive value was 
observed of the PASS physiological anxiety subscale for pain severity, the PASS escape/avoidance 
subscale for disability because of the pain, and the FABQ for complaint behaviours (McCracken et 
al., 1996). These latter findings implicitly advocate a broader conceptualisation of the FoP construct 
than the fear of present sensory signals alone.
In line with the suggestions made by McCracken et al. (1996), it has been proposed 
that the conceptualisation of FoP in research is largely dependent on the measure that is used 
to assess this construct (McCracken, 2004; McNeil & Vowles, 2004; Morley & Eccleston, 2004). 
Throughout time, several FoP scales have been developed (i.e., Pain Anxiety Symptoms Scale 
(PASS), the Tampa Scale of Kinesiophobia (TSK), the Fear Avoidance Beliefs Questionnaire (FABQ), 
and the FoP Questionnaire (FPQ)), which have all proven fruitful in establishing the role of FoP in 
relation to other pain-anxieties or responses to pain). Because of the different response modalities 
(cf. different feared objects) that are implied in each of these scales (i.e., fear of present physical 
pain, fear of potential pain, fear of movement/(re)injury, fear of being active or working), unique 
relations with divergent pain-related outcome measures have been observed with different scales 
(i.e., pain-related disability, negative affectivity, catastrophizing, pain tolerance, and subjective pain 
intensity) (e.g., Crombez et al., 1999; McCracken et al., 1996; McNeil & Vowles, 2004; Zvolensky, 
Feldner, Eifert, & Stewart, 2001). In the present thesis, the Fear of Pain Questionnaire (FPQ-III 
(McNeil & Rainwater, 1998) was used to tap pain-related fear. This 30-item questionnaire was 
specifically developed for the assessment of FoP in both clinical and non-clinical populations, 
and taps the fearfulness for pain in a large variety of life domains (McNeil & Rainwater, 1998). 
Consequently, FPQ scores are understood to reflect one’s potential to avoid painful or putatively 
painful situations (McNeil & Rainwater, 1998). Because of its ability to tap fearfulness for pain in 
a broad variety of life domains, the FPQ constitutes a particular good measure to adopt when 
trying to examine vulnerabilities for developing chronic pain from acute pain experiences (McNeil 
& Vowles, 2004). Nevertheless, the reverse side of the broad object of fear as implied in the FPQ 
might be that this scale serves a less good instrument for studying influences of FoP on specific 
components of dysfunctional responses to pain. 
Taken together, it can be concluded that the simultaneous study of multiple pain-
related anxieties, as well as keeping into account the object of the feared, is elucidating in terms 
of disentangling the precise contribution of each separate construct to the complex experience 
of pain. In addition, the hierarchical framework might offer a fruitful framework within which 
relations between the various construct can be understood. Up to now, the hierarchical model 
of pain-relevant negative emotional constructs has not been formally tested yet. Nevertheless, 
using principal components factor analyses or structural equation modelling, several authors have 
provided support for the hierarchical relation between negative affectivity and TA, between TA and 
the three fundamental fears, and between TA, AS, and the componential fears of AS (i.e., physical 
concerns, cognitive concerns, social concerns) (e.g., Sexton et al., 2003; Watson & Clark, 1992; 
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Zinbarg et al., 1997). It is suggested that future research addresses the issue of formal testing of 
the pain-relevant hierarchical model by means of similar statistical tests.
Cognitive proCeSSing biaS in funCtion of pain-relateD anxiety
One of the main objectives of this thesis concerned the examination of cognitive 
processing biases in function of pain-related anxieties. Information processing approaches to 
emotional disorders state that negative affective states and the current concerns of individuals 
are associated with favouring the processing of information that is congruent with these states 
and concerns (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). 
Given the notion that various pain-related anxieties are directed at different components of the 
pain problem (e.g., fear of current physical sensation, fear of future disability and illness, fear of 
movement/(re)injury), it is interesting to examine the extent to which these different constructs are 
associated with cognitive bias towards the specific concerns of the individual. 
Relation between elevated levels of pain-related anxiety and the processing of pain-
related information: Content-specificity
The present thesis has made use of both direct (Body Sensations Interpretation 
Questionnaire) and indirect measures (EAST, Primary Task Paradigm, Automatic lexical decision 
paradigm) to assess the occurrence of cognitive bias in relation to the emotional vulnerability 
constructs that were previously discussed. Although early cognitive models assumed for cognitive 
biases occurring in the later, strategic stages of processing to be characterized by content-
specificity only, contemporary cognitive models postulate that content-specificity can occur in the 
early phases of information processing already (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Jacoby, 1991; Mathews 
& MacLeod, 1994; McNally, 1995). These contemporary models assume that both automatic 
and strategic processes are involved in all cognitive bias to some degree (Mathews & MacLeod, 
1994; McNally, 1995). Results of the current thesis were generally supportive of the hypothesized 
association between the biased processing of information on the one hand and elevated levels 
of pain-related anxiety on the other hand at both an automatic and a more controlled levels of 
processing. More specifically, a positive and significant association was found between: (1) IS 
and the automatic threat appraisal towards pain-related stimuli in chapter 4; (2) IS, PC, FoP 
and the explicit negative interpretation of ambiguous bodily symptoms in chapter 5; and (3) 
PC and the attentional interference effect in chapter 7. In addition, FoP levels were found to be 
associated with the tendency to favour health threatening over positive resolutions of ambiguity 
in the automatic assessment of negative interpretations in chapter 6. This latter finding has to 
be interpreted with caution, though, given the fact that the lexical decision paradigm in chapter 
6 might have been unsuccessful in tapping genuine automatic negative interpretations (due to 
undesirable priming effects caused by methodological drawbacks of the stimulus material and 
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the testing paradigm, see limitations chapter 6). Nevertheless, the association between FoP and 
speeded responses to the health-threatening resolution of ambiguity is an interesting finding in the 
light of the hypothesized relation between (automatic) cognitive responses to pain-related stimuli 
in function of present pain-directed anxious states. It is important to acknowledge that findings 
of content-specific relations between current concerns and cognitive bias are largely dependent 
upon the stimulus material that is selected to assess the bias (e.g., McKellar et al., 2003). This is 
illustrated in chapter 4, where IS was found to be significantly associated with the automatic threat 
appraisal, whilst the relation with AS did not come to reach significance. Motivated by the notion 
that automatic priming effects (as assessed with the EAST) are presumed to occur in response 
to personally relevant stimuli only, target stimuli in this task were chosen to possess relevance for 
a healthy population (Teige et al., 2004). These stimuli did not refer directly to the state of pain, 
but represented physical health threat in general (physician, blood, infection, disabled, cancer, 
wound). In this light, the stimuli were specifically representative of the current concerns assumed 
to be involved in IS. Illustrating the importance of the stimulus material used in cognitive testing 
paradigms as the EAST, elevated levels of AS have been found related with an automatic health-
threatening appraisal towards target-stimuli that represented anxiety-related sensations (e.g., 
breathless, palpitation) (Lefaivre et al., 2006). Because of the omission of more direct affective and 
sensory pain stimuli (e.g., throbbing, pounding, aching, nagging, unbearable, agonizing) or more 
general negative stimuli (e.g., burglary, robbing, fight), conclusions on the observed association 
between IS and the automatic threat appraisal are limited. More precisely, it cannot be concluded 
whether IS is related with an automatic threat appraisal towards general health stimuli only, or 
whether this selective threatening processing extrapolates to pain-specific, or general negative 
stimuli as well. In the study on the attentional interference effect, an induced pain experience was 
used to represent the threatening stimulus. It needs no explanation that this stimulus serves a 
better and more ecological valid representation of physical pain than verbal words as used in the 
EAST. Given the fact that neither IS or AS showed associations with the attentional interference 
effect, while pain catastrophizing did, it might be concluded that the processing of an actual pain 
stimulus is specifically biased in function of elevated levels of pain catastrophizing. Last, content-
specificity was specifically addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis, where an explicit interpretation 
measure was used to assess negative interpretations of situational descriptions on several content-
domains. The major advantage of this study is that besides the inclusion of situations referring to 
bodily symptoms and sensations, situations referring to general threat and social events were 
incorporated as well (see chapter 5 for detailed results on the findings of this study). Important with 
respect to the issue of content-specific interpretations of pain-related information in this study is 
that both PC, FoP, and IS were found to be predictive of negative interpretations on the other bodily 
symptoms subscale. This latter subscale was assumed to be most representative of pain-related 
ambiguous situations. In addition, both IS and PC did not predict negative interpretations on any 
of the other domains assessed in this study. Furthermore and supportive of the content specificity 
of PC and FoP, the predictive value of IS for interpretations on this subscale disappeared when the 
pain-specific constructs were considered simultaneously with IS as predictors of this subscale. 
When combining findings of the current thesis with those of other studies on the 
assessment of cognitive bias in function of pain-related anxiety, it has to be concluded that 
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robust evidence on this matter is inconclusive yet. As such, there are studies that demonstrate 
associations between elevated levels of FoP or AS and the occurrence of memory, attentional, 
and interpretation biases towards either negative stimuli in general, pain stimuli in general, sensory 
pain words solely, or affective pain words solely (Asmundson et al., 2005; Keogh & Cochrane, 
2002; McKellar et al., 2003; Pincus & Morley, 2001). Nevertheless, studies that have failed to 
detect cognitive bias in relation to pain-related anxiety levels have been published as well (e.g., 
Asmundson & Hadjistavropoulos, 2007; Keogh, Thompson, & Hannent, 2003; Roelofs, Peters, 
van der Zijden et al., 2003). It might be suggested that mixed findings on this matter can be partly 
accounted for by methodological issues that typify the studies have been conducted on testing 
cognitive bias in the area of pain up to date, constituting of a lack of the assessment of pain-related 
anxiety in pain patients, the omission of including various types of pain-related stimuli, the lack of 
including control groups, the lack of including pain specific stimuli altogether, or the reliance on 
different testing paradigms (both indirect and direct). In this light further research on examining the 
content-specificity of cognitive bias in the area of pain is definitely warranted.
The orientation towards pain and health-related stimuli in cognitive processing
One notable finding in the current thesis was that irrespective of individual fear levels, 
a general automatic threat appraisal towards the pain-related stimuli was found with the EAST 
in chapter 4, and a general attentional interference effect of pain on cognitive performance was 
observed in chapter 7. These findings are not surprising, though, given the evolutionary benefits 
that are inherently connected to the fast and early detection of severe physical threat in terms of 
optimizing safety and survival chances. The benefits of the automatic detection and processing 
of severe threat are acknowledged in cognitive models of information processing as well (Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). As such, immediately upon 
the confrontation with a stimulus, the automatic, fast, and largely unconscious recognition of 
threatening stimuli is presumed to be ensured by the rapid activation of the orienting mode in the 
three-stage cognitive model (Beck & Clark, 1997). This orienting mode is conceived to function 
as an ‘early warning system’ that allows the individual to prepare eventual fight/flight responses 
in order to protect against or prevent the occurrence of serious bodily harm. Congruent to this 
idea, others authors report about a threat evaluation system (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), or 
a significance evaluator (Öhman, 1993) to operate in the earliest and most automatic stages of 
information processing that is directed at the detection of threat for evolutionary purposes. This 
automatic and fast threat detection process is assumed to involve a rapid evaluation of imminent 
threat with respect to its meaning and gravity (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Öhman, 1979). If this 
evaluation results in a non severe threatening appraisal of the stimulus, processing will go on as 
usual, and the individual continues his or her activities without even being aware of this evaluation 
process. It might be suggested that this evaluation process is illustrated in chapter 7, where the 
attentional interference effect was tapped at two time lags in the processing of the pain stimulus; 
immediately after pain onset (250 ms), and 750 ms after pain onset. Replicating prior results by 
Crombez et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b) the disruptive effect of pain on attention was found to be 
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especially pronounced at 250 ms after pain onset, and to have diminished substantially at 750 ms 
after pain onset. It might be suggested that at 250 ms after pain onset, the pain stimulus is still 
under evaluation; whilst at 750 ms this evaluation process is presumably in its end phase, leading 
to much smaller task deterioration. Furthermore, it might be suggested that the general automatic 
threat appraisal as measured with the EAST can be accounted for by the functioning of an early 
threat detection system as well. 
Nevertheless, some cautious remarks should be placed with this latter interpretation, since 
it can be questioned whether the temporal path within which the EAST taps cognitive processes 
does still fall within the earliest and most automatic stage of information processing. Despite the 
fact that the EAST is an automatized task requiring responses ‘as fast as possible’ (mean reaction 
times around 500 ms) it might be suggested that responses to this task involve some primitive, 
basic elaborative processing at least. After all, responses are based on making a decision about 
the colour of the target words under the assumption that the semantic and affective meaning of 
the targets is unconsciously processed as well (De Houwer, 2003). Hence, the EAST, and possibly 
also the primary task paradigm might tap automatic processes in a later stage of information 
processing, involving some basic degree of elaborative processing already. Another explanation 
might be in order to explain the counterintuitive finding of automatic negative processing bias in 
healthy individuals. Such an explanation might be sought in the severity of the threatening stimuli. 
More precisely, it has been suggested that healthy individuals might display automatic negative 
biases for stimuli that entail a severe threat value because of the evolutionary benefits of early 
threat detection, whereas stimuli that entail a moderate or no threat value are presumed to be 
negatively processed by high anxious individuals only (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). This explanation seems to fit the findings of the current thesis well. After all, stimuli 
referring to serious health damage can be proposed to possess severe threat value indeed and 
it is beneficial for an individual’s safety and well being that attention is devoted to these types of 
stimuli. The automatic threatening evaluation of health threatening stimuli does not necessarily lead 
to the instigation of further response patterns in function of this initial threat impression, though. 
In contrary, it can be suggested that in low anxious individuals, constructive primitive elaborative 
processes might be responsible for blocking off the display of further maladaptive responses. As 
Beck & Clark (1997) stated in their cognitive model of information processing, the primal threat 
mode involves a goal-directed strategy that allows for some primitive reflexive and elaborative, yet 
unconscious, processing already.
In contrast, the early warning system and primal threat mode are assumed to have lost 
their evolutionary value in high anxious individuals, and to have evolved into some sort of ‘anxious 
processing mode’ that is characterized by an excessive orientation towards the negative altogether. 
In anxious individuals, the excessive orientation towards the negative is assumed to dominate 
cognitive, physiological, affective, and behavioural responses, and to inhibit more constructive and 
adaptive processing. This excessive orientation might explain the more pronounced magnitude of 
both the automatic threat appraisal and the attentional interference effect in persons possessing 
elevated levels of IS and PC respectively. 
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Cognitive bias and the prediction of behaviour
One issue that remains to be dealt with in the discussion of negative cognitive bias as 
a vulnerability factor for pain chronicity concerns the relation between such biases and behaviour. 
More specifically, in assuming cognitive biases to underlie the maintenance and possibly also 
the onset of pain chronicity, it is crucial that these cognitive processing biases are found to be 
associated with maladaptive responses to pain. There is quite a bulge of literature available on the 
assumed predictive value of both automatic and strategic cognitive processes to behaviour. In brief, 
there seems to be general consensus that fast and automatic cognitive processes will be especially 
predictive of spontaneous, reflexive and uncontrolled behavioural patterns, whereas slow, strategic 
processes will be most predictive of controlled, reflective behavioural patterns (Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Fazio & Olson, 2003; McNally, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wilson et al., 2000). Illustrating the 
value of considering both automatic and controlled processes in the prediction of behaviour, 
research has demonstrated that both types of processes can predict different components of one 
and the same behaviour, whereas evidence on the divergent predictive value of automatic versus 
controlled processes to behaviour is available as well (e.g., de Jong et al., 2003; Huijding & De 
Jong, 2005). For example, in examining the divergent influence of automatic and self-reported fear-
related associations on fear responses, Huijding & De Jong (2006) found automatically assessed 
spider-fear associations (i.e., EAST) to be especially predictive of automatic, non-controlled fear 
responses (i.e., eye blink startle probe response) whereas the self-reported fear of spiders (i.e. 
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire) showed to be the best predictor of controlled strategic avoidance 
behaviour (i.e., behavioural approach towards spider). In another study, automatically assessed 
spider-fear responses were found to possess explanatory value over and above this of self-reported 
fear in the prediction of avoidance behaviour (Huijding & De Jong, 2005). Furthermore, evidence for 
the strength of automatic processes in explaining behaviour was offered in a study demonstrating 
positive automatic alcohol associations to be uniquely predictive of alcohol (misuse), and to form 
the single best predictor of individuals’ alcohol problems (de Jong et al., 2007). 
In the present thesis, only chapter 4 has included a behavioural measure to test for the 
predictive value of self-reported pain-related anxiety levels and the automatic threat appraisal to 
pain-related behaviour. These behavioural measures constituted self-report instruments, in which 
respondents were asked to report about their use of health care services in the past twelve-
and three-month period, and about their tendency to engage in preventive and protective health 
behaviours providing that they would find themselves in a number of hypothetically sketched 
situations that involve imminent long-term health-threat. Results of the regression analyses 
showed that the self-reported pain-related anxieties were predictive of both behavioural correlates 
only, whereas the automatic threat appraisal did not add anything to this prediction. In single 
correlations, the automatic threat appraisal was found to be marginally related (p < .10) to the self-
reported tendency to engage in protective and preventive behaviour, but showed zero-correlations 
with the self-reported use of health care services. In general, these findings seem to indicate 
that automatic threat appraisal towards health-threatening stimuli does not possess additional 
predictive value over the explicitly reported pain anxieties in the explanation of the behaviours 
assessed with both behavioural correlates. Nevertheless, the self-reported behavioural measures 
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in the current thesis might be unsuccessful in tapping the spontaneous behaviours that persons 
will display in response to the threat of pain or health damage. It is suggested that the spontaneous 
and reflexive behaviours proposed to contribute to pain might be objectively assessed by means 
of psychophysiological measures (i.e., increase in muscle tension), startle probe responses, and 
observational methods. The finding of a marginal single correlations between the automatic threat 
appraisal and the self-reported tendency to engage in health protecting behaviour might be 
indicative of a contribution of automatic appraisals of health threatening stimuli to the display of 
maladaptive responses that will lead to increased disability in the long term.
In contrast to the recent increase in studies on the examination of the occurrence of 
cognitive processing biases to pain, relatively few studies are available yet on the prediction of such 
cognitive biases for either strategic or controlled responses to pain. In order to be able to make 
more firm predictions on the contribution of both strategic and automatic cognitive processing 
bias on the persistence of pain complaints, future research should address this issue in both 
experimental laboratory and more applied clinical studies.
lImItatIons	of	the	studIes	presented	In	thIs	thesIs	and	future	researCh	
dIreCtIons
limitationS
One limitation to the current thesis concerns the inclusion of healthy participants only. 
The choice for conducting studies in a healthy population was motivated by the research objective 
of identifying vulnerability factors within the chronic course of pain. By examining the role of these 
factors in healthy individuals, it was possible to ascribe putative findings and effects to the presence 
or functioning of these factors, rather than to the presence of actual pain. Nevertheless, since the 
role of the subsumed risk factors of interest (i.e., pain-related anxiety and cognitive processing 
biases) was not studied in interaction with the state of pain, caution is warranted in generalizing 
findings on the influence of these factors to the persistence and maintenance of chronic pain 
complaints. This is especially true with respect to the negative emotional constructs that are studied 
in this thesis. As such, it might be proposed that in pain patients, other concerns or factors are of 
importance in maintaining pain than the ones that have been discussed in this thesis. In addition, it 
is possible that the self-report measures that are used to assess the constructs will be differentially 
responded to by patients than by healthy individuals because of different perspectives between 
both groups on the items of these constructs, being affected by suffering from continuous pain 
or not. To overcome this limitation, future research will benefit from conducting studies in acute or 
chronic pain populations. Furthermore, the vast majority of participants in this thesis were college 
students of relatively young age and with presumed above-moderate IQ levels. In this respect, this 
study sample does not entail full representativeness of the general population in which chronic 
pain problems are observed. Future studies should therefore study the role of vulnerability factors 
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in pain in more representative community samples as well. 
A second limitation of the current thesis concerns the cross-sectional design of the 
studies that it incorporates in examining vulnerability for developing and maintaining chronic pain 
problems. Ideally, the role of vulnerability factors would have to be examined within a prospective 
study design that collects longitudinal data on the development and exacerbation of chronic pain 
problems. Nevertheless, such a research design would be difficult to implement, since this requires 
the selection of participants prior to the experience of pain. One alternative to this option would be 
to study participant groups that are known to be subjected to a pain experience in the future (e.g., 
persons in the prospect of undergoing surgery or medical painful procedure), and to gather data 
on the variables assumed to be important for instigating long-term pain complaints prior to this 
procedure and at follow-up moments. 
A third limitation of this thesis might concern power problems due to the inclusion of 
relatively small participant samples in relation to the study of influences of multiple independent 
variables in each study. It is possible that stronger effects and associations between the cognitive 
biases and the presence of anxiety levels would have resulted when more participants were 
included in these studies. Although it is strongly recommended that future studies continue to 
include multiple variables for achieving a more thorough insight on their relative importance, it is 
advisable that large enough participant groups are concordantly recruited to test for the influence 
of these factors.
Finally, most studies in this thesis are limited by the omission of behavioural measures as 
the dependent variables assessing responses to pain. Due to this limitation, we can only speculate 
on the direct influence of the various anxiety constructs as well as the cognitive processing biases 
on specific maladaptive responses to pain. Future research will have to address this issue by 
including both indirect (e.g., psychophysiological responses, measures of muscle tension) and 
more direct (e.g., pain activity task, pain tolerance, avoidance behaviour, observational measures) 
measures of responses to pain in studies that aim to examine the contribution of anxiety states and 
automatic and strategic cognitive processing biases to these responses. 
future reSearCh DireCtionS
Based on the combination of findings presented in the present thesis and other findings 
in the research area on the examination of negative emotional and cognitive factors involved in the 
development and maintenance of chronic pain, the following directions for future research may be 
proposed: 
First, given the complex nature of pain and the close association between various pain-
related emotional constructs it might be suggested that future research will benefit substantially 
by the collective study of multiple pain-related anxiety constructs when trying to understand their 
respective roles in the development persistence of chronic pain. Taking a broader perspective 
on the role of anxiety in pain and studying the interplay between various constructs allows for 
the identification of the unique and relative importance of each of these constructs for specific 
components of the pain problem. The merits of this type of research have been emphasized in the 
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studies incorporated in the present thesis as well as those conducted by several other researchers 
in the field (e.g., Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2004; McCracken et al., 1996). It is suggested that a 
hierarchical structure might serve a useful theoretical framework within which findings of divergent 
influences can be understood and interpreted, and further formal testing of this model is warranted. 
In addition, it should be noted that the hierarchical model of pain-relevant constructs as presented 
in this thesis does not intend to be definitive, and leaves open the possibility for influences of other 
recently introduced (e.g., health anxiety; Hadjistavropoulos, Asmundson, LaChapelle, & Quine, 
2002; Hadjistavropoulos & Hadjistavropoulos, 2003) or yet to be discovered constructs. Since 
incorporating multiple independent variables in single study designs increases the risk at Type II 
errors of measurement, it is furthermore advocated that future studies on this subject include large 
enough participant samples, as well as adequate statistical testing techniques (e.g., structural 
equation modelling) for exploring or confirming hypothesized individual and conjoint influences of 
multiple constructs on pain. 
Second, in examining pain-related anxieties and fears in relation to pain further, it might 
be valuable to consider the precise object of these anxieties or fears more thoroughly. It is well 
acknowledged that fears and anxieties in the context of pain can be directed at the actual presence 
of physical pain and sensations and the direct functional consequences of activity, (re)injury, and 
work on the exacerbation and continuation of pain. In addition, the feared object may also extend the 
scope of the direct physical impact of pain on the individual. As such, one might fear the possibility 
of putative future pain, disability or physical health problems, the impact of pain on one’s social 
status and relationships, or fears on the impact of pain on financial resources (McCracken, 2004; 
McNeil & Vowles, 2004; Morley & Eccleston, 2004). The object of fear or anxiety may be proposed 
to depend upon prior personal learning history, prior knowledge, environmental contexts, and 
social influences. More than the distinguishable level of specificity in various pain-related anxiety 
and fear constructs, the exact object of this anxiety or fear may be suggested to be of particular 
importance in explaining divergent findings on rather broad or more specific relations between 
anxiety-related constructs and components of pain and disability. Drawing on earlier suggestions 
made by Hadjistavropoulos et al. (2004) and on findings regarding the distinctiveness of AS and 
IS in this thesis, it might be suggested that present-oriented fears and anxieties on physical pain 
or the actual presence of physical threat might be especially predictive of short-term disability and 
maladaptive responses to pain, whereas future-oriented fears or anxieties, directed at putative 
physical harm, future long-term disability and the functional and social consequences of injury and 
illness might be more predictive of long-term disability. These different objects may be proposed 
to guide different behavioural response patterns, with the former being directed at the escape 
from and dealing with present pain complaints, and the latter being directed at the prevention and 
protection against eventual serious physical harm. 
A third direction for further research concerns the further examination of the role of cognitive 
processing biases in the aetiology and persistence of chronic pain. The substantial evidence that 
is presently available on the occurrence of both automatic and strategic cognitive biases in both 
pain patients and high pain anxious individuals has paved the path for further research on precise 
influences of these cognitive processes on dysfunctional responses to pain. In order to examine 
this precise influence, it is suggested that further research includes measures of both strategic 
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and more spontaneous pain-related behavioural measures, including measures of avoidance, pain 
tolerance, muscle tension and other psychophysiological responses assumed to be of importance 
in pain. Furthermore, congruently with the benefits connected to the collective study of pain-
related anxieties in relation to pain and disability, it might be suggested that studying the combined 
effects of multiple cognitive processing biases (e.g., attention bias, interpretation bias, memory 
bias) can add significantly to our understanding of the unique and relative importance of these 
separate biases as well. Since high pain-anxious individuals are assumed to be characterized by 
the propensity to process pain-related information negatively, it is not very likely that the influence 
of cognitive bias will be solitary. It seems more appropriate to assume that one particular bias will 
be influenced by other biases or that several biases exert conjoint influences on the maintenance 
of pain. Recently, Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews (2006) have emphasized the importance of studying 
cognitive biases in combination for their influence on the maintenance of a given disorder in what 
they refer to as the ‘combined cognitive bias hypothesis’. These authors applied this hypothesis in 
the area of social phobia, by presenting and discussing evidence on the reciprocal relation between 
mental imagery and interpretation bias and their combined effects on the exacerbation of social 
phobia. The potential utility of the combined cognitive bias hypothesis is probably not confined to 
the area of social phobia, but applicable and testable in other emotional disorders as well, including 
the area of pain. Another issue that remains to be established is the causality between anxiety, 
cognitive biases, and the exacerbation of pain complaints. One way to study causality could be by 
the induction of cognitive bias in persons who are not prone for selective processing pain-related 
or health-threatening information and study effect on pain-related behavioural measures as well 
as on mood. Evidence on the possibility to induce cognitive biases successfully was recently 
offered with respect to automatic interpretation bias and attention bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007; Yiend & Mackintosh, 
2004; Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005). Given the fact that cognitive biases in anxiety can 
indeed be induced yields the challenge for examining the extent to which these biases can be 
reduced then, and serve as potential valuable additions to the treatment of persons characterized 
by irrational negative beliefs on pain. 
Another question that presents itself from the present thesis concerns the importance 
of the fast and automatic general threat appraisal that seems to exist in the general population 
towards health-threatening stimuli. More specifically, it would be interesting to examine the critical 
components that dampen or enhance this initial threat impression in the later stages of information 
processing. It is very likely that, according to the most common view on the role of cognitive 
processing bias in pain, the presence of pain-related anxiety serves one of the basic and necessary 
conditions for this threat appraisal to guide further dysfunctional responses. Nevertheless, it might be 
valuable to examine the importance of other characteristics of the person (e.g., positive personality 
traits), the (threat of) pain (e.g., severity, perceived threat value, identifiable causes) and the context 
within which the (threat of) pain occurs (e.g., social context, developmental history, care giving, 
relational goals) on the further functionality or the putative inhibition of this initial threat impression. 
For example, it has been demonstrated that the severity, novelty, and perceived threat value of 
the pain stimulus are critical factors in determining the impact of the interruptive effect of pain 
on attention (Van Damme, Crombez, Eccleston et al., 2004). With respect to context influences, 
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studies have demonstrated the role of practitioners’ attitudes and pain-related fear (e.g., Houben 
et al., 2005), and this of caregivers or significant others (e.g., Goubert, Eccleston, Vervoort, Jordan, 
& Crombez, 2006) on the exacerbation of fearfulness and catastrophizing on pain. Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that instrumental, relational, or caregiving goals of individual might affect the 
way in which persons give expression to their pain and are prone for further fearful and catastrophic 
appraisals of pain (Sullivan et al., 2004; Sullivan et al., 2001) 
Last, in addition to studying factors that contribute in a negative fashion to pain and 
disability, it is proposed that further research devotes attention to the role of psychological factors 
that might have positive influences on the development and persistence of pain. The present thesis 
demonstrated the importance of perceived control and self-efficacy beliefs in this light, as cognitive 
factors that have a beneficial influence on the experience of pain in terms of a subjective decrease 
in pain intensity and fearfulness for pain. Other cognitive factors presumed to exert positive 
influences on pain are acceptance and benefit finding. In addition, several stable personality traits 
have been suggested to possess promising value in protecting against the development of chronic 
pain conditions, for example dispositional optimism, general self-efficacy, and dispositional hope. 
It goes without saying that gathering knowledge on processes and factors that might contribute 
to the adjustment to and adequate coping with pain provides useful information for theoretical and 
management perspectives on chronic pain.
ClInICal	ImplICatIons	of	thIs	thesIs
Given the fundamental nature of the studies in this thesis, the direct clinical implications 
of its findings are limited. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the value of this thesis for clinical 
purposes lies exactly within the attempts that are made to disentangle the divergent influences 
of several psychological factors on the development and the persistence of pain. Treatment 
approaches in clinical practice can benefit from a more crystallized view on the (relative) importance 
of psychological factors and cognitive mechanisms that can make persons more or less prone for 
developing chronic pain from acute pain episodes. More precisely, insight in these factors can 
promote the development of tailored pain management techniques that are directed at counteracting 
dysfunctional response patterns to acute pain and at promoting functional and adaptive processes 
that might contribute to the healing process. Moreover, it can be proposed that the identification of 
assessable psychological vulnerability factors can be helpful for the early screening of individuals 
who are at risk for developing chronic pain complaints. An early identification of the presence of 
vulnerability for developing chronic pain can promote the early application of pain management 
techniques that are specifically tailored to the needs of the individual at risk. Furthermore, it may be 
proposed that the assessment of the occurrence of automatic cognitive processing biases might 
provide a testable means to check for the effectiveness of treatment in terms of a reduction in 
automatically favouring the processing of negative and pain-related information and an increase in 
constructive and functional elaborative information processing that counteracts threat processing 
templates (Dehghani, Sharpe, & Nicholas, 2004).
The advantage of identifying psychological factors involved in pain chronicity for treatment 
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approaches is illustrated by the effectiveness of current cognitive-behavioural approaches that have 
evolved from contemporary cognitive fear-avoidance models of pain. These treatment approaches 
are primarily directed at tackling FoP and pain catastrophizing beliefs in order to reduce pain-
related disability and to learn persons to cope with their pain more adequately. Drawing on the 
successfulness of exposure treatments in phobias, the exposure-in-vivo treatment for chronic 
musculoskeletal pain has recently proven to be a promising treatment for those pain patients 
who are characterized by irrational beliefs that pain is a signal of impending threat to the body 
(Boersma et al., 2004; de Jong et al., 2005; Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000; Vlaeyen & Morley, 2005). It 
will be interesting to examine in future studies whether the effectiveness of this exposure-in-vivo 
treatment does result in dampened or inhibited cognitive processing biases towards pain-related 
information as well.
Besides a focus on tackling those factors that can contribute to the onset and persistence 
of pain, it is furthermore suggested that pain management programs can benefit substantially 
from an additional focus on factors and processes that can promote adaptive responses to pain. 
Earlier in this thesis, it was suggested that perceived control and self-efficacy beliefs are important 
cognitive factors to consider in this light. It is proposed that in pain management programs, 
practitioners consider the importance of patients’ beliefs over their possibility and capability to 
control and deal with their pain. These patient beliefs might be strengthened by means of the 
practitioner providing motivational support and positive feedback on the progress and efforts of 
the patient in following the treatment programme. Further research will be needed to clarify the 
independent and interacting influence of both perceived control and self-efficacy beliefs in order 
to fine-tune their imbedding in intervention programs that are directed at the adaptive adjustment 
to and coping with pain.
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At risk for pain
Het ervaren van pijn is een welbekende sensatie voor de meesten onder ons. Een specifiek 
kenmerk van pijn is dat het, ondanks zijn universele aard, een sterk subjectieve ervaring is, die door 
verschillende personen op verschillende manieren ervaren en beleefd wordt. Bovendien is pijn niet 
altijd van voorbijgaande aard. Hoewel de meeste personen na een pijnervaring snel weer genezen 
door tijdelijk rust te nemen of een (medische) behandeling te volgen, is er ook een beperkt aandeel 
van de bevolking (ongeveer 5%) dat continu met pijnklachten heeft te kampen. Bij de meeste 
mensen met aanhoudende pijnklachten (meer dan drie maanden) kan geen duidelijke medische 
oorzaak gevonden worden en spreken we van aspecifieke chronische pijn. In dit proefschrift staan 
een aantal studies beschreven waarin persoonlijkheidskenmerken, denkprocessen en denkfouten 
onderzocht worden als mogelijke psychologische kwetsbaarheidfactoren voor de ontwikkeling en 
het blijven voortbestaan van chronische aspecifieke pijn. 
Hoofdstuk	1 van dit proefschrift start met een korte schets van de problematiek en 
prevalentie van chronische aspecifieke pijn, en een beschrijving van de meest invloedrijke theoretische 
verklaringsmodellen van pijn die doorheen de tijd ontwikkeld werden. Op dit moment wordt pijn 
over het algemeen benaderd vanuit een biopsychosociale invalshoek, waarbij biologische, sociale 
en psychologische componenten van belang geacht worden. Een belangrijk verklaringsmodel is 
het cognitief gedragsmatige model van chronische pijn (Vlaeyen et al, 1995), waarin chronische 
aspecifieke pijn gerepresenteerd wordt als het resultaat van een vicieus proces. In dit model 
vormen catastrofale interpretaties van pijn (bijv. ‘mijn pijn is het ergste dat mij kan overkomen’ of 
‘mijn pijn gaat nooit meer weg’) en de vrees voor pijn (bijv. ‘wanneer ik pijn heb ben ik bang dat er 
iets ernstigs kan gebeuren’of ‘pijn is angstaanjagend’) kritieke componenten die de vicieuze cirkel 
in stand houden. Hoofdstuk 1 besteedt verder aandacht aan de introductie en beschrijving van 
negatieve emotionele persoonlijkheidsconstructen (meer bepaald angst en vreesconstructen) en 
informatieverwerkingsfouten, die mogelijk kunnen verklaren waarom personen in meer of mindere 
mate kwetsbaar zijn om catastroferend en met vrees te reageren op pijn. Het zijn met name deze 
psychologische risicofactoren die in de studies in dit proefschrift nader onderzocht werden.
De hoofddoelstelling van hoofdstuk	 2	 is om de rol van injury/illness sensitivity (IS), 
gedefinieerd als de overdreven bezorgdheid om in de toekomst ernstig gewond, ernstig ziek, of 
invalide te geraken, nader te onderzoeken als een mogelijk belangrijke kwetsbaarheidfactor binnen 
het domein van chronische pijn. Hoewel eerdere literatuur wel al melding maakte van deze factor 
als een ‘fundamentele’angst die mogelijk een invloed heeft op psychopathologie, was er tot op 
heden weinig onderzoek voorhanden dat de rol van dit construct in pijn nader onderzocht heeft 
(Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). Daarentegen was er al vrij veel bekend over de rol van anxiety 
sensitivity (AS) als een kwetsbaarheidfactor voor chronische pijn. Een additionele vraagstelling van 
hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht of IS mogelijk een groter belang had in het bepalen van dysfunctionele 
responsen ten aanzien van pijn dan AS. Gezonde studenten  vulden een aantal vragenlijsten in 
waarin onder andere AS, IS, pijn catastroferen, en vrees voor pijn gemeten werden. Correlationele 
en regressie analyses toonden aan dat IS en AS beiden significante voorspellers waren van pijn 
catastroferen en pijngerelateerde vrees, terwijl IS als de beste voorspeller naar voren kwam. Een 
willekeurige groep van de grotere groep studenten die de vragenlijsten invulden werden vervolgens 
in het testlab uitgenodigd waar zij verschillende pijninducties ondergingen (elektrische stimulatie, 
warmte, druktest). Geanticipeerde angst voor pijn en pijntolerantie werden gemeten. Noch AS, 
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noch IS bleken voorspellend te zijn voor pijntolerantie scores van de drie verschillende inducties. 
Echter, IS, maar niet AS, resulteerde als een significante voorspeller van de geanticipeerde angst 
die proefpersonen voorafgaand aan elk van de drie inducties aangaven. De resultaten wijzen erop 
dat het zinvol is om IS nader te onderzoeken als een mogelijke kwetsbaarheidfactor voor pijn. 
Onderzoek naar deze factor naast de rol van AS kan mogelijk een beter inzicht bieden in de unieke 
en gemeenschappelijke bijdrage van beide constructen aan bepaalde pijnresponsen.
In hoofdstuk	3 werd verdere evidentie gezocht voor het hiërarchisch model van negatieve 
emotionele constructen relevant voor pijn (zie beschrijving en figuur in hoofdstuk 1; Lilienfeld et 
al.,1993; Keogh & Asmundson, 2004). De verschillende constructen die in het hiërarchisch model 
staan weergegeven worden in de praktijk veelal geoperationaliseerd en gemeten met behulp 
van specifieke vragenlijsten. Wanneer we willen aannemen dat deze lijsten ook effectief deze 
verschillende angstconstructen representeren, is het van cruciaal belang dat personen in staat zijn 
om de dimensionaliteit en de inhoudelijke verschillen in de betekenis van de items van deze lijsten 
te herkennen. Om dit nader te onderzoeken heeft een grote groep studenten een kaart sorteer 
taak uitgevoerd. Alle items (225 in totaal) van de meest courant gebruikte lijsten voor het meten 
van pijnrelevante angstconstructen werden apart op een kaartje uitgeprint (zonder de bijhorende 
antwoordschalen). Proefpersonen kregen de opdracht om de kaartjes zodanig in stapels te 
sorteren dat iedere stapel items bevatte met een inhoudelijke verwantschap. Een clusteranalyse 
op deze sorteerdata toonde aan dat items samen clusterden in groepen op een manier die in grote 
lijnen overeenstemde met de structuur van het hiërarchisch model. Meer nog, items uit specifieke 
subschalen van deze lijsten werden vaak samen gegroepeerd op basis van hun waargenomen 
gelijkenis op inhoudelijk vlak. Verder bood een muldimensionale schaal-analyse op de sorteerdata 
ondersteuning voor de dimensionaliteit die doorheen het hiërarchisch model verondersteld wordt, 
namelijk dat inhoudspecifieke constructen (items) in de onderste lagen van het hiërarchisch 
model geplaatst worden terwijl meer algemene en diffuse constructen (items)in de bovenste lagen 
van het model gelokaliseerd zijn. Een tweede dimensie die resulteerde uit de schaling analyse 
situeerde de items van de vragenlijsten op een dimensie die liep van interpersoonlijke naar meer 
intrapersoonlijke bezorgdheid over pijn en zijn gevolgen. De bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 3 suggereren 
dat het zinvol is om met verschillende angst en vreesconstructen te werken wanneer we de rol van 
deze constructen in pijn willen onderzoeken en dat het adequaat is om verschillende individuele 
vragenlijsten te gebruiken om de verschillende constructen uit het model te meten. 
In hoofdstuk	4 werd de relatie tussen de pijnrelevante fundamentele angsten (AS en IS) 
en het voorkomen van een automatische dreigassociatie ten aanzien van gezondheidsbedreigende 
en pijngerelateerde woordstimuli onderzocht. Deze vraagstelling was gefundeerd op de cognitieve 
informatieverwerkingstheorieën, die stellen dat automatische attitudes en associaties mogelijk 
betere voorspellers zijn voor spontane gedragingen (zo ook pijngedragingen) dan expliciet gemeten 
attitudes (bijv. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; McNally, 1995). De automatische dreigassociatie werd 
gemeten met de extrinsic affective simon task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003). In deze gecomputeriseerde 
taak worden automatische dreigassociaties indirect gemeten middels de registratie van reactietijden 
en fouten op een classificatie taak. In hoofdstuk 4 werden ook twee expliciete gedragsmaten 
meegenomen; het zelfgerapporteerde gebruik van gezondheidsdiensten (zoals medicatiegebruik, 
artsenbezoek etc.) en de zelfgerapporteerde neiging om gezondheidsbeschermende en 
proefschrift165x240_.indd   188 10-09-2007   10:56:15
		|18
At risk for pain
preventieve acties te ondernemen (zoals preventieve medische onderzoeken ondergaan of het 
mijden van plaatsen waar mogelijk ziektegevaar geldt). De resultaten tonen aan dat naarmate 
personen een hoger niveau van AS of IS bezitten, zij ook sterkere associaties bezitten tussen 
dreiging en woordstimuli die gerelateerd zijn aan pijn of ziekte. Daarnaast bleek er een verschil te 
bestaan in de voorspellende waarde van AS en IS voor de expliciete gedragsmaten. IS resulteerde 
als de enige voorspeller voor het ondernemen van gezondheidsbeschermende acties, terwijl AS 
de beste voorspeller was van het zelfgerapporteerde gebruik van gezondheidsvoorzieningen. 
Deze resultaten suggereren dat beide fundamentele angstconstructen gerelateerd zijn aan het 
bestaan van een automatische dreigassociatie ten aan zien van gezondheidsbedreigende en 
pijngerelateerde woorden, maar dat beide constructen differentieel bijdragen aan expliciet 
gerapporteerde gedragingen. 
Hoofdstuk	5	beschrijft een studie waarin onderzocht werd of er een inhoudsspecifieke 
relatie bestaat tussen verschillende angstgerelateerde persoonlijkheidsconstructen en een expliciete 
negatieve interpretatie bias voor ambigue situaties die overeenstemmen met de inhoud van deze 
specifieke constructen. In deze studie vulden gezonde vrijwilligers een aantal vragenlijsten in. De 
interpretatiebias werd gemeten met een vignet vragenlijst , de Body Sensations Interpretation 
Questionnaire (BSIQ: Clark et al., 1997), waarin 27 ambigue situaties geschetst worden in de 
volgende 4 domeinen: (i) paniekgerelateerde sensaties, (ii) andere lichamelijke symptomen, 
(iii), sociale gebeurtenissen en (iv) algemene gebeurtenissen. Daarnaast vulden de deelnemers 
vragenlijsten in die verschillende angst- en vreesconstructen uit het hiërarchisch model maten, 
namelijk trekangst, AS, IS, angst voor negatieve evaluatie, pijn catastroferen en vrees voor pijn. 
Eveneens werd optimisme gemeten. Resultaten van correlationele en multipele regressie analyses, 
met negatieve interpretatiescores op de vier BSIQ domeinen als afhankelijke variabelen toonden 
aan dat optimisme voorspellend was voor minder negatieve interpretaties op ieder domein. 
Bovendien resulteerden AS, IS, en angst voor negatieve evaluatie als de beste voorspellers voor 
negatieve interpretatiescores op het domein van respectievelijk paniekgerelateerde sensaties, 
andere lichamelijke symptomen en sociale gebeurtenissen. Wanneer specifieke aan pijn 
gerelateerde constructen (pijn catastroferen en pijngerelateerde vrees) aan het regressiemodel 
werden toegevoegd bleek overigens dat niet langer IS, maar wel deze laatst toegevoegde 
constructen voorspellend waren voor negatieve interpretaties in het domein van andere lichamelijke 
symptomen. Ondanks het correlationele karakter van de studie zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 5, 
wijzen deze resultaten in de richting van de aanwezigheid van een inhoudsspecifieke relatie tussen 
bepaalde angst- en vrees constructen en interpretatiefouten die specifiek zijn voor situaties die 
refereren naar de inhoud van deze angst of vrees. 
In hoofdstuk	 6 wordt onderzocht of individuele niveaus van pijngerelateerde 
angst en vrees geassocieerd zijn met een verhoogde tendens om ambigue situaties die een 
gezondheidsdreiging kunnen impliceren negatief te interpreteren op een automatisch niveau. 
Eerdere studies, waaronder die in hoofdstuk 5, toonden reeds aan dat pijnpatiënten of personen 
met een verhoogde mate van pijngerelateerde angst een negatieve interpretatiebias vertonen voor 
pijngerelateerd of gezondheidsbedreigend materiaal. Men kan zich echter afvragen in welke mate 
deze veelal expliciet gemeten interpretaties ook overeenkomen met de automatische en spontane 
interpretaties (cf. on-line interpretaties) die personen maken op het moment dat zij geconfronteerd 
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worden met ambiguïteit. Automatische interpretaties werden in hoofdstuk 6 indirect gemeten met 
behulp van een lexicaal beslissingsparadigma (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). 
Dit paradigma was gebaseerd op onderzoek in het domein van sociale angst en werd gemodificeerd 
voor toepasbaarheid binnen het domein van chronische pijn. Gezonde proefpersonen voerden de 
lexicale beslissingstaak uit en vulden tevens een aantal vragenlijsten in waarmee pijngerelateerde 
angst en vrees gemeten werden. De resultaten toonden aan dat, onafhankelijk van het niveau 
van angst of vrees, er een algemene tendens bestond voor het negatief interpreteren van de 
ambigue situaties die werden aangeboden in de lexicale beslissingstaak. Deze algemene 
interpretatiebias was gecorreleerd met de mate van pijngerelateerde vrees, maar niet met de andere 
persoonlijkheidsconstructen die gemeten werden in deze studie. In het discussiegedeelte van 
hoofdstuk 6 wordt beargumenteerd dat het waarschijnlijk is dat methodologische tekortkomingen , 
met name op het niveau van het gebruikte stimulusmateriaal, aan de basis liggen van de bevindingen 
uit dit hoofdstuk. Hoewel het lexicale beslissingparadigma op zich een veelbelovend paradigma lijkt 
voor het meten van spontane, automatische interpretaties, dient het aanbeveling dat dit paradigma 
verder afgestemd en gemodificeerd wordt in toekomstige studies om de toepasbaarheid ervan 
binnen het domein van chronische pijn te optimaliseren. 
Hoofdstuk	 7 van dit proefschrift gaat nader in op het onderbrekende en 
aandachtsopeisende karakter van pijn, het zogenaamde ‘interferentie-effect’ van pijn op aandacht 
(Crombez et al., 1996, 1998b; Crombez et al., 1999; Eccleston, 1994; Eccleston & Crombez, 
1999). Het interferentie-effect werd reeds veelvuldig onderzocht in voorgaande studies middels het 
primaire taakparadigma. Deze studies tonen aan dat pijn inderdaad aandacht opeist ten koste van 
andere cognitieve activiteiten, en dat onder andere de waargenomen dreigwaarde, de nieuwheid, 
en de temporele onvoorspelbaarheid van pijn dit effect beïnvloeden (Crombez et al., 1998a; Van 
Damme, Crombez, Eccleston, & Roelofs, 2004). Daarnaast blijkt het interferentie-effect meer 
uitgesproken te zijn bij personen die geneigd zijn om de betekenis en gevolgen van pijn uit te 
vergroten, zoals bijvoorbeeld het geval is bij personen die een verhoogd niveau van pijn catastrofen 
bezitten (Crombez et al., 1998a, 1998b; Van Damme, Crombez, Eccleston et al., 2004). De studie 
die beschreven staat in hoofdstuk 7 van dit proefschrift heeft enerzijds tot doel om deze eerdere 
bevindingen te repliceren, en anderzijds om na te gaan of het interferentie-effect ook gerelateerd 
kan worden aan niveaus van IS en AS. Het replicatie gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk was succesvol, 
en versterkt eerdere bevindingen over een verhoogd interferentie-effect van pijn op aandacht in 
personen die catastroferen over pijn. Het interferentie-effect bleek echter niet gerelateerd te zijn 
aan de mate van IS of AS. 
Hoofdstuk	 8	 beschrijft een studie waarin de mogelijk positieve invloed van twee 
cognitieve factoren, waargenomen controle en self-efficacy, op de pijnervaring onderzocht werd. 
Hiertoe werd een experiment opgezet waarbij zowel waargenomen controle als self-efficacy 
gemanipuleerd werden. Pijn werd geïnduceerd door het toedienen van een (afgestemde) elektrische 
pijnprikkel. Afhankelijk van de experimentele conditie waaraan de deelnemers willekeurig werden 
toegewezen, hadden zij al dan niet het idee dat de elektrische pijnprikkel controleerbaar was 
(manipulatie waargenomen controle) en of zij al dan niet goed in het toepassen van een techniek 
waarmee de pijnprikkel beïnvloed kon worden (manipulatie self-efficacy). Resultaten toonden aan 
personen die het idee hadden dat de pijnprikkel controleerbaar was over het algemeen minder 
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angst vertoonden voor de aankomende pijnstimulus. Daarnaast bleek geïnduceerde self-efficacy 
geassocieerd met een significante reductie in verwachte intensiteit en onplezierigheid van de 
aankomende pijnprikkel, en werd de relatie tussen SE en ervaren pijnintensiteit gemedieerd door 
de verwachte pijnintensiteit. De bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 8 tonen het belang aan van factoren 
als waargenomen controle en vooral self-efficacy in het bepalen van subjectieve responsen op 
een pijnervaring. Het wordt aanbevolen dat, om subjectieve aanpassing aan pijn te bekomen, 
pijnbehandelingen meer aandacht moeten schenken aan deze specifieke factoren.
Naast een samenvatting van de resultaten uit dit proefschrift, bevat hoofdstuk	 9	
een bediscussiëring van deze resultaten tegen de achtergrond van relevante literatuur die in 
dit onderzoeksdomein verschenen is. In hoofdstuk 9 wordt verder aandacht besteedt aan de 
beperkingen van de studies in dit proefschrift, de klinische implicaties van de bevindingen en het 
toelichten van aanbevelingen voor vervolgonderzoek. 
In het algemeen kan geconcludeerd worden dat de studies in dit proefschrift 
ondersteuning bieden voor de gehypothetiseerde rol van de angstgerelateerde constructen en 
informatieverwerkingsfouten die centraal stonden in dit proefschrift als mogelijke kwetsbaarheidfactor 
voor (chronische) pijn. Verder onderzoek zal moeten uitwijzen welke nu de precieze unieke, maar 
ook de interactieve, bijdrage van deze psychologische factoren is aan de ontwikkeling en het 
blijven voortbestaan van langdurige aspecifieke pijnklachten. 
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Dankwoord
Als je wil werken in de wetenschap, is – na je universitaire opleiding - een promotietraject de meest 
aangewezen te volgen weg. Die weg leidt dan naar een proefschrift, zoals het deze, dat je de 
nodige basiskennis en ervaring geeft om weer nieuwe wegen in te slaan. 
In de allereerste plaats is dit proefschrift voor mij een beschrijving en samenvatting van hetgeen 
waarmee ik mij in de afgelopen vier jaar met veel plezier en passie dagelijks heb mogen bezighouden. 
Daarbij heb ik het geluk gehad om tijdens die periode ondersteund, begeleid en gemotiveerd te 
worden door een aantal belangrijke mensen. Ere wie ere toekomt, en daarom wil ik mij in dit 
dankwoord richten tot al diegenen die, soms op heel directe wijze, en soms vanop een ietwat 
verdere afstand, hebben bijgedragen aan de tot stand koming van dit proefschrift. 
Madelon, als aanvrager en dus eerste bezieler van dit onderzoeksproject, stond jij de afgelopen 
vier jaar in voor mijn dagelijkse begeleiding. En er zijn periodes geweest waarin dit dagelijks echt 
letterlijk te nemen was! Dankzij je open-deur-beleid kon ik steeds bij je binnenlopen met eender 
welke vraag. En hoewel je eigen agenda doorheen de tijd steeds maar drukker en voller werd, 
was je nooit minder bereikbaar voor mij, en heb je er steeds voor gezorgd dat mijn manuscript-, 
presentatie-, en posterversies in een mum van tijd van feedback werden voorzien. Ik heb genoten 
van onze regelmatige brainstormsessies, waarin we op zoek gingen naar nieuwe onderzoeksvragen, 
alternatieve verklaringen voor op het eerste zicht vreemde resultaten, of het bedenken van gepaste 
onderzoeksdesigns. Ik heb veel respect voor jouw kwaliteiten als onderzoeker en als persoon: je 
gedrevenheid, je inhoudelijke diepgang en brede kennis van zaken; je eerlijkheid, betrokkenheid, 
enthousiasme en immer optimistische ingesteldheid. Je hebt mij de vrijheid en zelfstandigheid 
gegeven om van jouw oorspronkelijke onderzoeksproject mijn ‘eigen kindje’ te maken, en wanneer 
ik overvallen werd door twijfels of onzekerheid, was jij degene die mij weer deed geloven in mijn 
eigen kunnen, die mij aanmoedigde en haar vertrouwen in mij uitsprak. Tegen het einde van mijn 
aio-periode werd jij hoogleraar en bijgevolg ook officieel mijn eerste promotor. Ik ben trots, dankbaar 
en vereerd dat jij mijn mentor was, en dat ik als eerste ‘telg’ onder jouw eerste promotorschap mag 
worden opgetekend! 
Johan, ik ben blij dat jij mijn tweede promotor wilde zijn. Je stond in het begin van mijn project 
wat aan de zijlijn, maar vanop die plek heb je wel veel interesse getoond voor mijn bezigheden. 
Je was steeds bereid advies te geven, en naar het einde van mijn project toe zijn we ook nauwer 
gaan samenwerken, in de ‘kaartjesstudie’, en tijdens het afwerken van dit proefschrift natuurlijk. 
Ik vind het inspirerend en leuk om met jouw samen te werken. Jij bent iemand die aanvankelijke 
problemen met een kwinkslag en ongekende rust de kop indrukt, altijd vriendelijk en positief. 
Hoewel je een enorm druk bezet persoon bent, maak(te) je toch regelmatig de tijd om met mij te 
brainstormen over de betekenis en implicaties van de bevindingen uit mijn studies, om nieuwe 
denkpistes uit te werken, en plannen voor de toekomst op te zetten. Je bescheidenheid en ‘down-
to-earth-heid’ zijn jouw handelsmerk, en ik vind het bewonderenswaardig hoe je steeds op een 
(schijnbaar) dromerige, maar absoluut succesvolle, manier op zoek bent naar het letterlijke en 
figuurlijke verleggen van onderzoeksgrenzen! 
Madelon en Johan, jullie hebben beiden mede vorm gegeven aan de wetenschapper in mij! Ik kijk 
vol spanning en met veel plezier uit naar een gezamelijke samenwerking in de toekomst!
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Remco, tijdens het onderzoeksblok, mijn jaarwerkstuk en later ook mijn onderzoeksstage zag ik in 
jou iets dat ik ook graag wilde hebben, namelijk een ongekend enthousiasme voor en plezier in je 
werk. Jij wist het enthousiasme voor onderzoek op mij over te brengen, en vlak na mijn afstuderen 
was jij ook degene die mij stimuleerde en aanmoedigde om ook effectief verder te gaan in de 
wetenschap. Dank je wel daarvoor!
I would like to thank those who have collaborated with me throughout the design, data interpretation 
or writing process of the studies in this thesis. Gordon Asmundson, Geert Crombez, Jeffrey 
Roelofs, and Peter de Jong: many thanks for sharing your ideas with me and for the fast draft 
readings of manuscripts. Peter, aan verschillende studies uit dit proefschrift heb jij constructief 
meegewerkt en meegedacht. Tijdens ons eerste contact, zo’n 4 jaar geleden, was ik sterk onder 
de indruk van de snelheid (letterlijk èn figuurlijk) waarmee jij al mijn prangende vragen over de 
EAST en consoorten wist te beantwoorden. Jij bent de meest associatieve persoon die ik ooit ben 
tegengekomen, een gedegen en gerespecteerd onderzoeker, maar vooral ook een heel aardige 
en lollige man, die ergens vanuit het verre noorden van Nederland steeds bereid is om advies 
te geven, manuscriptversies op recordtempo door te lezen, alternatieve analyse methoden te 
bedenken en de motivatie erin te houden. Dank je wel!
I furthermore would like to express my gratitude to the members of the examination board for this 
dissertation, Jacques van Lankveld, Geert Crombez, Edmund Keogh, Maaike Cima, and Reinout 
Wiers, for taking the time to read and evaluate this thesis. 
Dank ook aan de studenten die, in het kader van hun bachelor of master thesis, vele uren 
gespendeerd hebben aan het testen van proefpersonen en het ingeven van data; maar ook aan 
het meedenken over opzet en resultaten van de studies die beschreven staan in dit proefschrift: 
Susan Gilissen, Nicole van den Ham, Vera Matti, Nathalie van Aken, Kristie van Montfort, Claudia 
Bongers en Miriam Egberink. Jullie inbreng was erg waardevol!
Zonder proefpersonen geen data, en zonder data, geen proefschrift! Daarom wil ik ook de 
vele proefpersonen bedanken die vrijwillig hebben deelgenomen aan één of meerdere van mijn 
experimenten. Een aantal onder jullie zijn zelfs bereid geweest om ‘voor het goede doel der 
wetenschap’ gepijnigd te worden met elektrische schokje!
Beste collega’s allemaal: aio’s van de oude en nieuwe garde, mensen van het secretariaat, wp-
ers en obp-ers: bedankt voor de vele plezierige momenten tussendoor, jullie bereidwilligheid om 
mijn vragen over vanalles-en-nog-wat te beantwoorden, de koffie-pit-stops, en de gezelligheid 
tijdens de frekwente ‘vlaai-momenten’, feestjes, borrels, of congressen. De collega’s van het 
tweewekelijkse somato-overleg, en van de pijngroep binnen CPS in het bijzonder: Hanne, Ivan, 
Jeroen, Johan, Karoline, Maaike, Madelon, Marielle, Petra, Saskia en Saskia. Het is een enorme 
luxe om deel uit te maken van deze groep, en om onderzoeksideeën en –resultaten met jullie te 
kunnen kortsluiten! Angela, bedankt voor het beantwoorden en oplossen van zovele declaratie, 
reisbudget, kamerruimte, en personele vragen/probleempjes! Charlie, jouw wil ik extra bedanken 
voor de tijd en energie die je steeds gestoken hebt in het programmeren en implementeren van 
mijn computertaakjes. 
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Lieve Jill: Toen ik net een paar maanden bij DMKEP aan het werk was, kwam Angela mij het 
volgende meedelen: “Linda, je gaat straks een nieuwe kamergenoot krijgen, het is een aardig 
Belgisch meisje, een perfecte match voor jou, denk ik”. Ze had helemaal gelijk! Ik had me geen 
beter kamergenootje kunnen wensen! De afgelopen vier jaar heb ik enorm veel aan jou gehad: een 
luisterend oor, pep-talks en steun wanneer het op persoonlijk of werk vlak even tegenzat, gedeelde 
frustraties wanneer de vertwijfeling toesloeg, samen analyses, hypotheses, review comments en 
presentaties onder de loep nemen, maar vooral en bovenal ook enorm veel plezier en gezelligheid: 
‘melige’ momenten aan het einde van de werkdag (eigenlijk gewoon op eender welk moment als 
de tijd ervoor rijp was), goede gesprekken tijdens lunch of microgolf-soepje tijd, mini kamer feestjes 
en een heus eigen kamerlied (hiep-hiep-hoi)! Sinds kort zijn we ‘van bureau en pc gescheiden’ en 
ex-kamergenootjes geworden. Maar we blijven natuurlijk vriendinnen en gelukkig ook collega’s, en 
ik ben blij dat jij straks als mijn paranimf naast me staat!
Katrijn, wij trekken al met mekaar op sinds onze studietijd, en zijn daarna beiden ‘blijven plakken’ 
binnen de Randwijck gebouwen, waardoor we ook collega’s werden. De afgelopen vier jaar 
gaven wij regelmatig rendez-vous voor een korte (en soms ook ietwat langere J) pauze, waarin 
dan vanalles en nog wat besproken werd: van het analyseren van impliciete taakparadigma’s en 
het overlopen van onze werkperikelen, tot de organisatie van trouw en –promotiefeest en het 
bespreken en plannen van aankoop,(ver)bouwen en inrichten van onze huisjes. Waar het ook 
precies over ging, deze intermezzo’s hebben mij altijd veel deugd gedaan, en vorm(d)en een leuke 
onderbreking van de dagelijkse werkactiviteiten. Bedankt daarvoor en natuurlijk ook omdat jij mijn 
andere paranimf wil zijn!
Mijn andere ‘Maastricht’ vriendinnetjes: Eva, Greetje, Tineke, Inne en Liesje. Ik vind het tof dat 
wij contact zijn blijven houden, en het is steeds leuk om elkaar weer te zien of te horen, en bij te 
babbelen tijdens etentjes of andere gelegenheden. Lieve Diana, ook jij hoort in dit groepje thuis. 
Veel te vroeg zijn jij jouw toekomstdromen en plannen je ontnomen, maar weet dat je met mij 
meereist in het realiseren van de mijne, je bent nog vaak in mijn gedachten! 
Ik wil ook alle vrienden en familieleden bedanken voor de interesse en betrokkenheid die zij getoond 
hebben voor mijn bezigheden. Inge, jij bent een goede en lieve vriendin bij wie ik altijd terecht 
kan, mercikes! De ‘barakkers’: bedankt voor de vele plezierige avonden, beach parties en wijntjes 
samen! Ons geregeld samenzijn betekent veel voor mij, en biedt een aangename afleiding en de 
broodnodige ontspanning...dat er nog vele van die activiteiten mogen volgen!! Sonja, naast het feit 
dat je een goede vriendin bent, wil ik jou extra bedanken voor het verzorgen van de omslag en lay-
out van mijn proefschrift! Zoals je intussen zelf hebt mogen ondervinden, ben ik zelf een ramp als 
het op opmaak-en grafische aspecten aankomt. Ik ben blij dat jij deze taak, waar ik als een berg 
tegenop zag, met zoveel plezier en inzet van mij hebt overgenomen! Het resultaat mag er zeker 
zijn!
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Papa en mama, jullie ben ik nog het meeste dank van iedereen verschuldigd. Het is dankzij de 
kansen die jullie mij gegeven hebben (en die heb ik soms risicovol bijna verspeeld; cf. mijn ‘feestjaren’ 
in Leuven), en het vertrouwen dat jullie mij geschonken hebben dat dit proefschrift er nu ligt. Jullie 
hebben ervoor gezorgd dat ik de persoon ben die ik nu ben, en jullie hebben mij de waarden en 
normen meegegeven die ik nu ook nastreef. Een promotietraject afwerken is leuk en belangrijk, 
maar wat mij betreft zijn familiale gezelligheid en steun toch nog steeds het allerbelangrijkste! 
Daarom wil ik jullie, papa en mama, maar ook jij, Kristel, mijn ‘grote zus’ en jij, Geert, mijn ‘kleine’ 
broertje J bedanken voor de gezelligheid, steun, en hulp die ik op alle vlak en alle momenten bij 
jullie kan vinden. Yvonne, Robert, Joeri, Sigrid, Jana, Brent, Werner, Tamara, Gunther en Leen, ook 
jullie maken zonder meer deel uit van die familiale gezelligheid, dank jullie wel!
Eddy, al meer dan 10 jaar ben jij mijn vaste rots in de branding, mijn man, die persoon die ik 
het liefst van al op deze wereld zie. De laatste maanden waren hectisch, en heb ik veel beroep 
gedaan op jouw (overigens indrukwekkende!) ‘echte-man-nieuwe-man’ kwaliteiten. Hoewel ik 
best aan deze situatie zou kunnen wennen J, beloof ik dat we het vanaf nu terug evenrediger 
gaan verdelen. Bedankt voor alles: je relativeringsvermogen, je steun, je liefde, en het feit dat je er 
gewoon altijd voor me bent!
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